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ABSTRACT 
 
 
AESTHETICS IN THE ECOTHEOLOGY OF SALLIE MCFAGUE: 
  
A CRITIQUE AND A PROPOSAL FOR A  
 
THEOLOGICAL AESTHETICS OF NATURE 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Mary-Paula Cancienne, RSM 
 
May 2009 
 
 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Marie Baird, Ph.D. 
 This dissertation focuses on the ecological theology of Sallie McFague, who, as 
part of her work, employs the use of aesthetics.  This study recognizes her contribution 
and then seeks to build upon it.   
 In aim of this goal, a limited history of aesthetics in the Western tradition is 
surveyed and attention is given to three significant contemporary scholars in the field of 
aesthetics and nature/environment (Emily Brady, Allen Carlson, and Arnold Berleant).  
While this work intended to propose the rudiments of a Theological Aesthetics of Nature, 
we find that nature and culture are so intertwined that what is initially called for is a 
framework for a Theological Aesthetics of the Environment that supports approaching the 
environment of nature and culture with a sense of the unknown and with questions. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The earth’s fragile habitats are imperiled and the list of causes is becoming 
increasingly familiar.  Among these are a growing human population; unbridled 
economic growth; over consumption; urbanization; pollution; global warming; and the 
apparent lack of comprehension or denial by many people regarding how profoundly 
humans are impacting Earth’s eco-systems. Yet, an increasing number of people have 
become aware that the power of humans to destroy Earth’s fragile habitats is outstripping 
Earth’s power to restore them.1  
Evidence of this shift in awareness can be seen in earlier efforts by some countries 
to reduce greenhouse gases, such as the “Kyoto Treaty,” as well as by mounting 
agreement by professionals of diverse disciplines that humans are responsible for damage 
to Earth’s environment.2  In 2007 there was a document released by the United Nations in 
which a broad consensus of scientists from around the world claim with ninety percent 
certainty that humans are to blame for global warming.3  Almost weekly one can read of 
new data that supports this claim.  It is no longer a question as to whether or not humans 
are causing harm to Earth’s biosphere.  Now the question concerns what we do about the 
situation. 
                                                 
     1Andrew C. Revkin, “Heat-Trapping Emissions Rise Globally,” The New York Times, 27 September 
2008, sec. A.  For example, see globalcarbonproject.org. 
     2The Kyoto Treaty was negotiated in December of 1997 under which industrialized countries will 
reduce greenhouse gases by approximately 5.2% compared to 1990 levels.  The United States and Australia 
have not signed on.  The treaty was revised in 2002.  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2233897.stm> (12 
March 2007). 
     3United Nations Intergovermental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007:  Physical Science 
Basis: Summary for Policymakers, February 2007, page 3.  <http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf> (19 
February 2007).   
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When scientists refer to the natural world or to “nature” they are usually speaking 
of the Earth’s biosphere—that part of the Earth and its atmosphere that is capable of 
supporting life and in which living organisms are found.  However, today the human 
species performs multiple roles in Earth’s biosphere and within its many ecosystems, 
resulting in “nature” becoming an increasingly complex intermingling of humans, human 
constructed domains, and non-human species and their habitats and environments.  
“Nature” cannot be understood or approached as an objective reality, not by science, 
economics, or by any other disciplines.  Rather, “nature” is a multifaceted social 
construct that has a significant role in a society’s culture.  Also, religion(s), as an 
important element of a society’s culture, contributes its (their) own part in how “nature” 
as a multifaceted construct is viewed and valued.  Often referring to it as “the creation,” 
religion is concerned with “nature,” both human and non-human.  In the twenty-first 
century, however, nature’s religious and theological significance is more and more 
complicated by increasing human activity.   
Many, including theologians, have responded to Earth’s increasingly threatened 
environment by helping us to see and grasp a more complex understanding of nature, and 
to understand our role and responsibility in caring for the health of Earth’s environment.  
One of these theologians is Sallie McFague.4 
Over several decades McFague has developed a theological analysis and a 
response to an imperiled Earth.  This emerges out of her examination of metaphor and 
images of God, where she ultimately makes the connection between how we envision 
God and how we understand and treat the Earth.  As her investigations continue she 
                                                 
     4Sallie McFague is Distinguished Theologian in Residence at the Vancouver School of Theology in 
British Colombia.  Prior to this she was Carpenter Professor of Theology at Vanderbilt Divinity School.  
 xi
directs her attention toward understanding our failed sensibilities and relationships with 
the Earth.  Her writings include God as friend in Metaphorical Theology: Models of God 
in Religious Language (1983), to various images in Models of God: Theology for an 
Ecological Nuclear Age (1987), to a panentheistic exploration in The Body of God: an 
Ecological Theology (1993).  She moves from an emphasis on metaphors of God to 
metaphors dealing with relational questions within the world as the body of God.  Her 
1997 book, Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature, investigates our 
attitudes, sentiments, and mental constructs of nature.   
McFague questions how we love nature, referring to the natural environment of 
Earth, especially as Christians.  In Super, Natural Christians she writes: “Christian 
practice, loving God and neighbor as subjects, as worthy of our love in and for 
themselves, should be extended to nature.”5  She advocates for a “subject-subjects” 
model where we do not see nature as an object(s), but rather that we engage nature as 
individual and particular subjects.6   
Each new book is a response to her previous one in that she addresses its 
shortcomings and tries to further her line of exploration.  Thus, in her 2001 book, Life 
Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril, she probes the issue 
of economics and North America’s consumerism, to the detriment of humanity and all of 
creation on the planet.  Between writing Super, Natural Christians and Life Abundant 
McFague realizes that “We do not love nature or care for two-thirds of the world’s people 
if we who are 20 percent of the population use more than 80 percent of the world’s 
                                                 
     5Sallie McFague, Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1997), 1.  
     6McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 3.  
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energy.”7  While McFague presses for a re-visioning of what the abundant life could 
mean within the world, metaphorically as the body of God, she does not bring forward 
work that she begins in Super, Natural Christians concerning aesthetics, which might be 
helpful in re-imagining the abundant life.   
 In Super, Natural Christians, while suggesting the use of writing as one way to 
explore experiences and to become aware and appreciative of the natural world (often 
referred to as “nature writing,” such as Annie Dillard’s essays), she says that science and 
aesthetics can help us to “pay attention” to nature as subjects in all of their particularity.  
Science “educates the eye,” asking us to become “apprentices” and “well informed 
friends.”8  Whereas the “aesthetic moment most basically is simply when one stops and 
looks at something for no reason other than interest in it.  Aesthetic interest is absorption 
in the particular, the individual: this stone with these particular markings which feels this 
way in my hand right now at this moment.”9  Scientific information along with 
imagination enlivens us toward nature; such that, “aesthetic attention, arrested attention” 
makes us “see them.”10 We become focused directly on the other.  Further, she writes: 
‘Nature as subject’ initially shocks, but, hopefully, it also causes a nod of 
acknowledgment.  Hence, the aesthetic rivets our attention on the other, but in a 
way that connects us to the other.  In other words, an aesthetic response to another 
is neither subjective nor objective, neither focused only on the self or only on the 
other, but on the connection of the self to the other.  But, and the ‘but’ is crucial 
here—on the other as other.  The interest is, as with scientific attention, primarily 
on the other, not the self.11    
                                                 
     7Sallie McFague, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2001), xii.  
     8McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 135. 
     9McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 135. 
     10McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 136.  
     11McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 136. 
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Her concern is that we engage nature as individual subjects, subjects to which we are 
both similar and dissimilar.  She claims that we do not have to objectify nature if what 
she names as the “loving eye” can be developed.12 
The loving eye, then, is the eye of the second naiveté, educated so as to 
help us embrace intimacy while recognizing difference.  This is the eye 
trained in detachment in order that its attachment will be objective, based 
on the reality of the other and not on its own wishes or fantasies.  This is 
the eye bound to the other as in an apprentice to a skilled worker, listening 
to the other as does a foreigner in a new country.  This is the eye that pays 
attention to the other so that the connections between knower and known, 
like the bond of friendship, will be based on the real subject in its real 
world.13 
 
She focuses on “intimacy and distance,” with both an “affection and respect for 
difference.”14  The difficulty, of course, becomes how to do this, what to do when you are 
paying attention, and what to do next. 
 Throughout Super, Natural Christians McFague both uses and alludes to aesthetic 
themes.  Sometimes she works with them directly, as with her comparison of the 
metaphors “landscape” and “maze,” for ways that we can think about nature.15  She 
prefers the image of a maze because, she contends, it does not lend itself to a single 
perspective.  However, she does not make much of a case for “maze” and her points 
against using the metaphor “landscape” for nature lacks contemporary dialogue.  In fact, 
she herself continues to use the metaphor “landscape.”16  The topic of “maze” never 
                                                 
     12McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 27, 28, 42, 43, 69, 77. 
     13McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 116.  
     14McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 116. 
     15McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 67-70. 
     16McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 107, 133, 165 “panorama.”    
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surfaces in Life Abundant.  While spending most of her aesthetic attention on sight, she 
then advocates for touch as the primary experience of nature.17   
 McFague, like contemporary culture, does not have a hard and fast definition for 
aesthetics or for art.  She understands aesthetics to be rooted in sense experience and 
values it as a way to sensitize our appreciation of creation.  In general, McFague is to be 
commended for bringing aesthetics into theological dialogue with attitudes and praxis 
concerning nature.  Yet, in Super, Natural Christians she does not go far enough, and in 
Life Abundant she engages economics and calls us to see and act in the world differently, 
but leaves aside aesthetics.  After reflection and feedback regarding Super, Natural 
Christians: How We Should Love Nature, one has to wonder if McFague thought her 
approach in this particular book was too naïve.  In her preface to Life Abundant she 
writes: “I realized love was not enough.”18   
 If this be the case, McFague is probably not alone when it comes to questioning 
how best to interject what some refer to as the “softer sciences” into academic and public 
discourse.  A place at the table for theology, and I venture to say for disciplines such as 
aesthetics, can sometimes be difficult to obtain.  However, in a contemporary world that 
is tied together so intensely with multi-media, especially visual media, and although 
aesthetics is more than visual experience, it would be gravely neglectful of theology to 
ignore the aesthetic role in a theology of nature for the twenty-first century.    
While art, aesthetics, and beauty have been understood as very distinct activities, 
they have also been spoken of synonymously.  As a way to enrich our investigation this 
                                                 
     17McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 91-95.  
     18McFague, Life Abundant, xi. 
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dissertation will begin by considering selective understandings of art, beauty, and 
aesthetics historically in the Western tradition, then moving to more contemporary 
understandings of aesthetics and the environment. 
 Toward this aim, McFague’s work provides a service in that she begins to explore 
a contemporary theology of nature that includes aesthetics in a way that is more than just 
an acknowledgement of possible contributions to be made by aesthetics.  Thus, this 
dissertation will examine her most recent works and with a hermeneutics of suspicion 
postulate what is missing and, finally, consider how to build on her work.   
 According to McFague, a contemporary theology of nature must grapple with the 
fact that humanity is not only dependent on the natural world, but in an ironic fashion, 
“the very air, water, trees, soil, [and] forests on which we depend now depend on us to 
manage them economically, that is, for the long-term well-being of the whole household 
of planet Earth.”19 As we increasingly become aware of our responsibilities to all of life 
on the planet, and not just to the growing human population, we realize the need for 
skills, methods, systems, and technology that could help us to conserve and preserve the 
natural world, as well as assist us in ethically planning and managing increasing 
dimensions of Earth’s environment.  As we do so, we need to continually ask how the 
natural world, humanity, and our social, constructed worlds could interact in better ways, 
in ways that are respectful of all of creation, or toward what McFague refers to as a re-
imagined “abundant life.”  Obviously, this line of questioning is not abstract.  
                                                 
     19McFague, Life Abundant, 102-103. 
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For example, it is estimated that beginning sometime in 2007 over half of the 
world’s people were living in urban areas.20  And, one of every three city residents in the 
world now live in slums.21  This migration to the world’s cities and urban areas where so 
many people live in squalor illustrates our need to imagine, design, construct, and 
manage complex natural, and social environments, and to do so with humility, respect, 
foresight, care, and justice.   
For the most part, in Super, Natural Christians, McFague focuses aesthetics 
primarily on personal and local experiences with the hope that these experiences will help 
train and guide one’s actions in larger arenas.  In Life Abundant she leaves this approach 
behind and, along with it, aesthetics.  Instead, she approaches the world and nature 
through economics.   
 However, in 2008 McFague wrote yet another book, A New Climate for Theology: 
God, the World, and Global Warming.22  In this text, written for a general audience, 
rather than an academic one, McFague distils and synthesizes her earlier material and 
focuses her major theological themes on global warming.  McFague continues to be 
intently focused on the poor, which now includes the natural world.  She reasserts her 
metaphor, the world as the body of God, but with particular attention to the global 
problem of climate change.  She calls, once again, for a new vision of God, the world, 
and of humanity.  Sustainability of the planet and justice for all of creation through an 
                                                 
     20Joan Lowry, “World City Dwellers to Outnumber Rural,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 8 April 2002, 
World News Section.  <http:www.post-gazette.com/world/20020406urbanworld0408p2asp>  (11 October 
2006). 
     21Eduardo Lopez Moreno and Rasna Warah, “The State of the World’s Cities Report 2006-7: Urban and 
Slum Trends in the 21st Century,” UN Chronicle Online Edition.  
<http://www.unorg/Pubs/chronicle/2006/issue2/0206p24htm>  (29 October 2006). 
     22Sallie McFague, A New Climate for Theology: God, Theology, and Global Warming (Minneapolis, 
Minn.: Fortress Press, 2008).   
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ecological economic paradigm with a different vision of God and humankind, remain her 
mission.  
Also, while McFague does not pursue aesthetics per se in her 2008 text, she does 
begin to use the term, aesthetics, in a way she has not previously done before.  This 
indicates that as McFague prepares A New Climate for Theology she reviews her previous 
appreciation and use of aesthetics.  Then, she massages her vision in light of global 
warming and her continued focus on sustainability, justice, and economics, as well as 
God, world, and anthropology.  However, the topic of aesthetics is not her aim and, in 
fact, the term does not appear in the index of the book.  Yet, her periodic use of the term 
in her 2008 text is telling and important for this study. 
 Furthermore, after examining McFague’s work, this dissertation will propose that 
approaching nature through theological aesthetics, especially one that is attentive to 
contemporary understandings of nature and aesthetics, could be one way of supporting 
critical appreciation and engagement of a twenty-first century environment.23  Some basic 
reasons include the following: 1) aesthetics has both personal and corporate 
characteristics; 2) aesthetics involves appreciation and creativity; 3) aesthetics is not 
outside diverse, complex understandings of nature, but integral to how humanity 
perceives nature and culture and to how humanity participates in shaping the overall 
environmental reality; 4) the role or place of aesthetics only grows as humanity has 
increasing responsibility in determining the shape and quality of a complicated 
                                                 
     23A search was done to see if anyone has written on Sallie McFague and her use of aesthetics concerning 
nature.  While several dissertations and theses concerning McFague’s work have been written, this search 
reveals that none have focused on this material.  However, it did show that in 1997 a dissertation called 
“Ecofeminism in a Postmodern Landscape: The Body of God, Gaia, and the Cyborg,” was written by Rita 
Marie Lester at Northwestern University, under the guidance of Rosemary Radford Ruether.  It included in 
its bibliography McFague’s 1997 book, Super, Natural Christians.  But the author does not reference 
McFague’s 1997 text in her writing, nor does she reference it in her notes.   
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environment on a planet with limitations.  This dissertation aims to show that a 
contemporary conversation that includes aesthetics, theology, and nature, spurred by 
McFague and with the help of others, could make a positive contribution in terms of how 
we perceive, understand, and approach the environment of an imperiled Earth.   
 Moreover, as we struggle to understand the gifts and limits of the natural world, 
we also wrestle with our own human limitations, sometimes failing to acknowledge that 
we even have them.  These can sometimes include our failure to understand and 
acknowledge when our preferred customs, practices, pleasures, economies, and 
ideologies are contributing to the devastation of the Earth’s environment.  The questions 
become: How are we to be creative?  How do we contribute in shaping and constructing 
viable, healthy, social, ecological environments?  How do we balance and integrate our 
responsibility for life on this planet amidst Earth’s limitations, our own limitations, and 
calls for justice?  How do we participate in on-going creation?   
 In light of such questions, Earth’s emerging reality requires of theology a more 
purposeful understanding of humanity’s capacity for participation in and responsibility 
for a world that is never static or fixed, but is dynamic and evolving.  Nature, in these 
times, includes a strikingly cultural, social, urbanizing, ecological environment.24   
   Thus, because of the inseparability of our constructed reality from the natural 
world on a planet that does have limitations, and because humanity has increasing 
determination regarding the future quality, shape, and health of Earth’s environment, this 
                                                 
     24Allen Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, second ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 541-555.  Carlson’s “environmental aesthetics” incorporates the natural 
world and the humanly constructed world, including art.   
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dissertation will argue that, to some degree, we are already engaging in a complex 
environment through aesthetics, whether or not we name it as such.  However, a  
twenty-first century aesthetics of nature that is inseparable from the humanly constructed 
environment is not about a static “picture” mentality, reminiscent of an appreciation for 
emotionally stimulating, grand picturesque landscapes, nor about an aesthetic formalism.  
Rather, this understanding of aesthetics while supporting awareness and appreciation, 
also promotes our participation in the health, design, and function of non-static dynamic 
environments where a broader understanding of nature envisions an on-going, evolving, 
complex environment.  Most importantly, today’s theological aesthetics must be 
concerned with a beauty that speaks of humility, justice, care, and of responsible actions 
fostering life both now and into the future.   
The use of aesthetics is not necessarily positive.  To be so a theological aesthetics 
of nature must speak to what McFague describes as prophetic and sacramental 
approaches to nature; that is, to the glory of God to be found in all of creation’s 
particularity, and of our desire to be “fully alive” in the midst of this “glory.”25  A 
theological aesthetics of nature would have to assist us in both appreciating how God’s 
“glory” overflows into and amidst nature, including its natural, constructed, and social 
realities, and how we are called and challenged to use our creative capacities to care for 
and to participate well in on-going creation.  It would have to encourage sensitivity for 
deep beauty, a beauty known to be possible, no matter how fleeting, but also experienced 
as missing.  It would have to nurture our capacity to weep and to act for each other, all 
kinds of others.  
                                                 
     25McFague, Life Abundant, 3, 201-202.    
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One way this study will work to further McFague’s efforts will be to engage with 
scholars who are writing specifically in the area of aesthetics and nature.  Particular 
writers to be highlighted are Allen Carlson, Emily Brady, and Arnold Berleant.  Carlson 
advocates for an aesthetic understanding that involves common sense and science.26  He 
attempts to perceive and appreciate nature for what it is.  This view gives science a 
central role in an aesthetics of nature.27  However, there are some who take exception to 
Carlson and his insistence on the need for science to be so central in an aesthetics of 
nature.    
 Brady, for instance, values appreciating nature as it presents itself, but she does 
not believe that scientific information is necessary in order to do this.  Rather, she places 
in high regard the role of the imagination for how we appreciate nature.28  And, while 
Berleant is more accepting of Carlson’s opinion, he emphasizes that the melding of the 
natural environment and the human results in nothing less than a “social aesthetics.”29  
These authors will both agree and challenge positions argued by McFague.   
 This dissertation will, in the end, attempt to build on McFague’s work by 
pursuing a way to bring theological and secular views on aesthetics and nature, in light of 
the overall environment, into dialogue.  The purpose of this aim is to support a deeper 
appreciation of the natural world and to encourage greater responsibility for how we act 
                                                 
     26Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture 
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 6-7, 11-13.  
     27Allen Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, second ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 548-551.  Also, Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment: The 
Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture (New York: Routledge, 2000).   
     28Allen Carlson, “Budd and Brady on the Aesthetics of Nature,” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 55, 
no. 218 (January 2005): 106-107. 
     29Arnold Berleant, “Getting Along Beautifully: Ideas for Social Aesthetics,” in Aesthetics and 
Environment: Variations on a Theme (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing), 147-161. 
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creatively in the shaping of the environment that is an increasingly complex integration 
of nature and culture.   
 
Anticipated Contribution 
 As the human population anticipates nine billion people by 2050,30 the role of 
humans in shaping the global environment will only expand.  How we engage, perceive, 
appreciate, and respond to a twenty-first century environment presently marked with 
increasing tensions, will significantly contribute to determining what kind of world we, 
and those after us, live in.  While there is a body of literature concerning aesthetics and 
nature, there are minimal writings on theological aesthetics and nature, especially 
concerning contemporary understandings of aesthetics and nature.  McFague’s writings, 
while not providing a systematic approach to aesthetics, do provide significant and 
focused material where aesthetics and ecotheology are engaged within a Christian 
tradition.  Thus, McFague’s writings will be analyzed in terms of how they contribute to 
the development of a theological aesthetics of a twenty-first century nature/environment.   
A contemporary theological aesthetics that realizes the manifold dimensions of 
nature might be able to assist us with apprehending and appreciating the interrelatedness 
of creation, as well as its multiplicities, paradoxes, and challenges.  And it may encourage 
us to contribute ethically in its evolution.  A contemporary theological aesthetics may 
also have something to offer late modernity/post-modernity in terms of re-dimensioning 
how we see and experience the world, as opposed to what is sometimes described as a 
flatness of experience, resulting from more exclusively cognitive approaches.  
                                                 
     30United Nations, 2005.  < http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp>  (13 January, 2007).  This estimate is 
based on a medium variant.  But this increase in population could happen as early as 2030.  Earth’s human 
population is presently just over 6.5 billion. 
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A dissertation and book search show no comparable studies of this topic to date. It 
is a hope that this dissertation will call attention to the need for aesthetics in theology 
regarding nature and the overall environment.  Also, it is hoped that it will contribute to 
the growing awareness of the importance of perceiving, understanding, and engaging the 
overall environment in ways that support the flourishing of life, justice, and peace.  
 To carry out the aims of this dissertation, the methodology will be to apply a 
hermeneutics of suspicion to Sallie McFague’s ecological theology. This hermeneutical 
strategy will encompass her attention to aesthetics in her theology.  The second major 
move will be to compare and contrast her understandings of aesthetics and its role in her 
ecological theology with selected scholars who focus on aesthetics and nature. The final 
major hermeneutical strategy will be constructive, culminating in a proposed initial 
framework for a theological aesthetics of nature/environment. 
 Chapter one will provide selective information regarding the ancient Greek use of 
aesthetics, followed by theology and aesthetics, and, lastly, aesthetics and nature.  It will 
help locate this dissertation within a historical conversation and set a context for this 
study as a whole.  
 Chapter two’s task will be to describe the trajectory of Sallie McFague’s theology 
with particular attention to her treatment of metaphor and how it operates in her writings 
on nature.  It will examine where and how aesthetics plays a part in McFague’s writings, 
whether or not named as such.  Next, the task will be to understand McFague’s overt 
contributions to a theological aesthetics of nature, especially in her later texts.   
 Chapter three will examine three major voices from the discipline of aesthetics: 
Emily Brady, Allen Carlson, and Arnold Berleant.  The guiding questions will be: What 
 xxiii
contributions can they make to a theological aesthetics of nature?  In what ways do they 
improve or challenge McFague’s writings?  How is theological aesthetics enhanced by 
contemporary understandings of nature and aesthetics offered by Brady, Carlson, and 
Berleant?   
 Chapter four will describe an initial framework for a contemporary theological 
aesthetics of the environment that includes nature and culture.  Building on the work of 
Sallie McFague and others, and by raising questions for further study, this dissertation 
intends to encourage a vision of life that is sustainable and just for all of creation.  
 1
Chapter One 
 
What is Aesthetics in Relation to Theology and Nature? 
 
  To assess critically Sallie McFague’s aesthetic treatment of nature and to propose 
an initial framework for a theological aesthetics of nature/environment, it will be 
necessary to understand historical meanings and relationships between aesthetics, nature, 
and theology.  Thus, this chapter will examine the terms “aesthetics” and “nature,” 
drawing from select ideas and writings representative of positions that have influenced 
Western understandings.  Although this chapter will not supply a comprehensive 
treatment of aesthetics and nature, it will provide a limited survey of the evolution of 
these terms and a cadre of their meanings, drawing on primary and secondary sources.   
 Initially we will examine aesthetics starting with ancient Greek philosophies, 
particularly their most influential thinkers, Plato and Aristotle.  Here we see that 
questions and values concerning measurement and harmony, reason and the ideal, 
imitation and ethics, come into play regarding how we perceive beauty, the proper 
“nature” of things, and the responsibility of humans to use their creativity well.  Next, we 
move from an early Hebrew sense of beauty that is closely connected to God’s “glory” 
and with living righteously, to a representative sampling of Christian ideas on beauty and 
aesthetics that, among other things, recalls Plato’s idea of splendor.  This chapter will 
conclude with an exploration of aesthetics and nature, pointing out how a hierarchy of 
realms led us to favor the spiritual realm, or the world of ideas, over and against the 
natural world. 
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 This survey is important for several reasons.  First, it can provide information 
regarding the roots of some of our assumptions about the terms.  Second, it may help to 
highlight limited understandings concerning some of our assumptions about aesthetics, 
nature, and theology.  Third, it may provide some point of view that needs to be re-
claimed as part of the ongoing dialogue regarding aesthetics, nature, and theology.  
A.  Aesthetics and the Ancient Greeks 
 The meaning of aesthetics, and its related terms, has evolved over time and 
continues to do so.  As we examine its evolution, it will be useful to notice how aesthetics 
treats subject and object; relationships; repose and dynamism; perception and 
interpretation; creativity; value; reason and emotion; imagination; ethics; and the material 
world.  Although aesthetics is more than about beauty, beauty remains especially 
important to aesthetics.  
 Historically, beauty was often associated with measurement and justice, showing 
concern for moderation, symmetry, and harmony.1  Greek art often focused on an 
ephemeral ideal of the human body, but, as such, there was no perfect prototype to copy.  
Thus, they composed by way of a synthesis of excellent examples of certain parts of 
living bodies.  They created a “synthesis that became the vehicle for the expression of a 
psychophysical Beauty that harmonized body and soul.”2  Examining Greek sculpture 
Umberto Eco writes: “This Beauty finds its finest expression in static forms, in which a 
                                                 
     1Umberto Eco, ed., History of Beauty (New York: Rizzoli, 2004), 37.  Eco is President of the Scuola 
Superiore di Studi Umanistici, University of Bologna.  He has written and lectured extensively on subjects 
related to aesthetics, semiotics, linguistics, and morality.  The volume being cited is an historical 
investigation and commentary on the meaning of beauty by Eco in which he breaks down his study by 
periods and topics and chooses excerpts from original writings from those significant periods.  His 
commentary and selection of excerpts is accompanied by illustrations of art works that help to 
communicate the meaning of beauty for those times.  The capitalization of “Beauty” is Eco’s.   
     2Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 45. 
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fragment of action or movement finds equilibrium and repose, and for which simplicity 
of expression is more suitable than a wealth of detail.”3 
 The ancient Greeks explored the connections between beauty, virtue, 
measurement, reason, the making of things, the imagination, and the senses.   However, 
Eco referring to classical Greek thought writes: 
[W]e can talk of an early understanding of Beauty, but it was a Beauty 
bound up with the various arts that conveyed it, devoid of any unitary 
stature: in paeans Beauty is expressed as the harmony of the cosmos, in 
poetry it is expressed as that enchantment that makes men rejoice, in 
sculpture as the appropriate measure and symmetry of its elements, and in 
rhetoric as the right phonetic rhythm.4  
 
Beauty, aesthetics, and art, inclusive of various crafts and technical skills, have at times 
been understood as synonymous terms, somewhat related terms, as well as distinctly 
different terms.  However, in ancient times aesthetics and beauty were in close proximity 
to one another and held in far more esteem than was art, craft making, and the technical 
skills.  This kind of early diminishment of the arts and earthy materiality can be found in 
Plato’s writings. 
 1.  Plato   (429-347 B.C.E.) 
 The philosopher Plato can be understood as focusing primarily on two main 
concepts of beauty.  His first is described as “harmony and proportion between the parts,” 
and the second as “splendor.”5  His understandings of harmony, proportion, and splendor 
are found imbedded throughout his writings and they help give guidance for how things 
could be as one aspires toward what he considers the spiritual, ideal Forms.  Plato, 
centuries later, will be called a moralist; that is, one who believes if something has a 
                                                 
     3Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 45.  
     4Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 41. 
     5Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 49. 
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moral flaw then it has an aesthetic flaw as well.6  In their introduction to Plato’s texts, 
Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns write: 
Among the arts, the highest is that of the divine maker (the Demiurgos) 
who composed the universe as an imitation of Ideas or unchanging Forms.  
Like him, the statesman, most exalted of human makers, envisages the 
human community according to the Ideas of justice, the good, courage, 
temperance, and the beautiful.7    
 
In light of the Forms being expressed in material reality, Plato contends that there is a 
divine maker and there are human makers as well.   
 In Plato’s Sophist the stranger says that the “products of nature, as they are called, 
are works of divine art, as things made out of them by man are works of human art. 
Accordingly, there will be two kinds of production: one human, the other divine” (265e).8  
He further states that the divine produces originals as well as “the image that in every 
case accompanies it” (266c). The stranger explains: 
 -Stranger:  I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out of 
 which things are made—fire, water, and the like—are known by us to be each 
 and all the creation and work of God. 
 -Theaetetus:  True. 
 -Stranger:  And there are images of them, which are not them, but which 
 correspond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful skill. 
 -Theaetetus:  What are they? 
 -Stranger::  The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, 
 such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection which is 
                                                 
      6Emily Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama 
Press, 2003), 248.  Emily Brady is vice-president of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, 
associate editor of the journal, Environmental Values, and a professor at the University of Edinburgh. 
<http://www.geos.ed.ac.uk/homes/ebrady/> (17 February 2008).   
     7Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, eds., Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Selected Readings in 
Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 4.  
     8Plato, “Sophist,” trans. F.M. Cornford, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 1013.  All further excerpts from Plato’s 
writings will be from this volume, except where otherwise noted.  Numbers in parentheses indicate 
paragraph citation markings. 
 5
 produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets on their surface with 
 an external light and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight.9  
              Sophist (266b) 
Plato hints of a rich mythic belief system that operates even as his writings begin to give 
voice to a different kind of rationality.  He reasons that the divine and human makers 
each produce “originals” and “images” (266a-d).  Production, here, is defined as “any 
power that can bring into existence what did not exist before” (265b).   
 While assigning to both the divine and to humans the capacity to produce, or to 
make “originals” as well as “images,” or what he in addition calls “actual things” and 
“likenesses” (266d),10 Plato says that there are two different kinds of human art, the 
productive and the acquisitive (265a).11  But, it is by way of productive art that we come 
to imitation (265a-b), for within the human production of images he distinguishes 
between the production of “likenesses” and “semblances” (264c, 266d).  Plato does not 
trust semblances because he thinks they are deceptive. 
 Certain of the fact that there can be false images, just as there can be false 
statements; Plato surmises in the Sophist that there can exist “an art of deception” (264d). 
Accordingly, within dubious “semblances,” there are two kinds (267a). One is a 
semblance that is made with tools, and another, focusing on the whirly-ness of the 
sophist, happens when “someone uses his person or voice to counterfeit.”  This Plato 
calls “mimicry” (267a).   
                                                 
     9Plato, “Sophist,” trans. Benjamin Jowett, in Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Selected Readings in 
Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger, eds. Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1964), 47.  
      10cf. Plato, “Sophist,” trans. Benjamin Jowett, in Philosophies of Art and Beauty, 47.  In Jowett’s 
translation he uses the words “originals” and “images,” but also “things themselves” and “likenesses.” 
     11“Acquisitive” refers to “hunting” and other such skills (Sophist 265a). 
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 Mimicry, itself, has two forms.  The first shows some degree of knowledge, the 
second example does not.  The first he calls “mimicry by acquaintance” and the second, 
“guided by opinion,” he calls “conceit mimicry” (267d-e).   
 Because Plato holds in contrast the ideal, spiritual, and unchanging Forms over 
against imperfect material reality, there exists a substantial dualism in his philosophy.  
This mode of thinking further pervades his thoughts on mimesis.  Plato has greater regard 
for what is original, and for that which has most knowledge of the original, as opposed to 
that which is not original or at a distance from it.   
divine artist     (Sophist 265d) human artist 
  
 
divine 
productions/art 
 human 
productions/art 
acquisitive12 
(265a) 
                                
 
Originals images  (266a-d) originals images   (265a-b) 
        |            |         also described as         |                          |      
actual things 
(266d) 
likenesses actual things likenesses 
                                                                                                      
          
likenesses  (264c- 
266d) 
semblances 
 
                                                                                                                          
                   
by tools 
(267a) 
mimicry 
             
         
mimicry by 
acquaintance (267e)   
mimicry guided by 
opinion 
 
Figure 1.  Plato: Divine and human art—originals and images, to mimicry13  
                                                 
     12“Acquisitive” refers to “hunting” and other such skills (Sophist 265a). 
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 Plato is fearful of distortions.  While he maneuvers over evermore minutia he 
advocates, though in different ways, for openness to the Forms, certainly the virtuous 
Forms.  Thus, in Phaedrus, he tells how the soul will journey differently on earth 
depending on how much it has seen: 
In her first birth she shall not be planted in any brute beast, but the soul 
that hath seen the most of being shall enter into the human babe that shall 
grow into the seeker after wisdom or beauty, a follower of the Muses and 
a lover; the next, having seen less, shall dwell in a king that abides by law, 
or a warrior and ruler; the third in a statesman, a man of business, or a 
trader; the fourth in an athlete, or physical trainer, or physician; the fifth 
shall have the life of a prophet or a Mystery priest; to the sixth that of a 
poet or other imitative artist shall be fittingly given; the seventh shall live 
in an artisan or farmer; the eighth in a Sophist or demagogue; the ninth in 
a tyrant. 
 
Now in all these incarnations he who lives righteously has a better lot for 
his portion, and he who lives unrighteously a worse.14                   
       Phaedrus  (248d-e) 
 
The closer you are to having seen what is most important, the greater the distance you are 
from semblance and tyranny, as well as from soil and dirt.  And, although he values the 
statesman, who is the major builder, he unfailingly asserts the value of the spiritual realm 
over material reality. Again, in Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates says: 
Beauty it was ours to see in all its brightness in those days when, amidst 
that happy company, we beheld with our eyes that blessed vision, 
ourselves in the train of Zeus, others following some other god; then were 
we all initiated into that mystery which is rightly accounted blessed 
beyond all others; whole and unblemished were we that did celebrate it, 
untouched by the evil that awaited us in days to come; whole and 
unblemished likewise, free from all alloy, steadfast and blissful were the 
spectacles on which we gazed in the moment of final revelation; pure was 
the light that shone around us, and pure were we, without taint of that 
                                                                                                                                                 
     13Figure 1 by Mary-Paula Cancienne.  cf. Plato’s Sophist.  Also, Measurement has two forms: The first 
concerns relation to an other, and the second concerns a standard (Statesman 238d).      
     14Plato, “Phaedrus,” trans. R Hackforth, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 495.   
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prison house which now we are encompassed withal, and call a body, fast 
bound therein as an oyster in its shell.15                       Phaedrus (250b-c) 
 
In soul’s earthly existence, then, there “dwells no luster” (250b).  For Plato, splendor 
remains at a distance. 
 With splendor muted, what is required is a commitment to the “art of 
measurement,” which has two forms: the first involving relation to another, and the 
second concerning a standard (Statesman 283d).16  Measurement refers to a just right 
tempo, length, rhythm, shape, emotion, action, and is determined in relation to all 
elements involved.  Further, measurement is determined according to ideal criteria.  
Proper measurement involves negotiated realities, following along the lines of ideal 
Forms.  But Plato, himself, did not originate the idea of order and beauty according to 
measure.  Pythagoras, (c. 570-495 B.C.E.) who left no writings, but instead a league of 
Pythagorians, emphasized order’s importance in beauty.  Eco points out: 
Pythagoras (who in the course of his travels probably came into contact 
with the mathematical reflections of the Egyptians) was the first to 
maintain that the origin of all things lay in numbers.  The Pythagoreans 
had a sort of holy dread of the infinite and of that which cannot be reduced 
to a limit, and so they looked to numbers for the rule capable of limiting 
reality, of giving it order and comprehensibility.  Pythagoras marks the 
birth of an aesthetico-mathematical view of the universe: all things exist 
because they are ordered and they are ordered because they are the 
realization of mathematical laws, which are at once a condition of 
existence and of Beauty.17 
  
 Interestingly, Pythagoras supposedly believed that harmony consisted of odds and 
evens, males and females, opposites, conflicts where there is only one side that is in fact 
                                                 
     15Plato, “Phaedrus,” trans. R Hackforth, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 496-497. 
     16Plato, “Statesman,” trans. J.B. Skemp, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 1050.   
     17Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 61.  
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“good or beautiful; the elements placed in opposition to them represent error, evil, and 
disharmony.”18  However, it was Heraclitus (c. 500 B.C.E.) who questioned this view and 
offered something surprisingly different.  According to Eco, Heraclitus suggested: 
[I]f the universe contains opposites, elements that appear to be 
incompatible, like unity and multiplicity, love and hate, peace and war, 
calm and movement, harmony between these opposites cannot be realized 
by annulling one of them, but by leaving both to exist in a state of 
continuous tension.  Harmony is not the absence of but the equilibrium 
between opposites.19  
 
Heraclitus taught that beauty is not limited to perceptibility and sensibility.  He even 
taught that the “harmonious Beauty of the world manifests itself as random flux.”20 
 However, regarding Plato, we see that he incorporates into his thinking a concern 
for measurement with the belief that there is something more than the physical ability to 
measure, or to see and to hear.  He suggests the soul’s ability to see with the “mind’s 
eye.”21    
 Writing in the fifth and fourth century B.C.E., Plato writes in the Symposium of 
the wise woman Diotima and of her lesson to Socrates on love and beauty.  Diotima says 
that if life is ever worth living it is when one has “attained” the “vision of the very soul of 
beauty” (211d).22  In Plato’s text Socrates recounts Diotima saying: 
[I]f it were given to man to gaze on beauty’s very self—unsullied, 
unalloyed, and freed from the mortal taint that haunts the frailer loveliness 
of flesh and blood—if, I say, it were given to man to see the heavenly 
beauty face to face, would you call his, she asked me, an unenviable life, 
whose eyes had been opened to the vision, and who had gazed upon it in 
true contemplation until it had become his own forever?  
                                                 
     18Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 72. 
     19Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 72. 
     20Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 56. 
     21Eco, ed., History of Beauty, 41.  
     22Plato, “Symposium,” trans. Michael Joyce in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 563. 
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And remember, she said, that it is only when he discerns beauty itself 
through what makes it visible that a man will be quickened with the true, 
and not the seeming, virtue—for it is virtue’s self that quickens him, not 
virtue’s semblance.  And when he has brought forth and reared this perfect 
virtue, he shall be called the friend of god, and if ever it is given to man to 
put on immortality, it shall be given.              Symposium (211e-212a)23 
 
 According to Christopher Janaway writing on Plato’s aesthetics, “the ideal lover 
is portrayed as ascending through a hierarchy of love-objects—first the beautiful body of 
a particular human beloved, then all beautiful bodies equally, then the beauty of souls, 
then that of laws, customs and ideas—and ending as a lover of wisdom or philosopher.”24 
Again, Diotima explains to Socrates:  
Starting from individual beauties, the quest for the universal beauty must 
find him ever mounting the heavenly ladder, stepping from rung to rung—
that is, from one to two, and from two to every lovely body, from bodily 
beauty to the beauty of institutions, from institutions to learning, and from 
learning in general to special lore that pertains to nothing but the beautiful 
itself—until at last he comes to know what beauty is.     
                Symposium (211c)25 
 
 Where Plato advocates for a wide horizon on the one hand, at least for the likes of 
Socrates, for the more plebian sort he would prefer that their horizon be proscribed.  His 
concern is that those who are not philosophers will involve themselves, and others, in 
thoughts and actions that are not guided by reason.26  The imagination should not run 
wild.  Instead, beauty entails not only measurement and standard, but it partakes of 
rationality as well. 
                                                 
     23Plato, “Symposium,” trans. Michael Joyce in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 563. 
     24Christopher Janaway, “Plato,” in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd ed., eds. Berys Gaut and 
Dominic McIver Lopes (New York: Routledge, 2002), 9. 
     25Plato, “Symposium,” trans. Michael Joyce in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 562-563. 
     26Janaway, “Plato,” 3-4, 6. 
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 One may ask, how do reason and emotions affect our desires, perceptions, 
interpretations, and creations, be they concerning our relationships, artifacts, laws, 
institutions, or other kinds of human design?  How do we balance the cognitive and 
rational with imagination and emotion in terms of perception, appreciation, and 
creativity?   
 Reflecting on Plato’s thoughts on creativity, Janaway writes: “All love desires 
some kind of offspring.  The highest form of love catches hold of a superior object and 
produces a superior offspring,” as explained by Diotima in the Symposium (211e-212a).27  
He recalls in the Republic how Plato favors the makings of the philosopher.  Janaway 
writes: “While the poet makes only images, and understands only images, the 
philosopher, who strives for and encounters the eternal unchanging Beauty, can bring 
genuine goods into the world because he understands what virtue is.”28  However, with 
the aide of the muses the poet can exhibit a kind of brilliant madness.29  
 Of course, it is not just poetry that receives Plato’s scrutiny, the plastic arts, those 
that use tools, receive his scrutiny as well (Sophist 267a).30  In the following important 
passage from the Republic, Socrates ponders other potential threats: 
Is it, then, only the poets that we must supervise and compel to embody in 
their poems the semblance of the good character or else not write poetry 
among us, or must we keep watch over the other craftsmen, and forbid 
them to represent the evil disposition, the licentious, the illiberal, the 
graceless, either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any 
other product of their art, on penalty, if unable to obey, of being forbidden 
to practice their art among us, that our guardians may not be bred among 
symbols of evil, as it were in a pasturage of poisonous herbs, lest grazing 
                                                 
     27Janaway, “Plato,” 9-10.  
     28Janaway, “Plato,” 10.  
     29Janaway, “Plato,” 11.  See Plato’s Ion (534a-b). 
     30Plato, “Sophist,” Francis Macdonald Cornford in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 1015. 
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freely and cropping from many such day by day they little by little and all 
unawares accumulate and build up a huge mass of evil in their own souls.  
                   Republic (401b-c)31 
 
Creativity for the thrill and sake of creativity does not hold sway with Plato.  But in 
Phaedrus he is a bit more favorably disposed to the artist’s path.   
 Herein, Socrates even “‘praises ‘madness,’ explicitly including the state of mind 
in which good poets compose, ‘a Bacchic frenzy’ without which there is no true 
poetry.”32   James A. Martin says that an artist’s talents can be considered a “gift 
(charisma) or an inspiration unique to the artist’s ‘genius’.”33  But this “gift” can be 
dangerous, going too far in either of two directions: 
Unordered variety threatened to induce Dionysian chaos, unvaried form 
threatened to produce Apollonian deadness (to borrow a contrast later 
celebrated my Nietzsche).  Thus was born that ‘classical formalism’ that 
would inform Kant’s concept of beauty and would constitute, for Hegel 
and others, the norms of the highest achievements of art in the spiritual life 
of humankind.34 
 
 Plato realized both the constructive and the unruly dimensions of creativity.  
Generally, however, one could easily perceive Plato’s efforts as oppositional to the arts; 
yet, it is important to note the means by which Plato confronts and engages his audience.  
Janaway contends that while Plato is working to steer his culture in a different direction, 
                                                 
     31Plato, “Republic,” trans. Paul Shorey in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 646. 
     32Janaway, “Plato,” 11. 
     33James Alfred Martin, Beauty and Holiness: The Dialogue between Aesthetics and Religion (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 13.  Martin taught at Union Theological Seminary where he was a 
Danforth Professor of Religion, and he was Professor Emeritus of Philosophy of Religion at Columbia 
University.  He died in 2007.  The relationship of aesthetics and religion, or beauty and holiness, played a 
central role in his investigations.  This particular work draws attention to how certain cultures have 
understood beauty as rooted in morality, where for others, beauty itself speaks of virtue.  Contemporary 
cultures can be seen to wrestle with certain assumptions and distinctions.  Questions regarding nature are 
not excluded from these tensions.  
     34Martin, Beauty and Holiness, 13. 
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he also employs that culture’s very practices, its poetic craft, in order to do so.35  In 
addition, while Plato might prefer that those involved in crafting, teaching, and 
persuading be guided by philosophers who are more familiar and committed to truth, 
beauty, and goodness, he calls more than just philosophers to the task of reason: 
[W]e must look for those craftsmen who by the happy gift of nature are 
capable of following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young 
men, dwelling as it were in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from 
all things about them, whence the influence that emanates from works of 
beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze that brings for 
wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly guide 
them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason.  
       Republic (401c-d)36  
 
 But perhaps it is Diotima in the Symposium who gives us the clearest indication of 
the beauty to which Plato longs: 
It is an everlasting loveliness which neither comes nor goes, which neither 
flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same 
then as now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to every 
worshiper as it is to every other. 
 
Nor will his vision of the beautiful take the form of a face, or of hands, or 
of anything that is of the flesh.  It will be neither words, nor knowledge, 
nor a something that exists in something else, such as a living creature, or 
the earth, or the heavens, or anything that is—but subsisting of itself and 
by itself in an eternal oneness, while every lovely thing partakes of it in 
such sort that, however much the parts may wax and wane, it will be 
neither more nor less, but still the same inviolable whole.   
                    Symposium (211a-b)37  
 
 According to Martin, Plato relied upon mathematical and geometrical models, 
such as the triangle, as a way to speak about the eternal Forms whose images in the 
temporal world change.  However, no perfect version or model exists; yet, we “must 
                                                 
     35Janaway, “Plato,” 12-13. 
     36Plato, “Republic,” trans. Paul Shorey in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 646. 
     37Plato, “Symposium,” trans. Michael Joyce in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 562. 
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look” to these if we are to “achieve the goals of truly human life.”38  Martin contends that 
Plato’s search is not passive: 
It is infused and motivated by an active process that is in many respects 
like that of artistic creation; indeed, it is the basic drive underlying that 
and all other forms of creation.  It is eros, or love.  Artistic creation is 
good if and only to the extent that it takes its ordered place in the more 
fundamental work of love in relation to its ultimate object.39 
 
This “ultimate” is the good, it is excellence in everyway.40  More so, “the highest and 
most powerful reflection of that total excellence or perfection which is the Good is the 
Beautiful.”  And this “Beauty” is the “chief propadeutic to the Good.”41  That is, it offers 
by its loveliness an invitation to the good and a place for learning to begin.   
 Moreover, Eco asserts that for Plato, “Beauty has an autonomous existence, 
distinct from the physical medium.”  Therefore, the “sight of the senses must be 
overcome by intellectual sight, which requires a knowledge of the dialectical arts, in 
other words philosophy.”42  Yet, there needs to be a connection between the abstract 
spiritual world and the material world. 
 Thus, while beauty is eternal and unchanging and it is not rooted in the physical 
world, the physical world does partake in it, even though its participation does not affect 
ultimate beauty.  Further, to know beauty we are to “discern beauty itself through what 
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     39Martin, Beauty and Holiness, 14. 
     40Martin, Beauty and Holiness, 14. 
     41Martin, Beauty and Holiness, 14. 
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makes it visible” (Symposium 212a).43  Plato assigns to “divinity the work of the 
demiurgos: the work of incarnating eternal forms in temporal formations.”44 
 Beauty is associated with the highest of spiritual values, but human production 
can participate in beauty as long as imitation and deception are minimized; that is, as long 
as semblance is curtailed.  Not all images are bad or deceitful.  Even God creates, and 
according to Plato, even creates images (Sophist 266a, c).45  While Plato gives greatest 
value to spiritual Forms and secondary status to material reality, he exhorts human 
makers to create well, avoid what is not real, and to use reasoning to create acceptable 
things and likenesses.  Yet, is there an attitude to be found in Plato’s writings that in spite 
of wanting to generate a model social state, paradoxically fosters a dismissive attitude 
toward the material world for a mythic world, and thereby complicates even a practical, 
humble, earthly project?  However, in Plato’s favor, is the diminished condition of the 
natural world brought about in great measure because of the toll of human products, too 
often made without regard for deep moral considerations that would include their impact 
upon the natural world?   
 Plato did not come to his ideas in isolation.  He was immersed in the dialogue of 
his time that included stories, teachings, and writings bequeathed by his culture’s 
ancestors, along with challenging dialogue with his peers and students.  His ideas remain 
in academic conversation because they cannot be easily plummeted, summarized, or 
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dismissed.  Also, as teachings rightly called “classic,” they have been an important part 
of Western thinking. 
 The ideas that he wrestled with include questions pertaining to beauty and 
creativity; namely, to what do we aspire, how is society to train its young, and how do we 
create and build?  Plato’s understanding of beauty speaks of the ideal Forms, and those of 
us involved with the makings of anything are encouraged to strive in their direction, but 
Plato did not trust that we always would. 
 While recognizing the gulf between Plato’s understandings of the natural sciences 
and today’s tensions around the topics of metaphysics and dualism, we can still say that 
Plato did significantly grasp the dynamism found in creative activities and their capacity 
to influence and shape human minds, culture, and society.  Further, within this awareness 
he realized the power of beauty.  One of his students, Aristotle, knew this also, but saw 
things differently.  
 2.  Aristotle   (384-322 B.C.E. 
 Both Plato and Aristotle have deep desires for knowledge and truth, and deep 
concerns for the good of society.  But where Plato is more focused on universals, 
Aristotle asks to what end is something created.46  Aristotle, “recognizes the importance 
of forms, but he believes that forms are to be perceived only as materialized.  Therefore, 
both matter and form are irreducible ingredients of things in the world.”47   
                                                 
     46C.D.C. Reeve, Introduction,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: 
Random House, 2001), xv-xvi. 
     47Martin, Beauty and Holiness, 15.  
 17
 With Aristotle, we find someone who positions himself more closely with the 
ordinary,48 perhaps indicative of “his biologist’s observant mind.”49  For Aristotle, 
knowledge starts with the senses.50  Concerning anything, Martin points out that Aristotle 
would raise four questions: from what did it come; of what is it made; what is it; and for 
what is it made?  For Aristotle, the world itself is “seen as an initiating-forming-of-
material for a purpose.”51  The four questions reflect Aristotle’s four forms of causality: 
efficient, material, formal, and teleological.   
 Aristotle’s vision of reality leads him to an understanding of mimesis different 
from Plato’s.  Where Plato is suspicious of tragic plays and poetry because of their 
mimetic, imitative characteristics, Aristotle views in mimesis a legitimate way to educate 
because humans, from early childhood, learn by imitation.52  But, Aristotle does not “take 
the poet’s mimetic activity to suffice for the presentation of general truths.”53  Pappas 
makes the point that Aristotle is concerned with how poets construct or make their work.  
It should not be overdone.  Nicholas Pappas writes: 
Aristotle … says that too much plot-making busy-work can lead to 
unbelievable and inferior plays (Poetics 1454b1).  Construction does not 
invariably yield aesthetic value.  He says that poets are not at liberty to 
change too many details of a traditional story (ibid.: 1453b22).  Again the 
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poet’s activity becomes secondary matter in the presentation of a good 
story, and the story itself rises to eclipse it.54 
 
 But how does the story “itself” rise?  This inquiry is indicative of general 
teleological questions that we notice with both Plato and Aristotle.  However, where 
Plato focuses on activity that reaches toward the ideal, Aristotle includes in his corpus 
questions concerning to what end is something made; that is, as in his four questions, he 
wants to know what is already present within the creature that would tilt it toward its 
telos.  Even in his Poetics one can find hints of his attentiveness to this topic.  Pappas 
states: 
[Aristotle] says that tragic poets typically do not invent their plots (Poetics 
1451b15).  Thus the merits of good plots must derive from some source 
besides their having been consciously made up.  They have an intrinsically 
subsisting value—so that even an adherent of the active-mimesis view 
speaks of artistry as ‘regulated by the teleological realization of form in 
matter.’55 
 
 Aristotle holds that there is already present, such as in a creature, an inherent 
function toward a particular end.56  This approach lends itself to greater relationship 
between creature and its goal, as opposed to Plato’s approach which leaves more of a gap 
between creature and the ideal.  Also, Aristotle does not necessarily pit science and the 
imagination against each other.  Speaking of Aristotle, Martin writes: 
To vivify that world through the imaginative makings (poiesis) of humans 
is to enhance the quality of human life.  In both processes—those of the 
intellect in science and those of the imagination in the poetic arts—there 
are three desiderata: (1) integrity, or unity, because the intellect is pleased 
in the fullness of being, ‘the joy of knowing,’ (2) proportion, or harmony, 
because the intellect joys in order and consonance; and (3) clarity, or 
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radiance, because the intellect joys in that light which causes intelligence 
to ‘see.’  Analogous exemplifications of integrity or unity, proportion or 
harmony, and clarity or radiance, characterize well-made works of art.57 
 
However, because of Aristotle’s particular analytical and teleological understandings and 
because of his openness to imitation, imitation has to be understood as distinct from 
Plato’s thoughts, whether concerning tragic plays, character building, a painting, a seed, 
or the structuring of the social order.   
 Pappas asserts that Aristotle does not accept as the focus of tragedy its actors and 
their imitation of others or the emotional stirring that goes on in order to affect audiences; 
rather, its focus is the development of plot by way of the actions of the players.58  
Aristotle advocates for an understanding of mimesis where action upon action is key.59  
Mimesis is not passive; rather, it is described as actions that connect, following along an 
issue and forming a plot, and where “the end is everywhere the chief thing” (Poetics 
1450a 15-20).   
 According to Aristotle, there is in a creature an inherent function toward a 
particular end.  It seems analogous to a play about life where it is action upon action, 
forming a plot to reveal its end or purpose.  Within a tragedy, in fact, there are three 
elements that serve its unity: “plot, time, and place.”60  Aristotle advocates for 
particularity in tragic plot, while Plato focuses more generally on types of characters, 
with a keen leeriness toward imitative, subjective characters.61 
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 Why is this significant?  Because with Aristotle we find a more specific inclusion 
of a horizontal perspective; that is, of an earthly reality.  In tragedy it is more than just the 
characters, there is a broader contextuality that connects players and events.  Plato, on the 
other hand, is more interested in a transcendent reality, in higher Forms.  His focus is on 
characters and their relation to the Forms.  However, while agreeing with Plato that 
“perfect happiness is found in contemplative activity,”62 Aristotle exemplifies someone 
who is genuinely absorbed in analyzing what is before him. For example, Aristotle 
writes: 
[T]o be beautiful, a living creature, and every whole made up of parts, 
must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts, but also 
be of a certain definite magnitude.  Beauty is a matter of size and order, 
and therefore impossible either (1) in a very minute creature, since our 
perception becomes indistinct as it approaches instantaneity; or (2) in a 
creature of vast size—one, say, 1,000 miles long—as in that case, instead 
of the object being seen all at once, the unity and wholeness of it is lost to 
the beholder.  Just in the same way, then, as a beautiful whole made up of 
parts, or a beautiful living creature, must be of some size, but a size to be 
taken in by the eye, so a story or Plot must be of some length, but of a 
length to be taken in by the memory.           Poetics (1450b 20 – 1451a 5) 
 
 Nevertheless, John S. Marshall contends that we cannot deduce from the Poetics a 
theory of aesthetics for Aristotle, but rather take from the Poetics his thoughts on 
tragedy.63  However, his idea of plot, or becoming, surfaces in other places, such as in his 
Physics.   
 Herein, as he refers to form and matter related to nature, he writes: “The form 
indeed is ‘nature’ rather than the matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is 
when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially.”  That is: “Not into that 
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from which it arose but into that to which it tends.  The shape then is nature.”64  So, while 
“‘nature’ has two senses, the form and the matter,”65 it is form that speaks to nature’s 
attributes or the characteristics that are required for it to act as itself, toward its end, over 
and above its material composition and measurement.   
 In addition, Aristotle, as evidenced in the Poetics, believes that imitation of 
various forms is, in fact, a legitimate way to learn and to teach.  Nevertheless, imitation in 
tragedy needs to be accompanied with high moral expectations of those involved, the 
characters are to be of a certain dignity, its plot is to have “moral significance,” and the 
story itself should be of a high moral value.66  Furthermore, Pappas contends that 
Aristotle never cedes all universal territory to Plato.  He claims that while the “objects of 
mimesis are not universals, they can still bring about a mimesis that presents 
universals.”67  In fact, Aristotle claims that “art arises when from many notions gained by 
experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced.”68 
 Thus, the ordinary can speak voluminously, as in tragic plays, but it should not be 
overdone or overworked.  To avoid such excess, a bit of temperance and prudence is 
recommended.  Aristotle’s suggestions could have implications for our broader 
discussion of nature if, in fact, we live in what some are referring to as a “cultural 
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landscape” where our human makings can be judged excessive, resulting in  deleterious 
consequences.69   
 Aristotle asserts that while the good and the beautiful may be related they are, in 
fact, different, because the “former always implies conduct as its subject, while the 
beautiful is found also in motionless things.”  More so, the “chief forms of beauty are 
order and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a 
special degree.”70 
 Aristotle continued to probe using the tools of his day.  Nonetheless, after all 
examination is complete, and if all were taken away, what would be left?  For Aristotle, it 
is that activity which brings “perfect happiness,” contemplation of God.71  Martin 
explains: 
What is the contemplative activity of God?  Briefly, in his metaphysics 
Aristotle employed the concept of theos as the focal principle of being.  
God is that ‘unmoved mover’ which is the goal, and therefore the source, 
of all motion.  In a metaphysic that envisions all of reality in terms of 
potentiality moving to actuality, God is Pure Act.  And God’s activity is 
“thinking on thinking.”72 
  
 Generally speaking, from this study of Aristotle we recognize the significance of 
the following concerning aesthetics and nature: ordinary sense experience; potentiality in 
creation; action upon action leading to a plot in time and place; theos as telos; imitation 
as a legitimate way of learning, teaching, and creating; the importance of method in 
examination and analysis; measurement; and the need to avoid excess.   
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 As Aristotle insatiably studied the world around him, one wonders if he was more 
confident in humanity’s ability to create well than was Plato?  Although Aristotle did not 
have what we might call a full aesthetic philosophy, his thoughts, like those mentioned, 
have contributed to our thinking on aesthetics and the natural world, whether we have 
understood his ideas correctly or not.  However, it is important to remember that both 
Plato and Aristotle have contributed to our view of the natural world as being somehow 
less significant than the spiritual realm, or the world of ideas.   
B.  Aesthetics and Theology   
 The external and sensual dimensions of religion are features of theological 
aesthetics, which we use to speak of and support different lived theologies, often by way 
of analogy and symbol.  Yet, the term, “theological aesthetics,” is difficult to define.  
 Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen says that a definitive definition of theological aesthetics is 
“neither possible nor necessary.”  Yet, she does venture to say that it is “concerned with 
questions about God and issues in theology in the light of and perceived through sense 
knowledge (sensation, feeling, imagination), through beauty, and the arts.”73  She asserts 
that because of a diversity of media today theological aesthetics “would generally imply a 
broad, inclusive term rather than a narrow concept, especially as it includes the dialogue 
between theology and the arts, rather than being limited to a theology of beauty.”74  As 
Thiessen describes it, contemporary theological aesthetics participates in interdisciplinary 
dialogue during fragmented times as part of a “quest for a more unified, holistic 
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worldview and a sense of order,” but where beauty is not necessarily the basic concern.75  
She claims that aesthetics is pertinent to all areas of theology.76   
 Historically, the relation of art to beauty and to the gods/God, or to the Forms, has 
been a serious question.  We know that for some Greeks the making of art carried moral 
significance, and art and its artists could be suspect.  In a similar but different fashion the 
ancient Hebrews also mistrusted art and craft making.  It seems humans make images and 
then they worship them, causing havoc in their relationship with the One God.  A 
defilement takes place, which brings upon them calamity and disorder, as in famines and 
plagues, or an enemy’s sword.  The importance of order, versus chaos, involves serving 
the right God and living righteously. 
 Inheritors both of the Hebrew and Greek traditions, Christians were suspicious of 
images also, eventually erupting in a period known as the Iconoclasm.  Questions arise: 
How does aesthetics evolve in the Christian era, and how is the natural world and the 
constructed world viewed and appreciated in the midst of Christianity?   
 This section will, in a broad fashion, examine different periods in Christian 
theology for its use of aesthetics.  It will begin with Scripture, followed by a sampling of 
ideas and theological texts about and from the first millennium, and then the second.  Our 
goal in this section is to grasp some understanding of the uses of aesthetics in Christianity 
over the centuries and to see how these are both helpful and troublesome for a 
contemporary theological aesthetics of nature/environment.  
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 1.  Scripture, Image, Form, and Vision 
 Thiessen, writing in regard to Western thought, asserts that there have been “two 
interrelated threads that have been primary in theological aesthetics through the ages, 
namely, the beauty and vision of God and the theology of the image.”77  Further, she 
states: 
[D]espite the radical changes brought about through Enlightenment 
rationalism, the longing for the vision of God has remained a theme for 
theologians to this day, even if for some only in passing.  Already in the 
Hebrew Bible and in the New Testament, the importance of not just 
hearing the word of God but the desire to see God is attested to by various 
writers.78 
 
 Pope Benedict XVI writes that the most important deed that Moses did was not to 
perform miracles, nor to lead the Israelites out of slavery in Egypt, but to have spoken 
with “God as a friend” (Exod 33:11, 17).79  In the midst of his relationship with God, 
Moses implores God that he be allowed to see God’s face (Exod 33:17-23).  This desire 
for intimacy with the Holy, spoken of analogously, is a yearning not particular to Moses 
alone.  
 This longing to see God speaks of a familiar yearning for intimacy with the divine 
in the Hebrew Scriptures, but only Moses is blessed with a kind of intimate proximity.  
Nonetheless, even the first creation story speaks of a special closeness with God.  It says 
that humans are made in the “likeness” and “image” of God (Gen. 1:26-27).   
 While the Greeks were interested in various kinds of knowledge and know-how, it 
is with poiesis, that “special kind of ‘making,’” where we find at least one example of 
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common ground between the Greek and Hebrew traditions, and with Christianity as 
well.80  Martin investigating the relationship between religion and aesthetics writes: 
The distinction between poiesis and other forms of know-how, seen as a 
matter of kind and not simply of degree, would in later centuries become 
one of the bases for distinguishing the ‘fine’ arts from the other arts.  
Poiesis was seen by the Greeks to be both more important and more 
problematic than other forms of art understood as techē.  Its importance 
would be symbolized by the choice of poiesis as the term for the divine 
‘making’ portrayed in Genesis, in the definitive translation of the Hebraic 
scriptures into Greek.  This was consonant with the traditional Greek 
admiration of the poet—an admiration shared… by the Hebrews.81 
 
 Within the Book of Genesis there are two mythic accounts of creation and a third 
new beginning story if you understand the story of Noah and the flood (Gen. 6-9) as a 
sort of remaking of creation.  More particularly, in Genesis 1 we find not only the mythic 
dimension of storytelling, but a sense of poetry and ritual as well. 
 The translation found in the Jewish Study Bible of the initial few lines in Genesis 
reads: “When God began to create heaven and earth—the earth being unformed and void, 
with darkness over the surface of the deep and a wind from God sweeping over the 
water—God said, ‘Let there be light”(JSB Gen 1:1-3).  The first creation story in Genesis 
is an emblematic account, which must have satisfied the priestly writer(s) and editors, as 
a grand and appropriate way to begin putting together stories representative of the 
Hebrew faith journey.  It starts with a story of the cosmos, telling how all was a void and 
without form, but when God did begin to create and to form heaven and earth—God did 
it well.82   
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 It tells a story that stresses the goodness of creation and of creation’s orderliness.  
It gives a religious analogy about how things should be.  It provides a mythic, symbolic 
teaching for later generations to engage and measure themselves against.  In this 
pointedly placed account God’s words speak light and life into existence and form, and 
humans are spoken into special form.  They, male and female, are spoken into life as the 
“likeness” (Gen 1:26), and “image” of God (Gen 1:26, 27).  But while each dimension of 
creation is declared to be good, and all of creation is declared very good, only the 
Sabbath is called holy (Gen 2:3).  Marc Zvi Brettler writes: 
The conclusion of this myth, however, describes the Sabbath in a manner 
that even surpasses humankind—only the Sabbath is “declared holy” 
(Gen. 2:3).  Holiness is especially important within the Priestly system, in 
which the Holy Sabbath plays a leading role (see especially Exod. 31:12-
17).  Thus, in offering these evaluations, the first creation story highlights 
the importance of both humankind and the Sabbath.83 
 
 Brettler makes note that “creation” usually refers to the “formation of physical 
objects,” but in this case it also refers to an institution or an abstract concept: such that, 
creation and creativity involve more than the realm of concrete objects and the senses.  
Similar non-physical creations can be recognized in the Mesopotamian myth where 
Enuma Elish “narrates the creation of kingship and of the institutions surrounding the 
worship of the god Marduk.”84 
 Following upon the mythic cosmic story is the second Genesis creation story of 
the first man and woman, who disobey God.  Generally speaking, these stories together 
tell us that a certain order has been terribly disturbed by humans.   
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 Genesis 1 tells how the cosmos is ordered and how humans are to know their 
place in this arrangement.  They are to be reflections of the Creator.  They are to keep 
God as their focus, central in all of creation.  The relationship with the holy, as inferred 
by the holiness of the Sabbath, is the measure.  However, final editors of the Hebrew 
Bible knew that human beings had a checkered history when it came to honoring God 
and living righteously, which involves taking care of the widow, the orphan, the 
stranger… and the natural world.   
 Genesis 1: 26-28, which directs man to subdue and have dominion over the earth 
(or master or lord over), has been interpreted over the centuries in ways now seen as 
problematic.  Yet, if we read this passage within the context of needing to be in overall 
right relationship with God there can be heard a certain call for humans to be responsible 
for where and how they live.  In the second creation story relationships become 
disordered when humans turn their eyes from the Creator and disobey God, taking and 
devouring what was not meant for their use and pleasure.  Interpretations of Genesis 
1:26-28 will inevitably be troublesome when God is not understood as the pervasive and 
central organizing relationship from which all other relationships are ordered and 
interpreted.   
 When Genesis 1:26-28 is interpreted outside of the broader context of right 
relationship with God, it is particularly difficult to read it as leading to anything other 
than man’s lording over nature, fueling a misalignment of relationships and misuse of 
power and responsibility.  Disobedience to God usually means some degree of idolatry, 
which causes chaos.  
 29
 Scripture tells how human eyes can turn toward other gods, whom we craft into 
material forms and images that we then worship.  Or, even, how we arrogantly and 
foolishly become enamored with our own human splendor.  Either way, the Hebrew 
Bible tells how humans often fail to give due glory to their maker and sustainer, which 
can lead to a contentious relationship with God.85  There was, according to Martin, 
“always a sense of the demonic possibilities in beauty.”86  Beauty, in fact, could become 
idolatrous.  The suspicion of such “would also be part of the legacy of Biblical religion to 
its inheriting traditions in the West.”87 
 However, the ancient Israelite God does forgive, although not necessarily without 
consequences, and sometimes with rather severe and bloody ones at that.  Yet, as the 
books of the Hebrew Bible come together they describe a history of a people with their 
God, and how they came to know and to deepen their relationship with their God.  While 
it is a relationship that often struggles, it tells of a God who is committed to a covenant 
with them, eventually to be understood as a relationship with all of creation, such as we 
see in the story of Noah where God promises never again to wage such destruction upon 
creation (Gen. 8:21-22). 
 In light of their relationship with God the Hebrew people are focused on the 
“beauty of holiness.”88  They desire to be close to a God whom they believe is holy.  
Herein, we find a certain kind of “glory” resonating with the Hebrew heart (1 Chr. 16:23-
36, Ps. 29).  
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 Glory was sometimes “perceived as a reflection of the transcendent (1 Kgs. 8:11); 
or it was an otherworldly brilliance.”89  But Martin writes that in the Hebraic tradition 
there was “early resistance to understanding a theophony as in any sense compromising 
the otherness or transcendence—the holiness … of the divine.”90  Martin continues: 
Glory … was a concept intermediate between the divine transcendence 
and those manifestations of divine immanence that, in other cultures and 
other times, would be the focus of aesthetic interpretation.  Here again, 
however, for Israel the natural and the historical are intertwined, and it is 
the triumph of the divine purpose in history that eventuates in a full 
experience of the divine glory in the whole earth.91 
 
 But glory was itself rather morally neutral until the time of the prophetic tradition:  
“Assimilated to the concept of holiness, it would apply to a ‘holy people’ obedient to 
God’s ‘holy will’.”92  The prophetic tradition was followed by the priestly tradition. 
Moreover, in “the messianic tradition there was a merging of the priestly and prophetic 
strands in the figure of divine glory who, in bringing the historical process to fulfillment, 
would at the same time bring all of creation into participation in the divine glory.”93  Life 
was not departmentalized. 
 However, according to Christians, while the first creation account speaks of the 
goodness of creation, the second indicates a defilement of its order through sin.  Humans 
and all of creation become, in some sense, mis-ordered.  The human is no longer a 
reflection of God as it was intended or, at the very least, it has become a muddled one. 
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 These issues will effect how humans come to perceive nature.  If creation is 
defiled and disordered, is it also in need of redemption in some way?  Is it evil because of 
its materiality?  What will be important for Christians in their effort to regain that lost 
sense of order?  Will they seek order/right relationships or control?  How will nature fare 
in light of their quest?  As humans long for the face of God where do we search?  Are 
glimmers of the holy more likely to be found in Christian sacraments, human virtue, 
human makings, or in the natural world? 
 2.  The First Millennium  
 While many have yearned to see the face of God, in the Gospel of John it states: 
“No one has ever seen God.  It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s heart, 
who has made him known” (NRSV John 1:18).  In reading Scripture, Benedict XVI 
affirms a discriminating use of the historical critical method, but stresses an overall 
Christian canonical reading of the Bible.  That is, he encourages a reading that 
understands the Hebrew Bible and Christian Scripture as a unity, claiming this method is 
“not linear, and it is often dramatic.”  He writes: 
[W]hen you watch it unfold in light of Jesus Christ, you can see it moving 
in a single overall direction; you can see that the Old and New Testaments 
belong together.  This Christological hermeneutic, which sees Jesus Christ 
as the key to the whole and learns from him how to understand the Bible 
as a unity, presupposes a prior act of faith.  It cannot be the conclusion of a 
purely historical method.  But this act of faith is based upon reason—
historical reason—and so makes it possible to see the internal unity of 
Scripture.  By the same token, it enables us to understand anew the 
individual elements that have shaped it, without robbing them of their 
historical originality.94 
 
 Benedict’s perspective on the reading of Scripture is interesting for this study 
because the unity that he describes would be similar in fashion to how earlier Christian 
                                                 
     94Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth, xix. 
 32
exegetes would read Scripture and compose their thoughts.  It speaks to an overt desire to 
synchronize and unify the Hebrew prophesies with Christian Testament writings that 
were written in Greek.  According to Benedict, the desire in the Hebrew Bible to “see” 
God gets carried over into the New Testament and is met with the response of the 
Incarnation.  Again, Benedict writes: 
Israel is allowed to hope for a new Moses, who has yet to appear, but who 
will be raised up at the appropriate hour.  And the characteristic of this 
‘prophet’ will be that he converses with God face-to-face, as a friend does 
with a friend.  His distinguishing note will be his immediate relation with 
God, which enables him to communicate God’s will and word firsthand 
and unadulterated.  And that is the saving intervention which Israel—
indeed, the whole of humanity—is waiting for.95  
 
The Incarnation of God gives form to the desire to see God, to be close to God.  And the 
voice, visions, and dreams of God, called theophonies, give way to the gift of God’s own 
in human material flesh.  According to some interpretations, Jesus Christ as Image of 
God fulfills earlier desires and prophesies found in the Hebrew Scriptures.  
 The Eternal becomes Image/Form in human flesh.  The Image is not a 
semblance.96  Paradoxically, something new comes into being, but also, it is the perfect 
Image of God through which humanity and all of creation, with grace, is to be re-ordered 
or reconciled (Rom 3:25-26, 5:15-6:4, 8:19-23, 2 Cor 5:16-19, Col 1:15, Col 3:10).  With 
a canonical reading of Scripture, Christian New Testament writers do not take Jesus’ life 
story and insert him into the earlier Hebrew prophesies; rather, Jesus’ life, death, and 
resurrection flow as a fulfillment of the past, and even of the future.   
                                                 
     95Benedict XVI, Jesus of Nazareth, 4-5. 
     96In English versions of the New Testament the word “image” appears an estimated 13 times not 
including the Book of Revelation.  The word “form” appears an estimated 11 times. 
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 According to Benedict, and somewhat reminiscent of Aristotle, reading Scripture 
as a unity “is a process in which the word gradually unfolds its inner potentialities, 
already somehow present like seeds, but needing the challenge of new situations, new 
experiences and new sufferings, in order to open up.”97  Hebrew texts are read with “new 
eyes in new contexts.”  They “evolve in continuity with their original sense, tacitly 
corrected and given added depth and breadth of meaning.”98  It “emerges from within the 
heart of a living subject—the pilgrim People of God—and lives within this same 
subject.”99  Benedict continues: 
The connection with the subject we call “People of God” is vital for 
Scripture.  On one hand, this book—Scripture—is the measure that comes 
from God, the power directing the people.  On the other hand, though, 
Scripture lives precisely within this people, even as this people transcends 
itself in Scripture.100 
 
 With Jesus Christ, and Scripture, there is a new measure for how we are to 
understand the world and live our lives.  However, this unity and measure, as presented in 
a canonical reading, are vulnerable to critique.   
 More conservative canonical readings of Scripture can be seen as overly 
homogenous, synthesizing, and dismissive of Jewish perspectives, as well as other 
diverse voices of interpretation, especially the voices of women.  However, for this study 
it is important to note how certain aesthetic characteristics are being used and valued in 
theology.  Connecting aesthetic language to God language has ancient roots, and in 
Christianity it takes on a particular flavor.   
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 An explicit example of a text that uses multiple aesthetic elements and that 
connects through symbolism with Hebrew Scriptures is the story of the Transfiguration in 
which Jesus is portrayed as the new Moses.  It incorporates sound, vision, and brilliance 
and is found in all three Synoptic Gospels (Matt 17:1-9, Mark 9:2-10, Luke 9:28-36).   
 This story of radiance that centers upon a lowly Jew can be seen in contrast to 
Octavian, the Roman deified leader.  The glory of Jesus was to be understood differently, 
as of a different ilk.  Jesus’ radiance reflected a supreme beauty, truth, and goodness: 
For the early Christians beauty, truth, unity and goodness in the world are 
always seen as signs of divine revelation, of God’s beauty, truth, unity and 
goodness. Beauty is objective, and always also has to do with spiritual and 
moral purification.  The good, the true and the beautiful cannot be thought 
of apart from one another, as God in Godself is supreme beauty, goodness 
and truth.101 
 
 Still, as we see in the second century writings of Irenaeus (130-200 C.E.), God is 
perceived as quite transcendent and distant from creation.  Speaking against the Gnostics 
who are said to possess and display “a portrait of Christ along with images of Greek 
philosophers,” Irenaeus explains that this is grossly incorrect;102 God is far too removed 
for such a portrait to be possible:  
[God] is at a great remove from human emotions and passions; He is 
unified, not composite, without diversity of members, completely similar 
and equal to himself, since he is all Mind, all Spirit, all Mentality, all 
Thought, all Word, all Hearing, All Eye, all Light, and entirely the source 
of every good thing.103 
 
 Yet, Christ is understood to be the bridge between the visible world and the 
invisible and while he remains an image, he shows forth a true image of God, which is 
                                                 
     101Thiessen, ed., Theological Aesthetics, 12-13. 
     102Thiessen, ed., Theological Aesthetics, 16. 
     103Irenaeus, Against Heresies.  Quoted in Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen, Theological Aesthetics, 16.  She cites 
The Early Church Fathers, Irenaeus of Lyons, eds. Robert Grant, London, New York, Routledge, 1997, 
Book 2, Ch. 13, para. 3, p.109. 
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also an image of himself.104  Though God’s grace is always paramount, humans are to 
work at resembling the Incarnate One, which we must assume means more than male 
physicality.   
 In fact, the spiritual quest for resemblance, or human salvation, can often focus 
primarily on a spiritual quest.  Yet, does this keep our eyes turned toward the beyond, 
encouraging us to lose sight of the gift of earthly creation in all of its variety?   
 Even so, God’s glory is often referred to in terms of earthly metaphors.  While 
Christ is described in the New Testament and in later writings analogously with the use 
of many metaphors, one exceptional one is that of light.105  Eco recalls that Plotinus (c. 
205-270), the Neo-Platonist, wondered why we ascribe beauty to color and to sunlight 
even though there brilliance has nothing to do with symmetry of their parts.106   
 Plotinus resolves that just as fire shines like an idea, “light that shines out over 
matter can only be attributed to the reflection of the One from which it emanates.  God is 
therefore identified with the splendor of a sort of luminous current that permeates the 
entire universe.”107   
 Analysis of nature continues to lead to insights and analogies for use in 
theological questions and propositions, which only grow in their complexity.  Even the 
geometric and aesthetic form of the trinity provides rich symbolic material for early 
Christians to incorporate, prompting questions related to God’s dynamism and 
                                                 
     104Irenaeus, Against Heresies.  Found in Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen, Theological Aesthetics, 17-18.  She 
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relationality.108  In particular, Augustine must be acknowledged for some of his classic 
writings on beauty.  Thiessen comments:  
Augustine, in particular, emphasizes in Platonic fashion how beauty 
includes symmetry, proportion and order.  Chaos cannot be beautiful.  
Beauty relates to the cosmos.  The individual parts of the cosmos are 
beautiful and make up its total beauty.  Beauty is something that attracts 
and something we love.109 
 
 Though much of Augustine’s writings on beauty were lost,110 we still find his 
thoughts on this topic in several places.  In his text, The Book of Psalms, Augustine 
expresses how at each stage of Christ’s life the Incarnate Word is beautiful.  But perhaps 
his most remembered text on beauty is, indeed, from his Confessions.  Here he writes: 
Late have I loved you, beauty so old and so new: late have I loved you.  
And see, you were within and I was in the external world and sought you 
there, and in my unlovely state I plunged into those lovely created things 
which you made.  You were with me, and I was not with you.  The lovely 
things kept me far from you, though if they did not have their existence in 
you, they had no existence at all.  You called and cried out loud and 
shattered my deafness.  You were radiant and resplendent, you put to 
flight my blindness.  You were fragrant, and I drew in my breath and now 
pant after you.  You touched me, and I am set on fire to attain the peace 
which is yours.                Confessions (Bk 10, Ch 27, para 38)111   
 
Augustine recognizes that creation is good, but understands that human focus can become 
mired and stuck in material reality and comfort.  Instead, the soul must adjust to God in 
order to “see” God.  One must live, study, and pray well if one wishes to glimpse the 
                                                 
     108Oxford Concise Companion to Classical Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 587.  
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beauty related to God.112  For Augustine, there is an emphasis on right living in this 
world, and on spiritual transcendence as well.113   
 Augustine understands that God’s creation is not like human makings; after all, 
“God’s art proceeds ex nihilo.”114  More so, although he would have been influenced by 
Platonic notions of the dangers of mimesis, he asserts the “import of human art as 
symbolic of the higher meaning of God’s art: that is, as exceeding mimesis.”115   
 Throughout early Christian texts we find themes of right living and purification 
accompanied with grace as a way to approach beauty; that is, the spiritual beauty of God, 
which is incomprehensible.  Gregory of Nyssa (c. 330-395 C.E.) contends that even 
though our descriptions of spiritual beauty are inadequate, we should not exclude our 
human efforts from trying to grasp in earthly form some understanding of it.116  He 
writes:  
How could anyone by means of those things which we grasp by perception 
alone come to know that which is the altogether invisible, the formless, the 
sizeless, as far as bodily perception goes?  And yet one should not, for this 
reason, despair of his desire simply because these things seem to be 
beyond his grasp.  Indeed, the treatise has shown that, in proportion to the 
greatness of what is sought after, it is necessary to elevate the mind in 
thought and to lift it to the level of what we are seeking, so that we are not 
                                                 
     112Thiessen, ed., Theological Aesthetics, 29.  See Augustine’s Divine Providence and the Problem of 
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excluded entirely from participation in the good.  On Virginity (para. 10, 
36-38)117 
 
 More so, Basil (c. 330-379 C.E.) says that we are born beautiful “according to 
nature,” although “dead by sin.”  Therefore, we “must have regard of beauty, in order that 
the Bridegroom” will receive us “without a spot.”118   
 Furthering these ideas is Pseudo-Dionysius, who was earlier believed to be 
Dionysius the Areopagite of Acts 17:34, but now is believed to have lived in the fifth or 
sixth century.119  According to Thiessen, Pseudo-Dionysius was the “first theologian to 
present what might be called a theological aesthetics, dealing in particular with the idea 
of the beautiful.”120  
 Pseudo-Dionysius writes that God has no name that can do God justice.  Yet, we 
continue to call God by many names, including the “Good and the Beautiful,”121 where 
beauty is even the “same as the Good.”122  More so, although God is nameless,123 God is 
the essence for those who have being:   
God is not some kind of being.  No.  But in a way that is simple and 
indefinable he gathers into himself and anticipates every existence.…  He 
was not.  He will not be.  He did not come to be.  He is not in the midst of 
becoming.  He will not come to be.  No.  He is not. Rather, he is the 
                                                 
     117Gregory of Nyssa, On Virginity.  Quoted in Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen, Theological Aesthetics, 25.  She 
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essence of being for the things which have being.    
            Divine Names (817D)124 
 
 Indeed, everything participates in God and “none among beings falls away.”125  
More so, beauty “bids” all of creation to itself and “gathers everything into itself.”126  
However, while God gathers all, we also yearn for God. 
 While we know that people have yearned for God, for the face of God, Pseudo-
Dionysius says that yearning and real yearning are distinguishable.  One is for God and 
the other involves “partial, physical, and divided yearning”; that is, yearning for an 
“empty image or, rather, a lapse from real yearning.”127  He thinks that humans struggle, 
but are “unable to grasp the simplicity of the one divine yearning…”128  He writes: 
The fact is that men are unable to grasp the simplicity of the one divine 
yearning, and, hence, the term is quite offensive to most of them.  So it is 
left to the divine Wisdom to lift them and to raise them up to a knowledge 
of what yearning really is, after which they no longer take offense.… To 
those listening properly to the divine things the name “love” is used by the 
sacred writers in divine revelation with the exact same meaning as the 
term “yearning.”  What is signified is a capacity to effect a unity, an 
alliance, and a particular commingling in the Beautiful and the Good.  It is 
a capacity which preexists through the Beautiful and the Good.  It binds 
the things of the same order in a mutually regarding union.  It moves the 
superior to provide for the subordinate, and it stirs the subordinate in a 
return toward the superior.   Divine Names (709C-D)129 
 
 Dionysius shows forth love and yearning in terms of a connection with the good 
and the beautiful.  This yearning “binds,” “moves,” and “stirs” us toward and within a 
“comingling” of the good and the beautiful.  
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 The Greek theologian Maximus the Confessor (c.580—622) moves in a 
somewhat different direction than does Dionysius when he turns his attention to the 
natural world.  According to Han Urs von Balthasar, who did a substantial study of the 
Greek theologian, Maximus is particularly positive toward the natural world: 
While Origen considers Scripture as alone supremely normative, Maximus 
accepts also the natural world, contemplated in the light of revelation, as a 
source of wisdom.  Perfect knowledge—the knowledge of the believing 
Christian and even the knowledge of the mystic—is gleaned from both 
“books” together.… The wise person stands in the midst of the world’s 
realities as in an inexhaustible treasury of knowledge.  No being leaves 
him untouched; everything provides food for his intellectual 
nourishment.130 
 
 But what helps facilitate the yearning and union that Dionysius describes or a 
stance toward all of reality that Maximus describes in his writings?  For one way we turn 
to what Thiessen describes as the theology of the image, or the writing of icons. 
 The making of images, whether representational or symbolic, has a complicated 
history.  Christianity’s inheritance from the ancient Greeks includes both an attraction 
and a suspicion of images, but for the ancient Hebrews the making of images is more 
clearly troublesome, even if the Hebrews tolerated some degree of it themselves.131  The 
Law said no graven images were to be made, not even a likeness, not of heaven or of 
earth (Ex. 20:4).  But adding to these sentiments Luke writes in the Book of Acts that 
God does not live in buildings or shrines made by humans (Acts 17:24).132  The focus for 
Christianity is Christ himself. 
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 Christ is the Image of the invisible and unchanging God, which also means that 
Christ is also unchanging.133  When someone requested a representation of Christ it was 
deemed absurd.  Why?  Eusebius, who lived in the third and fourth century, “could not 
imagine that anyone would be interested in an image of that countenance,” meaning the 
impermanent bodily material form of Jesus.134  This would not be a true image of Christ 
who was indeed the True Image, which a representation of his body’s form would not 
be.135  However, there was something that was, and that was the Eucharist, it having 
become truly a type of his being.136  Therefore, believers were not to make and craft 
images.  There was fear that use of icons would be the same as worshiping dead wood or 
stone.   
 Basically, those that argued against images “put their opposition to images of 
Christ in the form of a disjunctive syllogism.”137  If you painted icons and said that they 
represented Christ’s divine and human natures then you were claiming the ability to 
depict the incomprehensible, but if you claimed only to be portraying the humanity of 
Christ, then you were dividing his single person.138  However: “Underlying these 
aspersions on the artistic portrayal of Jesus Christ appears to have been a deep-seated 
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aversion to the material and physical aspects of his person.”139  Focusing the gaze on his 
humanity diverted from a greater focus on the Transcendent.140  
 Those defending icons did agree with the Iconoclasts that Jesus Christ is the 
Image of God, and that he is the “True Image,” the Image of the invisible God (Col 1:15).  
However, Christ was the “one who had been made human, and thus physical and 
material, by his incarnation and birth from the Virgin Mary, and therefore a Christian 
icon was not an idol but an image of the Image: such was in essence the case for a 
Christian art.”141   
 Part of the argument asked who invented images.  It was John of Damascus (c. 
655-c.750) who responded it was God: “God was the first and the original image-maker 
of the universe.”142 
 In Christianity the long, destructive and bloody battle over whether religious 
representations were permissible was resolved when approval of the use of images was 
received at Nicaea in 787 C.E., the Seventh Ecumenical Council, with final confirmation 
coming in 843 C.E.  Tensions surrounded the question of whether or not icons themselves 
harbored grace and religious energies.  St. John of Damascus, an essentialist, argued that 
they did.  But St. Theodore the Studite, a non-essentialist, argued that they did not.  St. 
Theodore’s position won the day, which took the fiery wind out of the sails of the 
Iconoclasts: 
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For him the icon did not belong to the sacramental realm.  The material 
substance of the sacraments received its sanctifying force by an 
instrumental grace (in baptism, water sanctified a person by the force of 
the Holy Spirit).  The icon did not give a person substantial participation 
in Christ as did the eucharistic bread which is the body of Christ.  The icon 
allowed the participation in Christ by its relation to the hypostasis (person) 
of Christ, and this participation was of an intentional nature.  Thus the 
icon must be recognized as the image of a definite person and must carry 
his name.  The icon was an intentional, deliberate communion with the 
person represented.143   
 
 For St. Theodore the icon was like an emperor’s seal impressed in matter.  The 
seal remained to itself separate from the impression in the icon.  Ultimately, it was Christ 
deified body that was represented by the icon.  However, according to Bissera V. 
Pentcheva, the “icon performed through its materiality.”144   
 For example, with the engagement of the senses through such activities as the 
flickering of candles and the rising of incense, there is a kind of vacillation between the 
appearance of presence, and then its absence.  The “icon thus goes through a process of 
becoming, changing, and performing before the faithful.”145  People are “then led to 
project their whiling psychological state and sensual experience… back onto the object to 
make the icon appear alive.”146  In its non-essentialists understanding, the icon “has 
received the imprint of the divine form,”147 impressed now with a tension:                    
The definition of the icon as absence has paradoxically heightened the 
materiality of this object.  A tension lurks on the icon’s surface between 
absence and presence, a tension that will be resolved in the icon’s 
performance (mimesis): the way it plays the appearances before the 
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faithful.  In contrast to our Western notion of mimesis as the imitation of 
form, Byzantium mimesis is the imitation of presence.  The icon is just an 
imprint of form, but it simulates divine essence through the interaction of 
its imprinted surface with the changing ambience.148 
 
Relief icons were made to recede, but later icons were created on a “flat surface of the 
wood and surrounded by a raised silver-gilt or enameled cover, which floods the eye with 
its radiance and shimmer.”149  The eye could be thought of as acting in two ways.  It 
could either touch or be touched.150  As icons began to be mostly painted, they employed 
three main materials: egg (animal), wood (plant), and gold (mineral). 
 In general, because the icon carries only the “visible characteristics” and not its 
“essence,” the icon “becomes the imprint of absence on matter.  This object is thus set to 
simulate presence (essence) through appearance.”151  The prototype is said to impress its 
image upon the memory of the iconographer, who then impresses this image into matter 
and form.  It is a double imprint creative process.152   
 Because the Council ruled that Jesus was both God and human and that his 
material reality, though now deified, could be represented, this meant that saintly men 
and women could be represented with images as well.  More so, icons could be 
venerated, which was not the same as worshipping idols.  Icons, made by human hands, 
like Scripture, impart the Word and are meant to teach and to draw us to the Holy.   
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 While the Church’s Tradition recognizes the “Incarnate Word and Holy Spirit” as 
the “twofold condition of the fullness of the Revelation,”153 within the Orthodox tradition 
the ongoing primary “outward” elements are Scripture, the Councils and Fathers, Liturgy, 
the Canons, and Icons.154  And within Scripture itself are both the oral and written 
traditions, each standing as an implied communication of the Spirit.155   
 Held within this marked distinguishing of Scripture into written and oral forms in 
the East are icons.156  They are understood to be written expressions within the tradition.  
Reading icons is not like analyzing a work of art, or reading Scripture, or reading the 
Book of Nature, but it does entail familiar cultural skills through which people understand 
various genres of telling stories, teaching, sharing wisdom, and the passing on of a faith 
tradition through the use of images.    
 The icon is “not a simple art, serving to illustrate the Holy Scriptures, but a 
complete correspondence of the one to the other, and therefore attributes to the icon the 
same dogmatic, liturgic and educational significance as it does to the Holy Scripture.157  
Leonid Ouspensky says that Christianity is a “revelation” of both the Word of God and 
the Image of God, “in which His Likeness is revealed.”158  The icon is a “likeness not of 
an animate but of a deified prototype.”  It is an image “not of corruptible flesh, but of 
                                                 
     153Vladimir Lossky, “Tradition and Traditions,” in The Meaning of Icons, by Leonard Ouspensky and 
Vladimir Lossky, trans. by G.E.H. Palmer and E. Kadloubovsky, (Crestwood, New York, St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1983),16.  (Text first published in 1952.) 
     154Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church: New Edition (London/New York: Penguin, revised 1993, 
1997), 206.  He is known as Bishop Kallistos of Diokleia and has been professor at Oxford.  
     155Lossky, “Tradition and Traditions,” 16.  
     156Lossky, “Tradition and Traditions,” 12.  
     157Leonid Ouspensky, “The Meaning and Language of Icons,” in The Meaning of Icons, edited by 
Leonard Ouspensky and Vladimir Lossky, trans. by G.E.H. Palmer and E. Kadloubovsky, (Crestwood, 
New York, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1983), 30.  Text first published in 1952. 
     158Ouspensky, “The Meaning and Language of Icons,” 35.  
 46
flesh transfigured, radiant with Divine light.  It is Beauty and Glory, represented by 
material means and visible in the icon to physical eyes.”159  And, this beauty and glory, 
which is somehow made present by means of the icon, is active: 
This recognition of the image as making reality present carries over into 
the attempt to see in all human beings the image of God in which they are 
created and to honour Him there, and into striving to purify God’s image 
in ourselves, so that the radiance of God’s love is felt by those with whom 
we have to do.  Delight in beauty, in the liturgy, in the icons, is not 
something merely aesthetic, but something tested in ascetic struggle.  This 
beauty purifies and draws out a passionate love for God and his whole 
creation.”160  
 
 Timothy Ware says the Iconoclasts, who resisted all material images of the divine, 
failed to understand that by dismissing all representations of God they also failed to 
accept the teachings of the Incarnation: 
They fell, as so many puritans have done, into a kind of dualism.  
Regarding matter as a defilement, they wanted a religion freed from all 
contact with what is material; for they thought that what is spiritual must 
be non-material.  But this is to betray the Incarnation, by allowing no 
place to Christ’s humanity, to His body; it is to forget that our body as 
well as our soul must be saved and transfigured.… It was not merely a 
controversy about religious art, but about the Incarnation, about human 
salvation, about the salvation of the entire material cosmos.161 
 
More so, the basis of an icon’s beauty does not rest in its capacity to be visually pleasing, 
or pretty, but rather in how it works and what purpose it serves. Ouspensky writes: 
On the plane of human creative work, beauty is the crowning given by 
God, the seal of the conformity of the image to its prototype, of the 
symbol to what it represents, that is, to the Kingdom of the Spirit.  The 
beauty of an icon is the beauty of the acquired likeness to God and so its 
value lies not in its being beautiful in itself, in its appearance as a beautiful 
object, but in the fact that it depicts Beauty.162 
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 Icons “depict” the Word of God; they teach and draw one toward transformation.  
They are a “means to an end,” for the “beauty of the visible world lies not in the 
transitory splendour of its present state, but in the very meaning of its existence, in its 
coming transfiguration laid down in it as a possibility to be realized.”163   
 However, concerning the one standing before the icon, “as iron is not transformed 
into fire but remains iron,” when one is “transfigured” you become “spiritualized and 
illumined,” with the caveat that “nothing” in you is “destroyed or taken away.”164  Thus it 
can be said: 
[T]hat a saint is more truly a man than is a sinner, since, by reassuming 
likeness to God, he achieves the original purpose of his being, is clothed in 
the incorruptible Beauty of the Kingdom of God, in the creation of which 
he participates with life.  Therefore, beauty itself … is not a beauty 
belonging to the creature, but an attribute of the Kingdom of God where 
God is all in all.”165  
 
 Icons, in concert with other elements of Orthodoxy, signify less focus on 
philosophical tenets and invite greater focus on an association with God, but from within 
a material world, even though material is not of itself ultimate beauty.  Tomas Spidlik 
writes: 
Having become Christians, Hellenized peoples were deeply conscious of 
their cosmic vocation—not a matter of inserting oneself into a universal 
harmony, but rather of actively co-operating to re-establish this beauty, 
spoiled by sin.  By vocation, the Christian must work at the perfection and 
the deification of the world, through ascetic purification which precedes 
cosmic joy.166   
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 While the transcendence of God is closely guarded in the East and the West, it has 
been more associated with the East.  Thus, it is interesting to find that the icon of the East 
deals very specifically with materiality as a means to help humans gaze upon the 
prototype who is Christ, as well as on those who have followed Christ in exemplary 
fashion, so as to model our lives on theirs.   
 However, over time and gradually, icons began to change.  A “dogmatic element 
began to dominate and determine the whole composition.”167  Increased use of 
imagination and conceptualization began to challenge the traditional canon concerning 
the writing of icons and the place and use of Scripture in them.  Iconographers began to 
interpret more freely than some thought appropriate.  Where as the transcendent God had 
been rarely portrayed, except minimally, as with the use of color for light or with a 
symbol of a hand written into the icon from above, gradually, God the Father and the 
entire Trinity were being directly depicted.168   
 This shift departed from the earlier tradition.  There could be found icons that 
“lacked the direct link with the mystery of the incarnation.”169  While this did take 
centuries, it eventually resulted in actions being taken by those in authority, such as the 
Councils in Moscow in the sixteenth century who issued prohibitions regarding certain 
kinds of icons.  But “under the influence of classical studies and rationalistic philosophy 
coming from the West, people were much too fascinated by these new ideas to be happy 
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with the simplicity of ancient forms.”170  There was an increase of boldness in terms of a 
willingness to represent the invisible God,171 and most poignantly in the West.  
 Overlooking the centuries when the icon debates took place, Jaroslav Pelikan 
makes an interesting observation as he considers beauty and people’s vision of the 
Divine.  He contends that of the triad, Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, it took Beauty “by 
far the longest time to evolve,”172 and that it was helped along by the tensions and 
debates over icons.  He writes: 
As the iconoclasts say with great clarity, the Beautiful was (and is) the 
most subtle and the most dangerous of the triad: the dangers of identifying 
the Holy with the True (intellectualism) and with the Good (moralism) 
have manifested themselves repeatedly in the history of Judaism and of 
Christianity, but it is noteworthy that both the Second Commandment 
itself and the message of the Hebrew prophets singled out the 
identification of the Holy with the Beautiful as the special temptation to 
sin.  The formulation of an aesthetic that came to terms with the reality of 
this temptation called for philosophical and theological sophistication.  In 
addition, of course, there had to have been an inspiration for religious art, 
an inspiration of more than a flatly didactic sort, before there could be any 
such aesthetic justification; and a sophisticated philosophical-theological 
challenge to religious art was necessary before any sophisticated defenses 
of it was possible.173 
  
 In both the East and the West there is a curiosity that is beaconing beyond the 
status quo.  And although we continue to find aesthetic themes such as harmony, 
measure, unity, and spiritual aspirations continuing, we also observe differences and 
variety erupting more broadly.   
 While what has been covered in the first millennium is only a small sampling of 
ideas found during its centuries, this part of section two on aesthetics and theology has 
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highlighted several facets related to aesthetics and theology.  Some of what has been 
shown includes recognition of similarities and dissimilarities with Greek and Hebrew 
thinking on beauty; how beauty connects to holiness; how there is both an attraction and 
unease with images; the significance of measurement and harmony; and a particular 
contribution of Christian understanding that rest upon the belief that the Incarnation of 
the Word is the true and unchanging image after which humans are called to model 
themselves.  This Image is itself the link between God and creation and is often described 
in terms of splendor and light.  Mimesis is not just associated with static imitation, but 
with the seeming performance of the Holy’s presence, followed by its absence.   
 Material matter in the style of icons, by way of grace and the iconographer, are 
impressed with a form that is empty.  There is the belief that beauty must involve 
purification, asceticism, and grace, for while there is earthly beauty, ultimate beauty is 
spiritual.  In addition, the activity of the icon speaks to an invitation that calls people to 
participate with the Holy and to accept as their vocation participation in the deification of 
the world.   
 This part of our study has demonstrated that matter has been both vilified and 
called beautiful and good.  God uses material matter to speak of Divine Mystery, to 
reflect God’s glory, to invite people to the Good, but God’s ultimate transcendence 
remains guarded in both the East and the West.    
 3.  The Second Millennium 
 Our goal in this section is to locate a few discernable voices and ideas concerning 
aesthetics and theology in the second millennium that could inform our overall project.  
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That is, we are searching for ideas on aesthetics and theology that may have influenced 
how we perceive and appreciate the natural and constructed world.  
 Where we noted a shift in iconography beginning to take place near the close of 
the first millennium we also find a shift happening in the West with regard to theological 
concerns.  Scholastic writers are beginning to focus not only on faith, but on the 
integration of reason and faith.  Writing on contemplation in his Summa Theologica, 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) considers the connection between beauty and reason:  
[B]eauty… consists in a certain clarity and due proportion.  Now each of 
these is found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes 
beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong 
to reason.  Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the 
reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is 
written (Wis. viii. 2) of the contemplation of wisdom: I became a lover of 
her wisdom. 
On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so far 
as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it in 
temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken 
the light of reason.                                                  (ST 2, 2, Q 180, 2ae)174 
 
Thomas maintains the practice of connecting beauty with morality, as well as connecting 
it to reason, contemplation, and wisdom. 
 However, when it comes to morality and nature, Francis of Assisi (1181-1226) 
teaches a special sensitivity for all of creation.  One of the most treasured writings by 
Francis is his Canticle of Brother Sun, which was written near his death.  The canticle is 
in praise of the Most High by one who is at “peace and in harmony with all the elements 
of creation and the whole cosmos.”175  Francis views all the elements of creation as 
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brothers and sisters and through them the Lord is praised.  In his canticle he claims a kind 
of likeness between creation and the Creator.  
 However, Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) turns the tables a bit when he uses the 
analogy of the face to refer to the beauty of God and tells how God looks at each of us.  It 
is God’s vision that makes it possible for creation to exist.  We in turn see God’s face as 
if God is of our own species; that is, each species projects its own face.176   
 Akin to Pseudo-Dionysius, other writers, like Meister Eckhart (c.1260-1327), The 
Cloud of Unknowing,177 and John of the Cross (1452-1491), turn their attention to 
apophatic spirituality and theology, an approach which includes a negation of all sense 
experience and judgment, including that of beauty.  However, the negation is never, in 
the larger context, found to be without a cataphatic dimension as well.  While the human 
mind cannot name who God is in God’s totality, neither can there be a negation of what 
was said about God unless there is something to negate.  These authors will enrich 
conversations on questions of God, asserting earthly metaphors and analogies of God, 
and then acknowledging that our assertions always fall short of fully naming Divine 
Mystery.  
 In the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries we find writers, such as Julian 
of Norwich (c.1342-c.1413) and Teresa of Avila (1515-1582), describing their insights 
and visions with intricate storytelling and imagination and with a heightened 
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understanding of emotional and spiritual development.  However, it also appears that 
Teresa’s experience was slighted by some because imaginative visions were understood 
as less superior than those of the intellect.178   
 Another example of someone who adds something particular to the conversation 
is Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), founder of the Society of Jesus, also known as the 
Jesuits.  Ignatius develops a method of discernment that focuses on how the living God is 
working and moving in a person’s ordinary life.  His aim is to recognize God in all 
aspects of creation.  In his Spiritual Exercises he writes: 
[O]ur very desire to name God our Lord carries with it greater respect and 
reverence than desire to name a creature.… The perfect [persons], through 
constant contemplation and enlightenment of their understanding, more 
readily consider, meditate, and contemplate God our Lord as being present 
in every creature by his essence, presence, and power.                    
       (SE, first week, 39)179 
 
With Ignatius we find a heightened desire to recognize the Spirit of God among us and 
dwelling within us day-to-day, while still maintaining the distinction between God and 
creatures.  There remains the need to aspire toward God and to follow God’s will.  
 During the Medieval period religious attitudes worked to keep God as the center 
of attention, as they reflected on how humanity is made in the image and likeness of God 
(particularly men).180  But Renaissance minds were turning more humanistic.  Thus, 
while they were rediscovering Classical times, they “restored man to the centre of 
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attention particularly in the philosophy of Plato.”181  For example, the work of the artist 
Michelangelo was all about the human body.182    
 Michelangelo was a sculptor first, and a painter second.  His work in the Sistine 
Chapel depicts figures that are classically sculptured.  The God portrayed lives on as God 
the Father, the old white man with the long white beard who floats in the air.    
 Turning to the natural world, Michelangelo “creates the sun and moon as 
geometrical abstractions.”183  In one sense, because he was a humanist, “he was the 
quintessential painter of the new art,” and because he refused to “put the world into his 
paintings means that a large part of reality [or creation] is missing.”184  
 Regarding Michelangelo’s work in the Sistine Chapel, it is important to notice 
that the image of “God the Father” is boldly depicted with no hesitation, contrary to 
historical religious reservations. Second, God’s image is portrayed in the holy of holies, 
the very place where popes are chosen to accept the keys to the kingdom first believed to 
have been passed to St. Peter.  Third, God’s semblance is made visible in the center of the 
Church’s structural might, insinuating a special intimacy with the divine.  Fourth, nature 
is only minimally represented.  Finally, the image of man is central. 
 While there was great acclaim over Michelangelo’s masterful accomplishment it 
was not necessarily a benign enterprise.  Bernard Lamarche-Vidal comments on 
Michelangelo and the golden age: 
Michelangelo’s enemies were not wrong; his work shows a retreat of 
investment from the legal dispositions of the religious discourses on the 
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pictorial codes toward new values sustained by the liberal classes, which 
are values of pleasure.185 
 
 Pope Julius II’s determination for mammoth projects, including the painting of the 
Sistine Chapel, speaks of a very real struggle that the institutional Church was having in 
asserting its authority as a unity of the temporal and spiritual realms.186  The apex of this 
connection between two worlds was the Church, now under increasing threat.  When 
Michelangelo completed the project in 1512, major troubles for the Roman Church were 
just over the horizon, including, but not restricted to, Martin Luther. 
 In 1517, Martin Luther (1483-1546) displayed his “Ninety-five theses,” which 
came to be recognized as the beginning of the German Reformation.  Concerning 
religious art, Luther was not totally against such representation; he simply did not think it 
was necessary.187  If it helped people’s faith to deepen and they avoided worshiping 
images, then he could tolerate them,188 but some of those that followed Luther were 
adamantly opposed to religious images, statuary, and such.  They included Huldrych 
Zwingli and John Calvin.189   
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 However, Calvin does address the topic of nature and prefers to use the metaphor 
of theatre when speaking of God and the natural world.  Citing this metaphor, Belden C. 
Lane writes: 
[Calvin’s] favorite metaphor in speaking of the natural world and its 
beauty was to describe it as a theatre of God’s glory.  Every human being, 
he said, is ‘formed to be a spectator of the created world and given eyes 
that he might be led to its author by contemplating so beautiful a 
representation.’190   
 
Moreover, the principal actor in this vast theatrical production is none 
other than God alone, evoking desire by ‘showing himself in the visible 
splendor of his apparel.’191  As Calvin understood it, the contemplation of 
God’s beauty on the great stage of nature is a performance that absorbs the 
whole of creation.  It is the end toward which everything is made.192 
 
 Following the Reform tradition, sculptures and paintings were allowed and 
understood as from God only if they depicted items that could be seen with the eye.193  
This meant that landscapes and people could be subjects of art, as long as the art was not 
specifically religious.  Thiessen makes the observation:  
It is interesting to note that this is precisely what happened with the 
reformation in the Low Countries.  Religious images were abandoned for 
genre subjects, still life and historical painting.  Yet, in many of these non-
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religious works, distinctly moral messages, such as the symbolical 
inclusion of the seven deadly sins, were retained and developed.194 
 
This kind of sublimation is not restricted to the Low Countries or to the sixteenth century.   
 With the Reformation and Counter-Reformation there was a dispersal of creative 
energies that opened the window, even more so, to different understandings of aesthetics, 
art, beauty, God, and the natural world.  However, at this juncture of time there can still 
be found an overwhelming belief in God and, although not always followed, there is the 
sense that one needs to live a moral life as part of a religious path in which one aspires 
toward the beauty of God or religious ideals.  Creation can still be understood as 
reflecting the Creator, as a means to the Creator, and as less significant than the spiritual 
world. 
C.  Aesthetics and Nature 
 In this the final section of chapter one, we will focus more closely on ideas and 
attitudes toward creation, or what we customarily refer to as nature or the natural world, 
in those years primarily after the Renaissance.  Part one will set a general context and 
part two will examine a limited number of ideas on aesthetics or art that, in particular, 
pertain to or refer to nature.  
 1.  Changing Perspectives and the Idea of Interconnectedness 
 Many have viewed the world as spirit and matter that are mixed to different 
degrees.  For example, a horse would have more spirit than a piece of wood, humans 
more than a horse.  But in the fifteenth century Nicholas of Cusa begins to use the term 
“machine” in speaking of the world, which would later help to diminish the spirit part of 
this metaphysical understanding.  Although the term is without the full force of the 
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meaning of “machine,” he anticipates what lies ahead.  His work is an example of earthly 
order beginning to be viewed as mechanistic: 
[T]hrough visible things and their magnitude, beauty, and order we are led 
to marvel at the divine art.… For through arithmetic God joined things 
together; through geometry God fashioned them in such a way that they 
receive steadfastness, stability, and mobility, according to their conditions; 
with music God gave them such proportion that there is not more earth in 
earth than water in water, air in air, and fire in fire, so that no element is 
wholly resoluble into another.  Therefore, the machine of the world cannot 
perish.                (Book2, Ch. 13, para. 175, p. 166)195 
 
 Yet, we also find toward the end of the Renaissance a shifting of ideas on beauty 
toward a new complexity: “Beauty did not so much spring from balanced proportion, but 
from a sort of torsion, a restless reaching out for something lying beyond the 
mathematical rules that govern the physical world.”196  Equilibrium, not unlike 
dissatisfaction with the ancient Greek value of repose, was not communicating the depth 
that it had once delivered.  For beauty to be understood differently and for a “change to 
occur in the arts… the world had to be understood as less ordered and geometrically 
obvious.”197  
 Ptolemy’s (4th – 3rd century B.C.E.) theory of the cosmos with earth as its center 
was “based on the perfection of the circle” and it “seemed to embody the Classical ideals 
of proportion.”198  Centuries later Copernicus (1473-1543) and Galileo (1564-1642) 
challenge geocentric belief when they each put forth a heliocentric understanding.  But 
also shocking was Kepler’s (1571-1630) “planetary model, in which the earth revolves 
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along an ellipse of which the sun is one of the foci,” thus, the “image of spherical 
perfection was thrown into crisis.  This was not because Kepler’s model of the cosmos 
did not obey mathematical laws, but because—in a visual sense—it no longer resembled 
the ‘Pythagorean’ perfection of a system of concentric spheres.”199   
 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Western world was beginning to let 
go of a very orderly cosmos in terms of science, politics, religion, and commerce.  In the 
seventeenth century René Descartes (1596-1650) questions the convergence of our 
different kinds of beliefs across disciplines.200  He determines that understandings arising 
from myths, theology, and science do not meet.  He moves to start his analysis from a 
different point, his own power to reason.  He encourages thinking that emphasizes human 
reasoning, which further divides body and mind, and matter and spirit.201  This shift is not 
exactly the same dualism of the past that placed greater emphasis on the transcendent.  
Rather, there is growing emphasis on the human mind.   
 For Descartes, thinking is existing.  His questions lead him to work “out a very 
clear and complete mechanistic conception of the physical world, including the world of 
organic creatures, and his thinking along this line has helped to give direction and 
impetus to the scientific study of nature ever since.”202    
 More so, if the world is not ordered as we thought and religion seems to have 
gone to war even with itself, then what are we to think and to believe?  Mark Lilla 
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explains that times were ripe in the seventeenth century for the ideas of philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).  Writing on political theology Lilla argues: 
Traditionally, political theology had interpreted a set of revealed divine 
commands and applied them to social life.  In his great treatise 
“Leviathan” (1651), Hobbes simply ignored the substance of those 
commands and talked instead about how and why human beings believed 
God revealed them.  He did the most revolutionary thing a thinker can 
ever do—he changed the subject, from God and his commands to man and 
his beliefs.203 
 
 Hobbes was a materialist, which means matter is matter.  Even God is matter.204  
And in this material world Hobbes believes that the “natural state of man is one of war 
and strife, unless acted upon and governed by the rules of social living.”  He thinks 
humans have free will, but are under the constraints of natural law: “Only a covenant kept 
by the rule of the sword can keep man from falling back into his natural state.”205   
 Hobbes was followed by others, such as John Locke (1632-1704) who furthers the 
divide between religion and the secular by aiming to put thinking on sound scientific 
grounds, empirical grounds.  In the West, an increased valuing of reason was fueling the 
rise of science.  In this regard, Isaac Newton (1647-1727) asserts the idea that the 
“universe runs according to law-governed mechanical principles.”206   
 These principles were providing new tools, as it were, for inventors; thus, creating 
new wealth for people beyond the traditional aristocracy.  Also, countries and enterprises 
were greatly enhanced by trade and the establishment of new colonies around the globe, 
                                                 
     203Mark Lilla, “The Politics of God,” The New York Times, 19 August 2007, 
<http:www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/magazine/19Religion-t.html…>  (19 August 2007).  Mark Lilla is 
professor of the humanities at Columbia University.  This essay was adapted from his book, The Stillborn 
God: Religion, Politics and the Modern West (New York: Knopf, 2007).  
     204Stokes, Philosophy: 100 Essential Thinkers, 69.  
     205Stokes, Philosophy: 100 Essential Thinkers, 69. 
     206Stokes, Philosophy: 100 Essential Thinkers, 71.  
 61
including in the Americas. The business of oppression, subjugation, and slavery provided 
needed labor for commerce.  Some of these labor resources were considered property and 
although the issue of slavery is too large for this study to address it is important to note 
how privilege and power can objectify difference and the perception of others as things or 
property. 
 By the eighteenth century parts of the Western world were changing quickly.  
But, the environmentalist Bill McKibben, citing the economist Jeffrey Sachs, believes 
that it was the invention of a practical version of the steam engine that finally catapulted 
the West into rapid growth and development.  McKibben writes: 
[I]n 1712, something new finally happened.  A British inventor named 
Thomas Newcomen developed the first practical steam engine.  He burned 
coal, and used the steam pressure built up in his boiler to drive a pump 
that, in turn, drained water from coal mines, allowing them to operate far 
more cheaply and efficiently.  How much more efficiently?  His engine 
replaced a team of five hundred horses walking in a circle.  And from 
there—well, things accelerated.  In the words of the  economist Jeffrey 
Sachs, ‘The steam engine marked the decisive turning point of human 
history.’207 
 
 Why?  Because before the steam engine was in use, large numbers of  
domesticated animals were needed to be cared for and fed, which meant lots of farmers 
needed to grow a great deal of grain to feed them.  This meant less for the general 
population to consume and an increased need to work on farms.  But with a working 
steam engine humans began to construct an entirely different energy apparatus that is 
based on fossil fuels.208  This, in turn, allowed more food for more people and innovation 
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raised confidence in humanity’s ability to imagine, create, and shape the future of life on 
earth.  And inventions, such as the steam engine, bolstered human determination to do so.  
Again, McKibbon writes:  
First coal, then oil, then natural gas allowed for everything we consider 
normal and obvious about the modern world, from making fertilizer to 
making steel to making electricity.  These in turn fed all the subsidiary 
revolutions in transportation and chemistry and communication, right 
down to the electron-based information age we now inhabit.  Suddenly, 
one-hundred-percent growth in the standard of living could be 
accomplished in a few decades, not a few millennia.209 
 
Interestingly, just as confidence was rising regarding the power and specialness of the 
human species to be inventive, the human ego is confronted with the idea of evolution.  
 Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) theory in the nineteenth century served to focus 
attention on the human species and to question its origin.  With evolution humanity stood 
to lose its privileged pinnacle as a species totally set apart from the rest of the natural 
world. 
 However, by the mid-nineteenth century God was still thought to be in nature or 
thought to be reflected in nature.  But as practical, mechanistic visions grew and were 
transformed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by events, cultures, and science, 
questions regarding metaphysics multiplied regarding whether nature, or matter, is 
imbued with Spirit, or if nature even reflects a Creator.  More basically, does God exist? 
 The dream, or “illusion,” loomed large that humanity could manifest its own 
destiny, and for some it did, but in the twentieth century the world experienced two world 
wars.  By their end, nuclear power had been unleashed, killing more than ever imagined.  
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The total dead from World War II is estimated at fifty-two million.210  The extent of 
destruction to the natural world can only be guessed.  Questions began to rise regarding 
human progress, our technology, and inventions. 
 In retrospect, as early as 1818 the novelist Mary Shelley wrote an alarmingly 
prescient tale about human creativity that tells of a lack of foresight and concern for the 
consequences resulting from human makings and science and technology.  Even as 
confidence in human abilities grew, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), among others, 
began to ask questions.  Referring to Greek tragedy, he challenges both science and art.  
He thinks that they each require both “dream and song,” and he suggests that “existence 
can be understood and justified only in aesthetic terms.  This then puts scientific inquiry 
in a new light: it is either a misleading failure or a rival to art; in the latter case it is itself 
a kind of illusion similar to the illusion of art.”211   
 The dangers of modern times are becoming evident.  In the mid-1930’s Martin 
Heidegger is exploring the differences between art and technology, or equipment, in his 
lectures later published as “The Origin of the Work of Art.”212  For Heidegger, art is more 
than a functionary; it has to do with truth that is somehow “working.”213 
  Also, throughout the twentieth century a growing conservationists and 
environmentalists movement increasingly sounds the alarm that progress has a significant 
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price tag.  Among such early issues to be recognized were pollution, decline and 
extinction of species, and the diminishment of wilderness. 
 In 1962 a still, small voice asked us to look at nature differently and urgently.  
That voice was Rachel Carson and she wrote Silent Spring.  In her text she makes earth 
the subject and she begins to demonstrate how human actions affect life on the planet, 
and not just human life.  Whereas Darwin had begun to show how we are related to other 
species, she aims to demonstrate how we are interconnected with other life forms, and to 
the consequences of our technological ways of living on the planet.  While Carson was 
not the first or the only person to draw attention to the interconnectedness of all of life, 
she does mark a moment when concern begins to spread to the general public and to a 
wider arena of professional disciplines.  Among other voices was Hans Jonas, a 
philosopher, who tries to show that we have an ethical responsibility for the technology 
that we create and for the ways in which it impacts the environment.214  
 2.  Aesthetics and Nature 
In the eighteenth century, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) uses the 
term aesthetics as a way to further the work and divisions of the sciences.  To do so he 
narrows aesthetics to the senses, intending to place the science “concerned with sense 
knowledge, alongside logic.”215  Baumgarten has a particular goal: 
The aim of aesthetics, for Baumgarten, was to perfect sense knowledge, 
and this perfection he considered to be nothing less than beauty itself.  In 
other words, beauty is not so much an attribute of things, or a feeling of 
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what is pleasant, but rather an expression of perfecting one’s attainment of 
knowledge in and through the realm of the senses.216 
 
Baumgarten places the “‘higher’ senses of sight and hearing primarily with mental 
activity.”217  With Baumgarten one finds that questions are shifting.  Where the 
medievalists might ask how nature reflects the beauty of God, during the Enlightenment, 
and further into Modernity, people are asking, how we judge something to be beautiful 
and even if we can?   
 While it is with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that aesthetics is propelled into its 
own distinct arena in philosophy, Kant does not come to his ideas as if he is in a vacuum. 
For example, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) had already come to the conclusion that 
there was something akin to an internal sensibility, different from “sensible pleasures,” 
and “rational pleasures.”218  Hutcheson concludes that the source of our pleasure in 
beauty is not to be “fixed on objects, as it had in rival rationalist accounts of beauty,” but 
that the source of this pleasure “lies in us as well as in objects.”219  The objects, however, 
do “give rise to the pleasure of beauty to the degree they posses complex order,”  
“uniformity and variety in high degree.”220  Uniformity and variety are not pitted against 
each other, but exist simultaneously.  And there could be beautiful theories, just as there 
could be beautiful things.221 
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 However, David Hume disagrees with Hutcheson’s idea of a distinct, third 
sensibility.  Instead, he “takes the pleasure of beauty to arise with the involvement of 
both senses and reason, and to have not one but irreducibly many causes in objects.”  
More so, Hume can find no way to establish a “standard of taste.”222  He is up against 
John Locke’s belief that beauty is a sentiment that does reside in the mind.223  But he 
aims to determine if there could be “principles of taste.”  He asserts that there are two 
stages that we pass through before establishing judgments of taste: the perceptual stage, 
and the affective stage.  Affective experiences cannot be compared and judged, but 
perceptual experiences can.  Some perceptions are simply more accurate than others.224   
 Hume observes that there is across time and cultures examples of similar 
judgment, as with great works of literature.  He concludes that when such appropriately 
sound examples are determined not to be beautiful that fault lies not with the object, nor 
the principles, but with the person’s perceptions.225  “Properly weighted perceptions” 
yield proper judgments: 
[W]here there exist universal principles linking the perception of the 
properties of a work to the arousal of sentiments of pleasure and 
displeasure in the mind, where, in other words, we would all respond 
uniformly to a work if we only ideally perceived it, the response of the 
true judge is the ideal response because the perception of the true judge is 
ideal perception.226   
 
Hume is criticized for not recognizing the importance of context when it comes to value.  
But he is given credit for distinguishing “mere differences of taste from perceptual 
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differences of taste, and in then arguing that the latter must have a standard in ‘real matter 
of fact.’”227 
 Kant picks up the task of judgment in his three critiques.  First he wrote Critique 
of Pure Reason, then Critique of Practical Reason, followed by Critique of the Power of 
Judgment.  In the first he tries to “justify metaphysics” by synthesizing the perspectives 
of the rationalists and the empiricists.228  He comes to the conclusion that “in order for 
human beings to interpret the world the human mind had to impose certain structures on 
the flux of incoming sense-data.”229  These he calls the “Categories,” along with time and 
space.230   
 In the second critique, he arrives at his “categorical imperative,” which basically 
means that when we are confronted with a moral question that we should ask ourselves: 
What if everyone did this?231  And in his third examination, Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, Kant makes a leap in that he goes “beyond empirical analysis to the 
identification of the aesthetic as a domain of human experience equal in dignity to the 
theoretical and the practical (i.e., the cognitive and the moral).”232  Kant asserts that in the 
making of an aesthetic judgment certain things are important; such as, disinterestedness; 
the notion of free contemplation; the possibility of making subjective universal 
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judgments; when something is found to be beautiful others ought to be able to agree; and 
spatial and temporal relations are to be valued over content or the utility of the object.233   
 According to Christian Helmut Wenzel, Kant aims to show that judgments of 
taste are not all about emotions or cognition; that is, they are neither totally subjective nor 
objective.234  More so, although Kant’s analysis of beauty has its “roots in an act of 
contemplation,” he does take into account the relationship between the beholder and the 
object.235  Kant argues that there are four moments to such an analysis.236   
 The first moment refers to disinterestedness.  This means that the beholder does 
not have a vested interest in the object.  In this regard, Kant distinguishes between three 
kinds of interest or pleasures: the agreeable, the good, and the beautiful.  The relationship 
based on agreeableness rests on the subject’s feelings or pleasures, while the good rests 
on concepts, rules, and values.   
 However, with the second moment we see that it is in the subjective that beauty 
rest; the reason being that the beholder’s concern does not depend upon an investment in 
the object.  There is nothing in the object that we can definitively point to that can justify 
such a declaration; therefore, there must be “grounds in us and in our relation to the 
object” that justifies this claim.”237  Because of disinterestedness there can remain room 
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for Kant’s second moment, a universal claim of beauty to which everyone should 
agree.238  
 Kant’s third moment involves purposiveness.  This means we “merely play with 
the representation of the object through our powers of cognition,” and although this “play 
is suitable for cognition in general” it is “not determined through any concepts.”  Thus, 
purposiveness is “without purpose,” or beauty is itself the form and the end.239   
 However, rationality and emotion are features of the third moment, although it 
cannot be “reduced to them.”  More so, it is wrong to assume that the “satisfaction in 
beauty is merely a less-developed or lower form of cognition.”  In addition, following the 
moment described as purposiveness is Kant’s fourth moment, referred to as necessity.  It 
holds that if the “first three moments are in place, then we cannot but judge the object to 
be beautiful.”240   
 Even though there may be elements of disharmony (ugly) in beauty, our cognitive 
powers actively search to find harmony.  In fact, a “local disharmony” may create or be 
part of a “harmony in a wider context.”  But in the “case of the ugly there is no wider 
context available in which the disharmony would turn into harmony.”  However, a “more 
sophisticated play between imagination and understanding may produce harmony where 
earlier perception had produced only disharmony.”241   
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 While Kant is most intent on judgments of taste regarding the beautiful, he does 
consider the sublime.  He contends that there are two steps related to the sublime.  One 
has to do with magnitude or size, and the other with power or dynamism.242   
 Kant writes that “it is the disposition of the mind resulting from a certain 
representation occupying the reflective judgment, but not the object, which is to be called 
sublime.”243  Recognizing how inventions of magnification have affected people’s 
perceptions and imaginations, he says that it is the ability to enlarge one’s perceptions 
with the imagination that stretches intellectual comprehension.244  In comparison, it is the 
mind that “feels itself moved in the representation of the sublime in nature, while in the 
aesthetic judgment on the beautiful in nature it is calm contemplation.”245   
 When Kant speaks of the sublime it is with regard to nature.  It has to do with 
those experiences where we feel overwhelmed by the scale of the natural world and by its 
command and energy.  In the midst of its overpowering magnitude and vitality we feel 
small and powerless.  Interpreting Kant, Crawford contends: 
Nature’s might makes us recognize our own physical impotence, 
considered as beings of nature, but at the same time nature discloses to us 
our unique power of a different kind of resistance.  We can come to realize 
that nature has no dominion over us, even over our physical and sensory 
response, since we have the ability, through the use of our reason, to direct 
our sensible faculties not to feel fear in fearful circumstances.246 
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Something is revealed to us about our own power and freedom in the midst of the ordeal, 
a kind of superiority as compared to nature.247  Judgments of the sublime can be 
universal, just as judgments of taste; however, they do not pertain to an object per se, but 
more to “a state of mind.”248   
 Kant’s work also includes some reflection on morality and beauty.  Crawford 
writes: 
[A]t a minimum Kant seems to think there is an analogy between the two 
realms.  The pleasure in apprehending and judging beauty (and perhaps 
the sublime as well) is ultimately based on an awareness of (and pleasure 
in) our faculty of judgment itself exercising a power over sensibility, 
which is required if morality is to have a point.  Based on this analogy, it 
is possible for an individual’s exercise of taste to transfer to the moral 
realm, the realm requiring the exercise of our freedom (in judgment, above 
all) to direct our actions in the empirical world.249 
 
Both the judgment of taste and the judgment of morality require reflection.  Beauty is, or 
at least can be, a symbol of morality.250   
 Concerning a very particular issue of morality, Kant focuses on mimesis.  He tells 
about a “mischievous lad” who tricks people into thinking that they are hearing live 
songbirds when they are, in fact, hearing only a young man’s imitations.  He says: 
[A]s soon as one becomes aware that it is a trick, no one would long 
endure listening to this song, previously taken to be so charming; and the 
same is true with every other songbird.  It must be nature, or taken to be 
nature by us, for us to  be able to take such an immediate interest in the 
beautiful, and even more so if we are to be at all able to expect of others 
that they should take this interest in it.251 
 
                                                 
     247Crawford, “Kant,” 64. 
     248Crawford, “Kant,” 64. 
     249Crawford, “Kant,” 67.  The parentheses are those of the translators. 
     250Wenzel, An Introduction to Kant’s Aesthetics, 117-118.  See Kant, Critique of the Power of 
Judgment, section 49. 
     251Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, para. 42, p. 182. 
 72
Is it simulation, or deception, which Kant like Plato would find most upsetting?  
Obviously the lad has knowledge of the songbird, but he is tricking his listeners who are 
attached to the original.  It is Aristotle’s view on art’s imitation of nature that Kant seems 
to reframe. 
 Aristotle writes that “‘nature’ has two senses,” form and matter and that “art 
imitates nature,” claiming that art and physics must know form and matter “up to a 
point.”252  However, Kant’s rendition seems to move the conversation to a place that 
leaves room for later questions that ask: What is nature and what is art, and what is the 
difference?  Kant writes: 
In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the 
purposiveness in its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint 
by arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of nature.  On this feeling of 
freedom in the play of our cognitive powers, which must yet at the same 
time be purposive, rests that pleasure which is alone universally 
communicable though without being grounded on concepts.  Nature was 
beautiful, if at the same time it looked like art; and art can be called 
beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature… 
beautiful art must be regarded as nature, although of course one is aware 
of it as art.253 
 
 Kant wants the making of art to be unconstrained and free to be explored.  Art not 
being the same as nature, yet made to look like nature, foreshadows contemporary issues 
related to virtual reality, bio-engineering, mimetic biology, and such.    
 From this study, we can assume that one of Kant’s objectives is to show that 
something is missing with only a reasoned and moral assessment of reality, and in fact, 
his work became the “cornerstone of Romanticism.”254  Also, he laid the groundwork for 
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aesthetics developing into its own discipline by separating aesthetics from his earlier 
critiques.  His work, marked by the idea of disinterestedness, contributed to aesthetics 
becoming mainly concerned with art, separated from the natural world and ordinary 
experience. 
 But some decades later Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) insists that 
philosophy is the “final” form, with “art but one previous step toward truth.”255  Hegel 
speaks of a kind of correlation between reality and the notion of reality.256  Beauty is only 
“one way in which truth is expressed.”257  Yet, for Hegel, in the broad scale of things, art 
does surpass nature: 
Without entering now into the disputed question how far the quality of 
beauty can justly be predicated of such objects, and consequently the 
beauty of nature comes generally into competition with that of art, we are 
justified in maintaining categorically that the beauty of art stands higher 
than Nature.  For the beauty of art is a beauty begotten, a new birth of 
mind; and to the extent that Spirit and its creations stand higher than 
Nature and its phenomena, to that extent the beauty of art is more exalted 
than the beauty of Nature.  Indeed, if we regard the matter in its formal 
aspect, that is to say, according to the way it is there, any chance fancy 
that passes through any one’s head, is of higher rank than any product of 
Nature.258 
 
The word he uses to assess nature is “utility.”259  Hegel’s assertion leaves no doubt that 
the human maker is privileged. 
 Yet, by the nineteenth century, while there is a drive toward technology, scientific 
understanding, industrial growth and progress, there is also a growing awareness by some 
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that many people are being left behind to fend for themselves in socially dire 
circumstances.  Modernity’s cities must deal with rancid water, coal blackened air, rivers 
of sewage, disease, and growing populations.  Along with political and philosophical 
writers, we see books such as A Tale of Two Cities (1859), by Charles Dickens, and 
paintings, such as The Potato Eaters (1885) by Vincent van Gogh.  
 While America during this time was still greatly influenced by England and 
France and although artists in the United States were wrestling with a very different and 
still not very populated terrain beyond the cities, even here the struggle between rural and 
urban was emerging.  For example, in 1836 Thomas Cole “envisaged” in his painting, 
The Oxbow, “tensions between nature and culture,” as he shows a serene valley covered 
with tree stumps, having been felled for the railroad.260  Later, in 1888 Albert Bierstadt 
executes a painting called, The Last of the Buffalo.261   
Conclusion   
 In this chapter we have attempted to show an unfolding of ideas and 
understandings concerning aesthetics, nature, and theology.  First, we explored aesthetics 
starting with the ancient Greeks, followed by the ancient Hebrews, and then examples of 
early Christian ideas.  Next, we selectively considered the use of aesthetics in first and 
second millennium Western history.  And finally, we took note of some of the changing 
perspectives regarding aesthetics and nature through the Enlightenment and into 
Modernity.   
                                                 
     260Andrew Wilton and Tim Barringer, American Sublime: Landscape painting in the United States 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 65.  See also pgs. 39, 41. 
     261Wilton and Barringer, American Sublime, 63. 
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 We highlighted ideas usually associated with aesthetics; such as, measurement, 
order, harmony, mimesis, representation, images, idolatry, spirit/matter, virtue, 
illumination, the beautiful and the sublime, and the natural world and human 
constructions.  From this survey we can assert a working statement about aesthetics.   
 Over time the meaning and reach of aesthetics has functioned in diverse and 
broad ways.  It has included how we appreciate beauty, as well as how we perceive, 
select, order, measure, judge, imagine, express, construct, form, and create.  Its meaning 
has functioned according to various canons, standards, criteria, or principles, and our 
understanding of aesthetics has been influenced by our needs, fears, joys, yearnings, 
revelations, inspirations, hopes, geography, and history.  Aesthetics has been strongly 
related to sense experience, but not limited to sense experience.  Consistently, the idea of 
harmonization arises, as well as questions concerning the validity of mimesis.  Often 
these ideas and questions have involved human beings seeking unity and harmony with 
the spiritual world, and now with the world itself.  In addition, when it comes to 
aesthetics, we have seen that the question of how to balance reason and emotions has 
been part of the conversation through history, for sure since Plato.  It emerges in Kant’s 
thinking on his ideas related to disinterestedness and universality.   
 Particular to Christianity, we see that divinized humanity was allowed to be 
represented with sensate material and, then, with the help of these representations and 
symbols, mortals would seek to be molded in the likeness of the prototype.  Gradually the 
taboo on representing even the Godhead faded away and depictions of God became very 
humanlike.   
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 More so, having known their smallness in the natural world and the largeness of 
Mystery, humans begin to imagine the cosmos differently with the growing importance 
of reason and the rise of science and technology.  There is a sense that human makings 
are of greater value than nature because it takes a human mind to produce such things as 
art.   
 Humans explore and push the outer edges of their power over nature, sometimes 
intentionally and sometimes not.  And while the latter centuries brought with them many 
welcomed discoveries and inventions, there are some who questioned modern 
developments, which relied so heavily on the idea of human progress.   
 Now, in the midst of a growing human population, our fierce attachment to 
consumer products, and our growing technological capacity and dependency, many are 
reflecting on the precarious state of the contemporary environment with feelings of deep 
sadness, as well as fear.  However, many also feel an ethical demand and urgency to 
appreciate nature with greater sensitivity, while simultaneously responding to the 
challenge to imagine and to create well.  Increasingly, questions concerning 
harmonization and mimesis now involve humanity/culture and the natural world.   
 What does it mean to appreciate the contemporary earthly environment, which we 
now understand is all so interconnected?  What does it mean to be a human creator/maker 
in a world where humans are more and more responsible for shaping the global 
landscape, a complex integration of nature and culture?  What do beauty, harmony, 
mimesis, and the sublime mean today?  How is the Mystery we call God active and 
present in the contemporary and evolving environment? 
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 In the next chapter we will examine Sallie McFague’s work, particularly her 
approach to nature and her use of aesthetics.  McFague dedicates notable effort to the 
integration of theology, aesthetics, and science in her approach to the natural world.
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Chapter Two  
 
Ecotheologian Sallie McFague and  
Her Use of Aesthetics 
 
 This chapter will examine how theologian Sallie McFague uses aesthetics in her 
theological work regarding the natural world.  Since McFague’s contribution to 
understanding the role of metaphor in theology is important not only for understanding 
her theology, but also for comprehending her treatment of aesthetics, this chapter will 
begin with her notion of metaphor, followed by attention to a particular metaphor for 
which her work is best known, “the world as the body of God.”1  This will provide us 
with a foundation for examining the topics of nature and aesthetics, and McFague’s 
suggestion that we read and write about nature as a way to render us more sensitive to the 
natural world.  Since her use of “glory of God” and “fully alive” have relevance for this 
study, they will also receive attention.  Finally, we will assess McFague’s work and 
attempt to name her contributions related to how we might think about and approach 
nature aesthetically? 
A.  Metaphor in McFague’s Theology 
 Sallie McFague’s first major text on the topic of metaphor was published in 1975, 
Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology.  This work was followed in 
1982 by Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language.  In the preface 
to her 1982 book she reflects on Speaking in Parables.  She writes: 
                                                 
     1Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1988), 60. 
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In part, the book attempted to suggest a variety of reflective forms other 
than constructive theology as genuine Christian literature in light of what 
appeared to me to be an improper primacy of theological reflection over 
other forms.  The value of the book, in retrospect, was its recognition of 
the importance in religion of imagistic language as the base and funding 
for conceptual, theological language; however, I did not attend to the 
movement from the one language to the other.2 
 
Thus, in Metaphorical Theology, McFague seeks to narrow the divide between the world 
of images/metaphorical language and conceptual religious language about God.  She 
considers her heuristic, metaphorical theology a “thought experiment.”  She wishes to 
prevent literalistic interpretations of any of her suggested models of God.3   
 McFague’s interest in the topic is not with methods of language or models of God 
for their own sake.  Rather, by the time she writes Metaphorical Theology she asserts that 
for Christianity to remain relevant it must examine the metaphors and models that it 
employs.  Christianity must be willing to let go of metaphors and models that no longer 
communicate depth of meaning and be willing to offer or embrace metaphors and models 
that speak to contemporary experience.  Even more so, in the second edition she 
addresses an urgent contemporary issue that focuses her point.   
 In her preface to the 1985 printing of Metaphorical Theology she recalls an 
address by Gordon Kaufman to the American Academy of Religion in 1982 in which he 
speaks of the need for both deconstruction and reconstruction of our religious symbols.  
He speaks to the possibility that our religious symbols could be “irrelevant” and even 
“harmful” to life on planet earth.4  McFague’s subsequent books will participate in this 
examination and dialogue.  For the purpose of this study we must keep her growing 
                                                 
     2Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1982), vii.  
     3McFague, Metaphorical Theology, viii. 
     4McFague, Metaphorical Theology, x. 
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concern about Christian symbols in mind as we explore her understanding and use of 
metaphor.   
 McFague is convinced that “metaphorical thinking constitutes the basis of human 
thought and language.”  Reminiscent of Aristotle’s positive assertion that even children 
use imitation to learn,5 she says even as “infants we construct our world through 
metaphor.”6  For McFague, metaphor is neither a copy of that to which it refers, nor is it a 
new creation totally un-tethered from reality.7   
 In fact, McFague values work being done by deconstructionists in philosophy and 
theology in terms of their questioning of traditional metaphysics, solidified metaphors, 
and the exploration of negative theology, but she also challenges a number of their 
assertions.8  Some thinkers declare that language is nothing more than metaphor,9 the text 
being inclusive of its author, but with no referent.10  McFague disagrees, and gives 
caution both to fundamentalists who tend to literalize and make absolute the text and its 
metaphors, as well as to deconstructionists who espouse extreme forms of deconstruction, 
asserting that all is metaphor, whereby a metaphor only refers to another metaphor…11    
 McFague believes that these two positions are linked.  She writes: 
“[F]undamentalism fails to appreciate that the language of theology is metaphorical, and 
                                                 
     5Aristotle, “Poetics,” in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, trans. Ingram Bywater (New 
York: Random House, 2001), 1457-1458, (citation 1448b 5).   
     6McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 15. 
     7McFague, Models of God, 26. 
     8McFague, Models of God, 24. 
     9McFague, Models of God, 23. 
     10McFague, Models of God, 22-24. 
     11McFague, Models of God, 22. 
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deconstruction refuses to acknowledge that there is anything but metaphor.”12  In their 
extreme, one sees only presence, and the other only absence.13  
 McFague does not accept that “language (writing)” is only about itself, nor is one 
constructed metaphor as good as another.  Instead, she says: “All that follows is that our 
access to reality is in every case mediated and hence partial and relative,” and that “the 
presence of many constructions, many metaphors, assumes conflict and the need for 
criteria.”14  But how is one to determine whether one construction or metaphor is better 
than another?  She writes: 
 [T]his is the claim that I would make: that a construction of the Christian faith 
 in the context of a holistic vision and the nuclear threat is from our particular 
 perspective and for our particular time relatively better than constructions that 
 ignore these issues.15   
 
McFague is pushing for theological language that engages the current reality that is 
increasingly imperiled.  She knows that language is reflective, in that it interprets reality, 
yet, at the same time, it is also constructive:  
All renderings of reality are metaphorical (that is, none is literal), but in 
our novel constructions we offer new possibilities in place of others.  In 
this sense, we create the reality in which we live; we do not copy it, or to 
put it more pointedly, there are no copies, only creations.  The assumption 
here, however, is that there is a reality to which our constructions refer, 
even though the only way we have of reaching it is by creating versions of 
it.16   
 
 However, no one can create images of God.  McFague claims that culture(s) gives 
rise to religious symbols; that is, they are “born and die in a culture for complex reasons.”  
                                                 
     12McFague, Models of God, 22. 
     13McFague, Models of God, 23-25. 
     14McFague, Models of God, 26. 
     15McFague, Models of God, 27. 
     16McFague, Models of God, 26. 
 82
Thus, we need to “attend carefully to the images in the culture and church which appear 
to be emerging and to experiment imaginatively with them, reflecting on their 
implications for life with God and with others.”17   
 Concerning Jesus and fearing literalism and various kinds of idolatries, McFague 
prefers to understand him as a “parable of God.”18  Jesus as “parable of God both ‘is and 
is not’ God.”19  He tells about “God’s relationship to us” through his parables and by way 
of his very person.  McFague’s “metaphorical theology is ‘positive’ as well as ‘negative,’ 
giving license for speech about God as well as indicating the limits of such speech.”20  
But her concern is over more than how we speak about God.  She questions what is being 
said and to this end she sees Scripture as a starting place, and not the final theological 
measure: 
The New Testament writings are foundational; they are classics; they are a 
beginning.  But if we take seriously the parables of Jesus and Jesus as a 
parable of God as a starting point and model, then we cannot say that the 
Bible is absolute or authoritative in any sense except the way that a 
“classic” text is authoritative: it continues to speak to us.  What must 
always be kept in mind is that the parables as metaphors and the life of 
Jesus as a metaphor of God provide characteristics for theology: a 
theology guided by them is open-ended, tentative, indirect, tensive, 
iconoclastic, transformative.21 
 
 McFague also distinguishes between metaphorical language and symbolic 
language by describing symbolic statements as being “not so much a way of knowing and 
speaking as they are sedimentation and solidification of metaphor.… The tension of 
                                                 
     17McFague, Models of God, 20.  
     18Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 18-19.  She specifically credits Leander Keck and John 
Donahue for their work on this subject.  See footnote #21, page 200.   
     19McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 19. 
     20McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 19. 
     21McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 19. 
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metaphor is absorbed by the harmony of symbol.”  With metaphorical tensions, we are 
still in the process of making judgments.22  Rather simply, sacramental thinking can be 
seen as “priestly and metaphorical thinking as prophetic.”  Accordingly, the former 
“assumes an order and unity already present waiting to be realized,” while the latter, 
“projects, tentatively, a possible transformed order and unity yet to be realized.”23   
 Granted, McFague’s distinctions are oversimplified.  However, she is trying to 
describe differences in metaphors, as well as to show how some religious metaphors have 
lost their potency.  
 Speaking practically about how we use metaphor, she writes: “Metaphor is seeing 
one thing as something else, pretending ‘this’ is ‘that’ because we do not know how to 
think or talk about ‘this’ so we use ‘that’ as a way of saying something about it.”24  
Indeed, we cannot know anything literally or directly, but we have “simply acquired a 
way of looking at it which is acceptable to us.”25  One might say, our perception has met 
a certain criterion or, by repetition, we now take for granted that it is so, and while we do 
not know all there is to know about a topic, we attempt to communicate what we think we 
know.   
 With the use of metaphors, models help us to organize our thinking; they assist us 
in noticing certain data and in filtering out other information as theories develop.  This is 
as true in the sciences as in the humanities.  However, when frameworks are not 
understood as having some sense of “metaphorical roots” open to revisions, they can 
                                                 
     22McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 16. 
     23McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 17. 
     24McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 15.  
     25McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 16.  
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become like idols, frozen in time.26  Following physicist/theologian Ian Barbour, 
McFague gives four ways to consider models that are relevant for scientists as well as for 
theologians: naïve realism; positivism; instrumentalism; and critical realism.27   
 With critical realism there is the understanding that no model is complete or fully 
adequate.28  However, McFague recalls Barbour writing that critical realists “hold that 
there are entities in the world something like those described in the model; they believe 
there is some isomorphism between the model and the real structures of the world.”29  
Models, in fact, “redescribe reality.”  In theology and in science, “something new is 
being said about reality which the user of the model believes describes it better, more 
appropriately, than the accepted views.”30   
 We do not deal with “reality as it is” and then articulate “views of it”; rather, we 
deal with views of reality, “old and new, accepted and unconventional.”31  In fact, there 
are no fully accurate descriptions; rather, what we have are interpretations.32   
 Still, our constructed models lead to theories and we continue to use them as long 
as they yield illumination.33  McFague writes: 
When we find that the models of a theological tradition illuminate our 
experience, we are claiming that they interpret, explain, make sense of that 
experience.  More important still, we are making a judgment that they can 
                                                 
     26McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 25-26. 
     27McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 132.  She credits Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A 
Comparative Study in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 34-38.  
     28McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 133.    
     29McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 133.  She credits Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A 
Comparative Study in Science and Religion, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 42.  
     30McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 133-134. 
     31McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 134.  
     32Sallie McFague, A New Climate for Theology: God, Theology, and Global Warming (Minneapolis, 
Minn.: Fortress Press, 2008), 52.  
     33McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 142. 
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make sense of it because they refer to reality, because in their own way—
that is, partially and indirectly—they are a redescription of it.  They are 
not reality [or that reality], but a construct or interpretation of it, which 
must, however, be in some sense isomorphic with reality or they would 
not be able to make much sense out of life as lived.34   
 
Theological traditions that shed light on our experiences include those ancient methods 
and models that were used to speak of, depict, and illuminate religious wisdom.  In 
general, redescriptions or models are made up of metaphors, and “good metaphors” are 
ones that are still vibrant; they still surprise us or “shock” us.35   They can “bring unlikes 
together… upset conventions… involve tension” and are “implicitly revolutionary.”36   
B.  McFague’s Major Metaphor: The World as Body of God 
 McFague acknowledges in her 1987 book, Models of God: Theology for an 
Ecological Nuclear Age, that there has been some degree of advancement “against the 
androcentric, hierarchical character of the Western religious tradition,” at least in some 
circles and places.  But, she contends that even feminists have not done enough to 
understand and embrace the “intrinsic value” of nonhuman creation in a way that could 
bring about a change in our consciousness, a change that is necessary in an age threatened 
with nuclear catastrophe and experiencing environmental degradation.37  But feminists 
are not alone in having fallen short. 
 McFague claims that process theologians “have not moved boldly to suggest other 
models more suited to a view of God as intrinsically and radically relational.”38  
                                                 
     34McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 142. 
     35McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 17. 
     36McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 17. 
     37Sallie McFague, Models of God: Theology for an Ecological Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1987), 6-7. 
     38McFague, Models of God, 19. 
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Regarding black and Third World theologies, she says that while they “fully retain the 
agential aspects of the Western concept, they do so in a way that limits God to the realm 
of persons and history, leaving much of the cosmos unaddressed.”  Their focus has been 
primarily focused on and limited to liberating human beings who are oppressed.39 
 Along with discouraging anthropocentricism, McFague rejects a mechanistic view 
of nature.  Rather, she supports an understanding of nature that is more organic, while 
avoiding sentimentalizing about nature, as well as a “leveling of all distinctions” between 
nonhuman creation and humans.  She writes: 
[T]he evolutionary, ecological perspective insists that we are, in the most 
profound ways, “not our own”: we belong, from the cells of our bodies to 
the finest creations of our minds, to the intricate, constantly changing 
cosmos.  The ecosystem of which we are part is a whole: the rocks and 
waters, atmosphere and soil, plants, animals, and human beings interact in 
dynamic, mutually supportive ways that make all talk of atomistic 
individualism indefensible.  Relationship and interdependence, change and 
transformation, not substance, changelessness, and perfection, are the 
categories within which a theology for our day must function.40 
 
 To support this holistic vision McFague states in Models of God that we need a 
“new sensibility.”  It would require us to be responsibly informed about nuclear issues 
and necessitate that we be conscious of the “constructive character of all human 
activities,” including our world views and our religions.41  She claims that in the last 
century we came to an “increasing awareness of the creative, interpretive character of 
human existence.”42  Now, however, we urgently need to take responsibility for our 
interpretations and our creativity. 
                                                 
     39McFague, Models of God, 19. 
     40McFague, Models of God, 7-8. 
     41McFague, Models of God, 21. 
     42McFague, Models of God, 21-22. 
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 Concerning symbols of faith, the task of deconstructing and reconstructing cannot 
be “merely or mainly hermeneutics.”  Instead, theology must be constructive and willing 
to risk thinking ideas that may be different from the past.43  McFague suggests we 
experiment with imagining the world as God’s body, as well as imagining God as mother, 
lover, and friend.   
 McFague proposes that these suggested models “offer possibilities for envisioning 
power in unified, interdependent ways quite different from the view of power as either 
domination or benevolence.”44  Domination encourages a “sense of distance from the 
world” and the latter usurps human responsibility.45  These are evidenced in our 
metaphors of God as king, ruler, judge, and overwhelmingly male.  Her “thought 
experiment” attempts to critique triumphalism, imperialism, and patriarchy, and to offer 
some alternative models by which to seek and understand the relationship between God 
and creation.46  McFague writes: 
[W]hat if we were to understand the resurrection and ascension not as the 
bodily translation of some individuals to another world—a mythology no 
longer credible to us—but as the promise of God to be permanently 
present, “bodily” present to us, in all places and times of our world?  In 
what ways would we think of the relationship between God and the world 
were we to experiment with the metaphor of the universe as God’s 
“body,” God’s palpable presence in all space and time?  If what is needed 
in our ecological, nuclear age is an imaginative vision of the relationship 
between God and the world that underscores their interdependence and 
mutuality, empowering a sensibility of care and responsibility toward all 
life, how would it help to see the world as the body of God?47 
  
                                                 
     43McFague, Models of God, 21. 
     44McFague, Models of God, 20, 62, 69, 70.  
     45McFague, Models of God, 69. 
     46McFague, Models of God, 20. 
     47McFague, Models of God, 60. 
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 McFague stresses several times that “world as the body of God” is a metaphor.  
She is not “defining or describing the world or universe as God’s body nor God’s 
relationship to it as that of mother, lover, or friend.”48  Certainly these metaphors will 
“miss the mark.”  However, she intends for a heuristic theology to play with ideas in 
order to discover something that is needed.  Metaphor can be “disclosive and 
illuminating,” creating “both a shock and the recognition” of something different.  
McFague is attempting to present metaphors that are appropriate for our time, 
“illuminating” in some way, and better than those that are presently operative.49   
 Recognizing body language that is found in the gospel writings on bread and wine 
as body and blood, and in the stories of the resurrection, McFague asserts that the 
tradition does have a strong bodily sense.  But, the “world as body of God” must include 
more than humankind.   
 However, while traditional images of king and kingdom may lean toward deism, 
McFague’s metaphor could bend toward pantheism.  Arguing against this she claims that 
“God is not reduced to the world if the world is God’s body.”50  She writes:  
Without the use of personal agential metaphors, however, including 
among others God as mother, lover, and friend, the metaphor of the world 
as God’s body would  be pantheistic, for the body would be all there were.  
Nonetheless, the model is monist and perhaps most precisely designated as 
panentheistic; that is, it is a view of the God-world relationship in which 
all things have their origins in God and nothing exists outside God, though 
this does not mean that God is reduced to these things.51 
 
                                                 
     48McFague, Models of God, 63. 
     49McFague, Models of God, 63. 
     50McFague, Models of God, 71. 
     51McFague, Models of God, 71-72. 
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McFague thinks the “world as God’s body” is a fruitful, but not faultless metaphor and in 
her 1993 text, The Body of God: an Ecological Theology,52 she works to further her case.   
 In The Body of God she explains that contemporary organic models have roots in 
ancient ideas, but while a classic organic model often emphasizes harmony and unity, 
freedom of the parts can be lacking.  Furthermore, because these models are usually 
based on male bodies and male associations, women’s experiences and their associations 
are often missing in these formulations.  A universalism can be found that seeks to apply 
a blanket description of experience for everyone.53   
 With Christianity there emerged a visible reality of an invisible deity.  Christ 
became known as the head of the body and humanity as the remainder of the body.  
However, non-human creation is usually not mentioned.  With Neo-platonic thought 
matter becomes less important and the spirit/mind is given greater and greater 
significance, resulting in a dualistic vision of body/matter and spirit/mind.  In addition, 
she claims that Christianity went from a “creation to a redemption context.”54  This led to 
salvation focusing on another world, beyond existence on earth.  Nonetheless, with the 
rise of science organic thinking became less popular.  The machine model excelled and 
still does.55   
 According to McFague, for an organic model to be relative for today, it would 
have to recognize diversity and wholeness; freedom and the common good; biological 
evolution and cultural evolution; human embodiment and the embodiment of all forms of 
                                                 
     52McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993). 
     53McFague, The Body of God, 36-37. 
     54McFague, The Body of God, 32. 
     55McFague, The Body of God, 32-33. 
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creation; natural science and religious faith.  It would have to leave room for a personal 
God who is somehow compatible with science even if not demanded by science.56  An 
organic understanding of the world needs to make sense “not just to our minds, but to our 
bodies, our feelings, our needs, and even our hopes and dreams.”57  She gives four basic 
reasons why an organic model might be adopted by someone.  They include “our own 
embodied and cultural experience; the testimony of significant communities to which we 
belong; the view of reality current in our time; and the usefulness of a perspective, model, 
or construct for humane living.”58 
 Her intention is to suggest an organic model that speaks to contemporary times.  
Ultimately, she wants to “remythologize” our appreciation and understanding of the 
God/human/creation relationship.  She writes: 
[T]hrough remythologizing the doctrines of God and human beings in 
light of the picture of reality from contemporary science—through the use 
of the organic model as a way of reconceiving the relation of God and the 
world—the appropriate human stance vis-à-vis God and our planet will 
emerge.  Remythologizing involves both appreciation and understanding; 
it is a form of embodied thought combining image and concept that calls 
forth both a feeling and a thinking response.  It also  implies an ethical 
response.  If one uses the model of the universe as God’s body, if one 
appreciates and understands creation as organically interrelated, one 
would, or at least might, act differently toward it than if one used the 
model of creation as a work of art.59 
 
She remains cautious because she knows that just because we know right, we do not 
always do right, as St. Paul explained.60  But she thinks remythologizing carries with it 
some degree of hope as she emphasizes ethics in the context of embodiment.61 
                                                 
     56McFague, The Body of God, 77, 76-85. 
     57McFague, The Body of God, 85. 
     58McFague, The Body of God, 85. 
     59McFague, The Body of God, 81. 
     60McFague, The Body of God, 81.  See Romans 7:15. 
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 As she does so, she refuses to get caught between two colliding world views, one 
being atomistic and the other being holistic.  Instead, she acknowledges the need for 
both.62  McFague writes: “The universe is a body, to use a poor analogy from our own 
experience, but it is not a human body; rather, it is matter bodied forth seemingly 
infinitely, diversely, endlessly, yet internally as one.”63  She is concerned about 
particularity and interconnectedness. 
 In The Body of God McFague wants to learn from the metaphor, not concretize or 
literalize the metaphor such that anyone would think God is a body, especially analogous 
to a human body.  She wants to explore what happens to us when we pursue such a view; 
that is, when we appreciate, understand, and ethically live out of the recognition and the 
shock that God is embodied through creation’s diversity and unity.   
 She feels something radical needs to happen.  Eventually, she will move in the 
direction of perceiving nature and its parts more personally; that is, as subjects.  She 
begins this turn when in Models of God she contributes to discourse about God as creator, 
savior, and sustainer with metaphors of mother, lover, and friend.64  
 While McFague thinks a “planetary perspective would advocate… for including 
much on earth hitherto excluded,” she is aware of deficiencies inherent in other attempts 
to perceive all of creation more inclusively.65  Among such efforts is creation spirituality.  
She claims that creation spirituality’s aesthetic perspective overly focuses on celebration 
                                                                                                                                                 
     61McFague, The Body of God, 48. 
     62McFague, The Body of God, 93. 
     63McFague, The Body of God, 97. 
     64McFague, Models of God, 183. 
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of the cosmos in hope that it will overwhelm us with awe, inspiring us to live ethically.  
Needless to say, it falls short.66   
 Another effort that she mentions is natural theology.  She says that while it does 
allow for God, a deistic God, it leaves out revelation and does not make room for a 
personal God.67  Rather, it tends to focus on the “questions of why and how,” keeping it a 
“work of the mind.”68  Her desire is for a “spirit theology” that focuses attention “on the 
rich variety of living forms that have been and are now present on our planet.  The breath 
of God enlivening each and every entity in the body of the universe turns our attention to 
a theology of nature, a theology concerned with the relationship of God and our living, 
breathing planet.”69 
 Eventually, McFague comes to believe that “process theology, which uses the 
analogy of the human self to postulate a form of subjectivity and purpose throughout all 
of existence, from the lowliest bit of matter to God,” along with evolution, or what 
Gordon Kaufman calls “creative serendipity,” could yield helpful results in rethinking 
nature.70  However, in the midst of late twentieth century thinking she is also aware of the 
importance of historical consciousness. 
 Nevertheless, McFague comes to recognize the limits of understanding the world 
primarily through an historical lens.  As early as 1993 she asserts that “now, space should 
become the primary category for thinking about ourselves and other life-forms.”71   
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 McFague contends that we should focus on the need for space that every creature 
requires.  Because focusing on space serves to make the playing field a bit fairer for all 
creatures.  This situates us all together on one small planet.  Secondly, the reason she says 
“we need to turn from a historical (temporal) to a natural (spatial) perspective” is because 
with space the relationship between ecological issues and justice concerns become 
highlighted.72   Ironically, the “crisis facing our planet is, in a sense, temporal:  How 
much time do we have to preserve the possibility of life in community?  But the reason 
that time matters is because we are misusing space.”73  She writes: 
We are ruining the space, and when this occurs, justice issues emerge 
centrally and painfully.  When good space—arable land with clean water 
and air, comfortable temperatures and shade trees—become scarce, turf 
wars are inevitable.  Wars have usually, not just accidentally, been fought 
over land, for land is the bottom line.  Without good land, none of the 
other goods of human existence is possible.  Geography, often considered 
a trivial subject compared to the more splendid history (the feats of the 
forefathers), may well be the subject of the twenty-first century.74 
 
 In her effort to move toward perceiving the earth as embodied space and toward a 
healthier way of engaging with nature, she recalls five models of God that influence how 
we understand nature: deistic (God as clockmaker); dialogic (“God speaks to humans and 
we respond”); monarchical (nostalgic kings control their subjects with little interaction 
with other forms of nature); agential (“God is assumed to be an agent whose intentions 
and purposes are realized in history”); and the organic model (for example, the world as 
God’s body).75  Preferring the two latter models, she welcomes process theology, but 
                                                 
     72The Noble Peace Prize in 2007 was given in large part to Al Gore because of his having demonstrated 
to the world a connection between global warming issues and their connection to peace. 
     73McFague, The Body of God, 101. 
     74McFague, The Body of God, 101.  
     75McFague, The Body of God, 139-140.   
 94
moves it toward a “social view of agency.”76  She wants to re-imagine the relationship of 
God and humanity, inclusive of all of creation where humans take on neglected 
responsibilities of caring for creation. 
 For McFague, spirit is the spirit of God embodied in the world, not as pantheism, 
which would reduce God to the world, but closer to panentheism.  She asserts: 
[God is the] spirit that is the source, the life, the breath of all reality.  
Everything that is is in God and God is in all things and yet God is not 
identical with the universe, for the universe is dependent on God in a way 
that God is not dependent on the universe.”77   
 
 In support of an agential/organic model, she distances herself away from any 
interpretation of the creation stories in Genesis that speak of a production.  This would 
imply something existing externally to God.  God is not an “Architect” who creates the 
world out of nothing (2 Maccabees 7:28).  Rather, God creates in and from Godself.  
McFague supports a procreation and emanation model.78  However, these terms can be 
problematic if they are overly extended.   
 Even so, according to McFague, God is “sacramentally embodied.”  The mystery 
of God is always mediated through some kind of embodiment, and never exhaustively.79  
In recollection of Exodus 33, she says it is similar to the “back and not the face of God 
that we are allowed to see.”80  Then, with the New Testament’s portrayal of the Spirit 
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renewing creation, Jesus of Nazareth becomes the embodied “extension,” leading to an 
“identification in the ‘cosmic’ Christ.”81  All of creation is relational in a dynamic God. 
 What McFague is trying to encourage is a non-static, evolving, relational model 
that works our imaginations and challenges our actions.82 Furthermore, in her next book, 
Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love Nature, she argues that “Christian 
practice, loving God and neighbor as subjects, as worthy of our love in and for 
themselves, should be extended to nature.”83  She works to deepen our awareness of the 
similarities and connections between humanity and the rest of creation, while also 
respecting difference.     
C.  McFague’s Use of Aesthetics and Her Response to How to Love Nature 
 McFague argues that an appreciation and understanding of nature are 
“prerequisites for appropriate action” toward a compromised natural world.84  More 
directly, she insists that Christian nature spirituality calls us to love nature as subjects, 
and to do this we “must pay attention to it, learn about its needs, [and] become better 
acquainted with it.”85  We do not love generally, but in the particular.    
 She believes, optimistically perhaps, that by “remythologizing the doctrines of 
God and human beings” in light of understandings about creation from contemporary 
science and through the use of a contemporary organic model that a more appropriate 
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“human stance vis-à-vis God and our planet will emerge.”86  However, toning down her 
optimism, we recall again her writing that if one “appreciates and understands creation as 
organically interrelated, one would, or at least might, act differently toward it than if one 
used the model of creation as a work of art.”87   
 She disparages seeing the world as art because this renders the world an external 
production of a mostly transcendent God.  A production model supports a dualistic 
hierarchy of body and mind; such that, it “depends upon an intellectual/aesthetic context: 
creation is of the mind, not the body.”  This being so, aesthetics is primarily associated 
with the mind.88  McFague wishes to move away from models that speak of production, 
products, or artifacts and away from models where there is a distancing between subject 
and object.89  She prefers procreation models that are inviting of the feminine, asserting 
that creation models are more rooted in patriarchy than those based on procreation.90 
 However, while viewing the world as a production or an artifact is not what she 
wants to do, she does think that art can be helpful in experiencing nature: 
[Art] frames fragments of our world: paintings, poetry, novels, sculpture, 
dance, music help us to look at colors, sounds, bodies, events, 
characters—whatever—with full attention.  Something is lifted out of the 
world and put into a frame so that we can perhaps for the first time, see 
it.91  
   
Reminded of her overall project, she writes: 
We are asking the question, how should a Christian love nature?  The 
answer emerging is that we must pay attention—detailed, careful, concrete 
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attention—to the world that lies around us but is not us.  We must do this 
because we cannot love what we do not know.92   
 
 For McFague, aesthetics becomes a way to pay particular and detailed attention 
by using all of the senses, not just the eyes.  She wants us to be touched by nature.93  She 
does not want to see nature as art, but she does want to approach and experience nature 
with an artist’s sensual awareness and sensitivity.  McFague’s aesthetics stresses a 
sensual awareness that joins in partnership with science in an effort to know and love 
nature.   
 Ironically, because the task of paying attention to the natural world is central to 
her project McFague relies more on physical perception than on imagination.  She says 
what the aesthetic mode of perception “helps us do is pay attention to individuals in all 
their particularity.”94  And while she does make use of aesthetic imagination, such as her 
use of metaphor, she is cautious regarding the imagination and nature, especially 
concerning fantasy.  She says the danger is when we “imagine who the other is, rather 
than taking the time to find out.”95    
 More so, she claims “aesthetic detachment” is necessary as a first step to 
developing an empathic way of seeing nature.   We “cannot connect appropriately with 
real others, in their real differences from us, until we acknowledge who and what they are 
in their own worlds with their own wishes and needs.”96  She is equally committed to 
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connecting earth’s beauty, with its vulnerability, to humanity’s responsibility to care for 
creation.   
 In her 1997 book, Super, Natural Christians, she argues that Christian practice 
should include loving nature as subjects.97  Herein, she works to deepen our awareness of 
the connection between God, humanity, and the rest of creation, and she further pursues 
her ideas as postulated in The Body of God:  
If God is physical, then the aesthetic and the ethical unite: praising God in 
and through the beauty of bodies entails caring for the most basic needs of 
all bodies on the planet.  If God is physical, then the divine becomes part 
of the everyday, part of the pain and pleasure of bodily existence.98  
 
 McFague wants us to think differently, hoping that we might act differently 
toward nature.  But how do we connect the aesthetic and the ethical, without playing the 
mind game as if God is physical?  In The Body of God she devises a metaphor/concept 
that we then use as an overlay or a lens through which to see, understand and interpret the 
world.  Her attention is on how we perceive God, a very embodied God, who is also 
transcendent.  She hopes that if we can change humanity’s thinking about God maybe we 
can change our thinking and actions toward nature.  However, at the end of The Body of 
God she seems to initiate a reversal to this approach, or at least she seems to question its 
emphasis.  One gets the inkling that in her next work she will highlight human 
experience.  She writes: 
Over the years I have learned that the closer attention I pay to whatever 
piece of the world is before me—the more I know about it, the more open 
I am to its presence, the closer I look at it or listen to it or touch it or smell 
it—the more amazed I am by it.  It is not that I “see God in it” in any 
direct or general way;  rather, it is the specialness, the difference, the 
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intricacy of each creature, event, or aspect of nature that calls forth 
wonder.  And that wonder helps sustain me; it helps me stay the course.99 
 
Recounting an experience in the woods around an old, dying tree with new saplings 
rising out of its decay, she writes:  
Perhaps this is the way that we see the presence of God in the world and 
are nurtured and renewed by it—not through feelings of oceanic oneness 
with nature but by paying attention, listening to, learning about the 
specialness, the difference, the detail of the “wonderful life” of which we 
are a part... We do not use nature or other people as a means to an end—
our union with God—but see each and every creature, every body, as 
intrinsically valuable in itself, in its specialness, its distinctiveness, its 
difference from ourselves.  This acknowledgement of difference and 
intrinsic worth is not only the basis of an ecological ethic as we have seen, 
but it is also the source of a nature spirituality.  The earth becomes the 
place where we put down our roots and renew ourselves to stay the course, 
not because all creatures are transparent images of God but because each 
in its own peculiar idiosyncratic, special difference is a wonder to 
behold.100  
 
 Indeed, in light of her dissatisfaction with approaches to nature that would focus 
on our dissimilarities with nature, it is not surprising that she chooses to explore an 
experiential direction in Super, Natural Christians.  Herein, she proposes that we extend 
the love we have for God and neighbor to nature.101  She asks for a change in “sensibility, 
in how we view nature,” as well as for changes in how we live.102  She advocates that we 
“relate to the entities in nature in the same basic way that we are supposed to relate to 
God and other people—as ends, not means, as subjects valuable in themselves, for 
themselves.”103 
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 But why is treating nature like a subject that much better?  And how would we go 
about doing this?  McFague speaks of the arrogant eye and the loving eye.  The first, a 
more traditional approach, sees non-human nature as very much other than humans, as 
something that humans are to use and control.  The arrogant eye objectifies nature.  It 
also uses nature as a “way to know God.”104  It tames harnesses, conquers, or shoots 
nature as with a gun or a camera and captures it for our pleasure and use.  It views 
nature’s landscape only from the human perspective.  There can be a “controlling gaze” 
or a “voyeurism” about the arrogant eye.105  But the loving eye understands humans as 
something similar to non-human creation, but with all having distinct differences.  She 
writes: 
The new sensibility understands human beings to be embedded in the 
world—indeed, in the earth: they are social beings to the core, and 
whatever they know of the world comes from interaction with it.  The goal 
of knowledge is not control so much as it is healthy, humane existence for 
all parties concerned—not progress and profit but sustainability.  
 
She questions whether we ever consider that they, various and particular parts of nature, 
are “subjects in their own worlds and not just objects in ours?”106    
 A subject-subjects approach is further deepened by feminists’ views when there is 
an ability to “embrace intimacy” and “recognize difference.”  This approach is enhanced 
when it sees the multiple, is interactive, and when it “sees a continuity between the self 
and others, it knows them differently—not as objects, but objectively.”  It benefits when 
“self-interest and altruism are not always opposed,” because sometimes they even 
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“converge.”107  But should we really extend a subject-subjects approach to include 
nature?  She responds: 
In one sense, the question is redundant, if not absurd.  The ecological 
model of self and world is derived from the workings of natural systems: 
we are interpreting the human self’s relation to the world as one instance 
of ecological interrelationship and interdependence.  But, in another sense, 
the question is a real one because the subject-subjects model is based in 
human relationships.108  
 
However, it is important to recall that McFague’s “ecological model of the self” has two 
key features: 1) touch is the primary sense that grounds the model, instead of sight; and 
2) it is a model.109  That is, no model is perfect, but do these ideas challenge us to be 
more sensitive and just?  
 She states that we “cannot touch without being touched.”110  Touch is related to 
the “whole body.”  It gives an immediate experience, not a mediated one.  With touch we 
realize that the world is both “resistant” and “responsive.”111  However, contemporary 
times rely pervasively on sight, even experiencing nature virtually.112  Herein, space is 
compressed and the sense of touch is dropped.   
 McFague’s suggested model of knowing nature assumes that the world is 
“composed of living, changing, growing, mutually related interdependent entities, of 
which human beings are one.”113  The subject-subjects, ecological model is not a 
“dualism but a continuum.  The knower and the known are more alike than they are 
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different.”114  In contrast, historically, humans maintained their premier position in 
creation because of difference.   
 McFague wants to connect sight to touch, such that vision is a “relational, 
embodied, responsive paying attention to others in their particularity and difference.”115  
She states: 
The eye of the body is not like the eye of the mind.  The eye of the body 
respects and admires the physical, the concrete, and the diverse, rather 
than searching for the abstract, the general, and the same, as does the eye 
of the mind.  The others known by the embodied eye will not be fitted into 
categories and types but seen as particular, embodied others that offer both 
resistance and response.116 
 
McFague emphasizes the need to pay attention.117  Opposing the arrogant eye that uses 
nature as an object or as a mere stepping stone to God, she claims that Francis of Assisi 
epitomizes a kind of sensibility, a horizontal approach that pays attention to the other for 
what it is, but that he also recognizes and praises nature’s Creator with a vertical 
recognition.118  As a result, Francis was able to let nature be itself and allow nature to act 
as symbols of God.  She points out that Leonardo Boff attributes Francis’s gift to his 
understanding of poverty.  Quoting Boff, the text reads: 
Poverty is a way of being by which the individual lets things be what they 
are; one refuses to dominate them, subjugate them, and make them objects 
of the will to power.… The more radical the poverty, the closer the 
individual comes to reality, and the easier it is to commune with all things, 
respecting and reverencing their differences and distinctions.  Universal 
fraternity is the result of the way-of-being-poor of Saint Francis.119 
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McFague claims that this is close to what she means by her title, Super, Natural 
Christians.120   
 Throughout history McFague sees that even with the help of Aristotle and 
medieval sacramentality, where the “world of created being is not a lump of clay,” that 
the emphasis remains using nature “as a way to God,”121 or simply on using nature.  
Either way, the natural world is used and not fully recognized for its own dignity.  
Perhaps, when anyone or anything is not appreciated for itself, then some aspect of life is 
not recognized and its particular gift is lost.   
 In response, McFague offers the subject-subjects, ecological model.  But, how 
does one make this model active?  In service of this she seeks a way to combine the 
experiences of sight and touch, and science and aesthetics.  With this in mind, she 
encourages direct experience and the mediated experience of reading about nature; that 
is, reading nature writings.122   
 In so doing McFague recognizes the benefit of art for its ability to focus and 
frame fragments of the world so that we might give our attention to them.  Paying 
attention to nature is the first step in recognizing similarities and differences and in 
tendering us toward caring.123  For this to happen she claims aesthetic detachment is 
necessary because it pushes us to recognize what is actually there.  However, the danger 
of distance is that we can easily project our own fantasies onto the other.124  Therefore, 
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the eye must be educated, as an “apprentice to a skilled worker, listening to the other as 
does a foreigner in a new country.”  She goes on to write: 
This is the eye that pays attention to the other so that the connections 
between knower and known, like the bond of friendship, will be based on 
the real subject in its real world.  The world of touch, of childhood, of the 
first naiveté that tells us we are all inter-related and interdependent, 
becomes, through the educated loving eye, its mature, adult realization—
the second naiveté.125 
 
 In an effort to grow in knowledge and sensitivity to nature and to further the 
environmental work that is needed, she encourages reading nature writings.  She claims 
that nature writing is the “ecological model in practice; it shows us how the loving eye 
develops.”126   
 Interestingly, she compares nature reading to reading a religious autobiography.  
One genre is more connected to theology and the other to science, but in each there is a 
“personal, interpreted, concrete experience of the subject-matter, with no pretensions to 
being anything else.”  Each tries to “let the material speak.”127 
 Focusing particularly on nature writers, McFague claims that they are not simply 
interested in other species; they are interested in the relationship with the other.  
However, they do not wish to fuse with it or to overly separate from it.128   
 Subsequently, she employs the metaphor of the maze and says that nature writing 
gives us a “maze” kind of knowledge and not a “landscape kind of knowledge.”  Nature 
writing “welcomes the influence of the exterior landscape on the interior one; it seeks 
intimacy with the other but only by way of aesthetic distance and scientific accuracy—it 
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really wants to know the other as other.”129  While admitting that this process is not the 
only way to educate the eye, she believes that reading nature writing “may be one of the 
best ways to educate our eye to nature as subject,” because it “gives us privileged access 
to nature via another,” who is usually very experienced and well informed.130 
 The writer offers us a close examination of a particular locale with a certain 
degree of that “first naiveté.”  Attention is given to place, wildness, and experience in a 
manner that speaks of the writer’s care for it in several ways: “through accuracy and 
imagination, through a naturalist’s scientific attention to detail and a poet’s aesthetic 
attention to the particulars.”  The experience of the writer is shared with the reader and it 
becomes a “second naiveté experience,” a “mediated account, a well-informed, 
imaginative interpretation by an adult.”131  
 When we read nature writings we do not get the experience of nature, but the 
mediated experience as transcribed by the writer.  This combines science and aesthetics.  
Regarding science, she writes: 
Accurate, detailed, scientific information about other life forms as well as 
whole ecosystems is central to educating the loving eye. Scientific 
knowledge need not objectify the other.  Rather, as we have seen, it can do 
just the opposite: it can produce appreciation of a desire to care for the 
other.  In fact, we cannot care for the wild others unless we do know, in 
detail, in accurate detail, who they are and what they need.132  
 
She contends that the best writings on nature often have the best science.133  But nature 
writers need aesthetics as well.   
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 Aesthetics brings “attention to the other through image and metaphor” that lifts 
“up the concrete particularity of the earth other,” helping us to see what we often do not 
see; that is, it helps us to pay attention.134  Surprisingly, she says that “aesthetic attention, 
arrested attention” facilitates the focusing of our “eye directly and precisely on the other.”  
It does so in a “connecting way; that is, metaphors attach us as well as arrest us.”135  
Thus, she returns to her theme of metaphor, going on to write: 
The central model of this book—the subject-subjects model—is an 
attempt to focus our attention on the differences and uniqueness of earth 
others through the metaphor of subject for nature.  A good metaphor first 
causes shock and then the shock of recognition.  “Nature as subject” 
initially shocks, but, hopefully, it also causes a nod of acknowledgment.  
Hence, the aesthetic rivets our attention on the other, but in a way that 
connects us to the other.  In other words, an aesthetic response to another 
is neither subjective nor objective, neither focused only on the self or only 
on the other, but on the connection of the self to the other.  But, and the 
“but” is crucial here—on the other as other.  The interest is, as with 
scientific attention, primarily on the other, not the self.136   
 
The experience is crucial, but the experience is now informed with “scientific knowledge 
and aesthetic imagination.”137  The other does not get morphed into the writer’s view; 
instead, the other remains distinct, but with a connection to the writer, a connection that 
she or he cannot ignore. 
 In service of this connection, McFague denigrates the idea of seeing the world as 
a landscape, as spectators viewing from a perch and prefers, instead, the idea of thinking 
about the world as a maze.  She believes that a maze more accurately represents the 
human experience in the world.  She claims that it invites our senses to be active: 
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To find one’s way about in a maze, a different kind of vision must come 
into play: one must pay close attention to detail.  Objectifying, distancing, 
controlling vision is useless; rather, one must notice small, particular 
differences.  Did I go by this hedge a few minutes ago?  Am I getting 
closer to the center or to the margin? Can I locate myself by the sound of 
the fountain?  One begins to feel like an animal, using all one’s senses to 
maneuver one’s way around this strange environment.  One is inside 
nature, not outside it.  One is part of it, not in control of it.138   
 
Approaching the world as a maze and rooted in the experience of nature, nature writing 
finds its role in bringing together both science and aesthetics, in hope of nurturing an 
ethical consciousness.139  
 McFague moves in this direction because she is concerned that we as a species are 
having less and less experience with the natural world.  She is aware that greater and 
greater numbers of people are now living in urban environments.  She wants to know 
how we can care about something, the natural world, if we do not experience it and come 
to know it.  The cities that we construct are built for the human species in mind, almost 
solely.  Thus, she wonders “what happens to nature and to us in such habitats?” Not only 
nature suffers, but humans suffer also. 140   
 She tells about a young boy at the 1992 Los Angeles riots who could tell from the 
sound of gun shots what kind of automatic weapon it was.  She goes on to say: 
In another time and place he would have been able to identify six common 
species of hawks and owls by sound alone.  The interior landscape is 
influenced by the exterior.  The environment in which a child develops 
matters: whether that environment includes nature or is defined by 
weapons influences who that child becomes and what she or he cares 
about.141 
                                                 
     138McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 68-69. 
     139McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 67-70. 
     140McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 118, 123. 
     141McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 123.  McFague gives credit to Paul Shephard, cited in Gary 
Nabham and Stephen Trimble, The Geography of Childhood: Why Children Need Wild Places (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1994), 28. 
 108
 
 McFague looks toward those who live close to nature for insight.  She says that 
those who spend time in nature, such as “naturalists, biologists, and nature writers—often 
claim that loving nature comes ‘naturally’ to humans.”  A caring, responsible relationship 
is not primarily an obligation, because we not only touch nature, but it touches us too:  
“We belong with these others and feel good when we are in their company.”142   
 However, McFague is not an elitist; she calls for “wilderness” as well as for those 
plain, simple kinds of “wildness.”143  By wildness she means those planned and surprise 
habitats in our urban areas.  These would include different sizes and kinds of city parks, 
as well as empty lots, cracks in the concrete, and balcony gardens.  Nature is more than 
wilderness.144   
 Furthermore, it is the “dualistic ideal” of living in the city and escaping to the 
wilderness that is “out-of-date and elitist.  It takes care of the few while neglecting the 
many.”145  In addition, the promises of suburbia have not fared so well, according to 
McFague “it lost both the diversity and excitement of a city as well as the wildness of 
nature.”146   
 McFague knows that she is not an urban planner and that all she can do is 
encourage something like an ecological model that supports loving nature as subjects.  
She advocates for wilderness in order to “protect biodiversity” and for wildness in order 
to “encourage real encounters between human beings and nature.”  She campaigns for 
                                                 
     142McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 119. 
     143McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 123. 
     144McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 124. 
     145McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 125. 
     146McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 125. 
 109
places of wildness in our cities where people, especially the poor, can encounter nature 
directly.147  She draws attention to those small encounters with nature that “can be the 
occasion” when we are changed.  She writes: 
This is why as a theologian I believe that the way cities are constructed is 
critical to the future of our species as well as of other species.  Of course, 
it is not the answer; it is simply one small piece in the vast, complex 
agenda spelling out how we can live humanely on this planet with all the 
others.  I cannot stress often enough the many different changes that we 
first-world Christians (and others) need to undergo if the planet is to 
survive and flourish.  The development of a Christian nature spirituality is 
merely the beginning step, the conversion to earth others, that should 
result in many kinds of changes (economic, political, legal, ecclesiastical) 
at many different levels of society, both national and international.  Our 
focus here, however, is on a change in sensibility, and personally, but its 
reach can be—and must be—global.148 
 
 However, McFague is not naïve.  While she advocates for preservation of 
wilderness, and for places of wildness, she knows that the relationship between the 
natural world and humans is going to be “mainly on our turf.”  Further, we need to “build 
nature into our new cities and rebuild it into those cities that have lost it.”  This needs to 
be done for “nature’s sake and for our own.”149  These constructions would be attentive to 
multiple voices, with clear inclusion of local people’s participation and concern for their 
interests.150   
 As McFague develops her subject-subjects, ecological model she values 
experience, touch and sight, science and aesthetics, but now she needs to consider how 
humans would respond to nature within such a model. Thus, she grounds an ethic of care 
in respect while accepting community as the metaphor through which to comprehend our 
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responsibilities to all others.151  By community she means one in which its members 
experience a kind of mutuality and where humans realize that caring for non-humans is 
both good for others and good for humanity.  Caring builds community.  It is not an 
instrumental or altruistic kind of caring, but more like a friendship.152  However, an ethic 
of care would need as part of it the justice and rights tradition to give it strength and to 
help guarantee limits.153   
 Such a subject-subjects, ecological model is one that “arises from a sense of touch 
and never loses that base.”154  It gives human beings a “sense of solidarity” with others.  
It is composed of interdependent relationships with other beings and other entities.  
Responsibility and cause of adverse events and conditions is understood within a broad 
complex system of nature and its cultural, social circumstances in time and place.155  
McFague realizes that the subject-subjects, ecological model challenges traditional 
Christianity and that Christianity also challenges it. 
 
D. “The Glory of God” and “Fully Alive” 
 McFague believes that Christianity is challenged to extend its basic tenet of love, 
love of God and love of neighbor as oneself, to nature and when it does it then becomes 
something very close to the ecological model.  She asks: 
 What justification is there for limiting the subject-subjects model to human 
 beings, drawing a line in the sand at our own species, with all other species and 
 the rest of nature outside the circle?  On the basis of Christianity’s own most basic 
 model, seeing God and others as subjects—as valuable in themselves, for 
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 themselves, and not just as for me or against me—should we not also love nature 
 this way?… Is it not only better for the health of the planet, but also more 
 Christian? 156 
 
 If we did extend this kind of respect and love, McFague claims that we would 
have a twenty-first century version of a medieval cosmological vision.  It would be 
“outer-directed” with a “functional cosmology in which we and all other natural beings 
and entities would have a place.”  Yet, different from most versions postulated by 
Christian medievalists, it would be more akin to the cosmology of St. Francis of Assisi, 
which allowed Francis to see “all things in God,” not just as “signs pointing to God or as 
symbols transparent to God, but each and every thing telling of the glory of God in its 
own distinctiveness.”157   
 However, Christianity also challenges and enhances the model and it does so in a 
couple of different ways.  First, it realizes human sinfulness and acknowledges God’s 
ultimate gift of forgiveness and love, a love that finds each subject “valuable as such.”  
This she calls justification.  But along with justification is sanctification, which invites us 
to do likewise; that is, to love each subject.158   
 Second, is the Christian community of care ethic.  It focuses on the “well-being of 
the entire community,” not just a privileged few.  It encourages the coming together of 
“social justice and environmental integrity,” but with a sense of priority for those who are 
the poorest.  Now, however, the poor refers to human beings and to other parts of 
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creation that are degraded and suffering, especially where humans who are poor and the 
poor of nature intersect.159  
 Lastly, she speaks of Christian sacramentalism.  In Super, Natural Christians her 
goal is to push its readers to experiment with viewing nature as subjects.  But this is not 
her end goal.  She reveals:  
[N]ow as we consider what Christianity might offer to the model, we must 
add a new sacramentalism.  This sacramentalism would, while “holding on 
to the huckleberries,” see all things in God.  However, the focus of this 
Christian loving eye is not vertical but horizontal; not on “God in this 
tree,” but “this tree in God.”… When the Christian eye has been so 
educated, it can and should then see them also as intimations of the 
divine.160   
 
She says  that sacramentalism should spur us toward a richer language about God, one in 
which we would not be so obsessed with God-talk such that it makes God super-human 
like, anthropomorphic and anthropocentric.  Instead, it would be eager to include other 
metaphors from creation and God.  Remembering diversity and particularity, she writes:  
‘Nature’ is not a metaphor for God.  The natural world is not a single 
entity but a marvelously rich, multidimensional, diverse, and intricate 
collection of life forms and things.  It is precisely this character of the 
natural world that presents itself to us as a new and exciting way to speak 
of God.161 
 
God’s glory is such that it is revealed in all of creation: “The incarnation of God in Christ 
Jesus further claims that the glory of God is revealed in the least, the most despised, the 
most oppressed of God’s creatures.”162  In her text, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology 
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and Economy for a Planet in Peril, she responds to the glory that she says is revealed, 
and writes: 
[M]y relative absolute is that we live to give God glory by loving the 
world and everything in it.  This is not an absolute, because I know it is 
simply my interpretation of the relation between God and the world, but it 
is a relative absolute because it informs everything else I say about God 
and the world.163 
 
For McFague, “nature is not ‘just nature,’” but “in its own way,” it “is a vision of 
God.”164  And the “glory of God is every creature fully alive.”165   
 McFague’s life experiences come to be expressed in “gratitude for life and glory 
to God,” whereby combining these two result in a passion for the world and for God.166  
This speaks to the Catholic sacramental appreciation of the world and the Protestant 
emphasis on transcendence,167 with Jesus as the one who unifies: 
The incarnation, it seems to me, is not merely or solely about Jesus.  It is 
more radical than that, although for Christians Jesus is the paradigm of 
both God with us and the world within God.  The incarnation reveals God 
as always with us and  our being defined as within God.  The incarnation is 
the solution to the “two worlds problem”: the problem of how to love God 
and the world.… In fact, loving the world, (not God alone), or rather, 
loving God through loving the world, is the Christian way.168 
 
 She says that because we are made in God’s image we are to “grow into that 
reality by doing what God does: love the world.”  This is our “vocation.”169  To live and 
do otherwise is to live outside of God’s house rules and outside of harmony and order.  
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Trying to order reality around ourselves, brings with it disorder and confusion,170 or 
chaos, distortion, and perversion of what really matters.171  To offer an alternative vision 
today takes a “sharp eye.”172 
 Just appreciating is not enough, we must identify with those who suffer.173  
Christians must “not just live differently,” they are to “recommend an alternative to the 
paradigm of unlimited consumption.”174  This means living according to “God’s house 
rules.”  But what God’s house rules are “in terms of ecological and economic 
imperatives–is one of the major tasks of Christian discernment.”  Indeed, the context of 
this “discernment is a cruciform one.”175  Since the “God whom Jesus reveals is the 
Creator of everything that is, the ‘beloved’ must include all disposed, outcast creatures 
and not only human ones.”176   
 McFague is careful not to equate human suffering with the suffering of non-
human nature, while she avoids dichotomizing any creatures who suffer into dualistic 
hierarchal groups.  She writes: 
Christians are those who should love the oppressed, the most vulnerable of 
God’s creation, for these are the ones according to the Gospel who deserve 
priority.  Christians, then, should be super, natural, for in our time, nature 
can be seen as the “new poor,” not the poor that crowds out the human 
poor, but the “also” poor; and as such it demands our attention and care.177  
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 McFague’s Christology has been challenged in the past as being left of center, 
perhaps even post-Christian,178 but with Super, Natural Christians she seems to move 
more toward the center.  Concern for nature is not just because our very lives depend on a 
healthy environment, but there are Christian theological imperatives as well: 
If God the redeemer is concerned for the well-being of all of creation, then 
we have to extend the line we have drawn which puts us within the circle 
of divine concern and the rest of creation outside.  And we must do this, 
first of all, for theological reasons.  It is what Christian praxis demands… 
because commitment to the God of Jesus Christ demands it.179  
 
McFague focuses on liberation and care for those who are most oppressed, but as the 
circle widens to include all of those who are oppressed, Christian practice gets quite 
complex and challenging.180  We have learned that simple charity to people who are 
oppressed is not the answer, they must also be “empowered,” but how do we empower 
the non-human oppressed?181 
 McFague looks for what is distinct in the Christian voice and suggests its 
liberation praxis for the poor; that is, the “paradigm of the destabilizing radical love we 
see in Jesus’ parables, healing stories, and eating practices,” which now must be extended 
to nature.  This extension to nature is counter-cultural and prophetic because it is at “odds 
with the religion of Economism”182 and how we structure incentives based on profit. 
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 With such an extension of praxis, McFague envisions Jesus’ ministry reaching 
toward nature in three ways.  First, Jesus spoke to overturning the tables of power, which 
now means “turning the hierarchy of humans over nature,” and supporting the belief that 
nature is loved for “itself by God in Christ.”  Secondly, “salvation means the health of 
bodies” and should address the ecological deterioration of earth, which is an affront to 
God, “who desires the wellbeing not just of humans but of all creation.”  Thirdly, we are 
reminded of Jesus’ eating practices which are a “foretaste of the eschatological banquet 
when all creation will be satisfied and made whole” together.183  
 The Abundant Life that McFague advocates is one where we know the beloved-
ness of all of creation and where we try to live in a way that lives out of God and toward 
God, while also in God.  This means living with gratitude and with a desire to give back, 
but not necessarily out of duty.  We are to avoid what causes injury or is not life giving 
and, on the other hand, there is an attachment to what helps creation to flourish.184 Our 
individualism must have limits.185  Our self-centered-world is de-centered and re-
centered on God and others, all others.186   
 The traditional metaphor/symbol used to express the dynamism of God-self and 
into which we are invited is the trinity.  She writes: 
[T]he God who cares about the management of the household, is its 
creator, liberator, and sustainer.  The radically transcendent and radically 
immanent God is the source of everything that is, the power that frees 
creation from what would destroy it, and the love that nourishes it in every 
moment.  The God whose glory is every creature fully alive cannot be a 
solitary, distant being.  The “trinity” is a model, a way of speaking of God, 
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that tries to express God’s profound involvement in, with, and for the 
world.187  
  
McFague claims that the trinity is about God, who is transcendent and immanent, and it is 
also about God in relation to the world.188  The “trinity is about God’s love for the world 
and the world’s response.”189   
 In the midst of dynamic love we recognize that we love God by loving the world 
well, such that our relationships with nature need habitual attention.  Our relationships 
with nature need a day-to-day praxis of paying attention to nature that is based in piety.  
Just as our prayer life needs time, and our friendships need time, so do our relationships 
in the natural world.190   
 McFague claims that Christian nature spirituality is “not nature romanticism,” but 
neither is it “very optimistic about the future.”  Yet, it is “determinedly realistic” and 
“determinedly hopeful,” because the creator of all creatures is “working in, through, and 
on behalf of us all.”191   
E.  Contributions  
 In evaluating McFague’s use of aesthetics concerning nature, it is necessary to 
note how she believes “nature” is not easily defined and that over the centuries its 
meaning has changed and will continue to change.  However, while acknowledging the 
cultural lens, she does support an evolutionary, relational, ecological, community model 
of nature.  Nature is an interdependent reality where God and humans share some degree 
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of intimacy with the natural world.  She rejects hierarchical dualism because it not only 
distances humans from the rest of creation, but it pits humans over and above all other 
aspects of creation.192  Rather, she encourages local and particular experiences and 
relationships among humans and the natural world.193  However, in the midst of this 
discussion she recognizes that there is no more “pristine” nature,194 or no more natural 
world on earth that has not been degraded, altered, or affected by humanity.  
 Against this backdrop, we remember that McFague’s work has developed over 
several decades as writings dedicated to ecological theology.  She came to understand 
earlier than most theologians that humans are responsible for the degradation of earth’s 
environment and that we must be held responsible for doing something about these 
conditions.  Her contributions have been in the form of speculative and constructive 
theology that she hopes will be functional in people’s lives.   
 McFague retrieves from the past, re-forms in certain cases, and offers new 
possibilities.  Her sometimes novel ideas and nuances, as well as her insights about 
contemporary environmental conditions, are recognized among her greatest strengths.  
However, her historical retrievals, assessments, and Christology are often points where 
she elicits questions and her greatest criticism.  These issues have been addressed by 
others and are not the main focus of this study.195   
 Instead, this analysis concentrates more narrowly; that is, on McFague’s use of 
aesthetics and her understanding of it in connection with the way in which she views and 
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approaches nature.  Early on, McFague uses aesthetics via her experimentation with 
metaphors and images of our traditional images for God.  She concludes that some 
traditional metaphors can restrict our vision of who God is for us, especially when 
metaphors are held narrowly or with exclusivity.  More so, they can constrict, inflate, or 
distort understandings that we have of ourselves, of each other, and of the natural world.  
In response, she puts forth a metaphor that she knows will itself be incomplete and 
limited, yet she hopes that it will divulge something that we need to be about in our 
relationships with God, fellow human beings, and with all of nature: the world as the 
Body of God.  She wants us to change how we see God, so she tries to influence our 
images and metaphors about God.  She wants to jolt us into seeing God and the world 
differently.   
 McFague’s next surprising metaphor in service of her concern is nature as 
subject.  Urging us to see nonhuman nature as subject(s), she encourages us to recognize 
and relate to the natural world in a new way.  While McFague is good at negating her 
metaphorical assertions, always aware of their incompleteness, she remains committed to 
the particular; that is, “this tree in God.”196  
 Indeed, in Super, Natural Christians McFague’s strategy for encouraging us to 
engage nature more as subject(s) and to care differently for nature is one of paying 
attention.  To do this she focuses on attentive skills employed in science and aesthetics in 
order to nurture a different sensibility toward nature.     
 In Models of God she claimed that our “renderings of reality” are indeed 
metaphorical, not literal, but in our fresh constructions we offer new possibilities to 
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replace others, such that we create the reality in which we live.  We do not copy reality, 
for there are no copies, “only creations.” However, they do “refer” to a reality.197   
 In Super, Natural Christians she says that science draws upon its ability to be 
attentive to details in reality.  It knows “about the other in its particular, special, unique 
character and ways,” and it has at its “heart of appreciation” a “subject—that is, as it is, 
as what it is.”198  And aesthetics, at least concerning that genre of art and science that is 
called nature writing, involves “attention to the other through image and metaphor.  Just 
as science is one form of lifting up the concrete particularity of the earth other, so also is 
art.”199  Together, science and art deal in particularity, appreciation, image, and metaphor, 
and according to McFague, metaphor makes some degree of reference to reality. 
 Indeed, metaphors are “renderings of reality,” not copies.  However, art, beyond 
nature writing, involves material renderings, as well as conceptual ones.  Either way, our 
material constructions and our conceptual or linguistic constructions are part of our 
cultural, social, and ecological environment.  McFague uses aesthetics through nature 
writing as a way to nurture the loving eye, which mainly keeps aesthetics in the mode of 
observation and appreciation.   
 She wants to support a certain kind of intimacy with nature whereby an 
appropriate bonding is established through apprenticeship, listening, and friendship.200   
To “know the other as other” she stresses “aesthetic distance and scientific accuracy.”201  
McFague is very concerned that we not project onto nature what we fanaticize about 
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nature.202  At times her version of aesthetic detachment can seem to lean more heavily 
toward the impersonal, but this certainly is not her intention.  Rather, she is trying to 
make space for theology and aesthetics at the table of academic and public discourse, 
where science usually reigns.   
 What she calls “aesthetic detachment” can be extended to the justice realm.  In 
fact, it needs to be extended so that our efforts are not soft.  Egalitarian justice needs good 
policies and laws.  In the end, McFague supports a model based on care and community:  
“The community model says that the well being of the whole is the final goal, but that 
this is reached through attending to the needs and desires of the many subjects that make 
up the community.”203   
 McFague’s aim is to encourage the loving eye, such that a person would want to 
build a caring and just community attentive to all.  She focuses on nature writing as a 
way to do this because she thinks the genre of nature writing is unique in its use of 
science and aesthetics; that is, in the way that it encourages an informed subject to 
connect with a non-human subject/nature.  However, she ignores the larger resource of 
aesthetics in history and in contemporary times, as well as its wider range of relational, 
interpretive and creative capacity that could be in service of connecting with nature as 
subjects and envisioning a shared environment. 
 Nature writing, per se, is generally thought to have begun around the time of 
Linnaeus and his Systema Naturae (1735) in which Linnaeus introduced a system that 
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allowed living things to be identified and classified.204  Natural theology was already 
established when in the second half of the nineteenth century certain authors were 
beginning to be called natural history writers.  They were working to “provide their 
readers with an antidote to industrialism and urbanization” and an alternative to what was 
thought of as the coldness of science.205    
 At a time when some writings are still found to be quite pastoral, the fields of 
science are discovering an ever greater complexity to nature.  In turn, nature writing 
begins to take on a more complex form as well.206   
 Also, in the latter half of the nineteenth century we see “origins of what we today 
call the environmental movement.”  Those involved begin to understand more clearly 
how economic systems and industrial growth and development are pressuring the natural 
world.  Subsequently, we find at the beginning of the twentieth century the “activist voice 
and prophetic anger of nature writers,” who declare “in [John] Muir’s words, that ‘the 
money changers were in the temple.’”207   
 Had McFague wanted to use the genre of nature writing as a premiere example of 
a process that nurtures the loving eye because of its use of science and aesthetics it might 
have been helpful if she had taken greater notice of the history and complexity of this 
particular genre.  She could have used a greater number and a more diverse sampling of 
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writings.  McFague’s three main examples of nature writing are all “by white, North 
American, middle-class women.”208   
 Although none of the three main writers that she features engage nature in urban 
areas, McFague, nevertheless, strongly encourages all kinds of local and small efforts at 
being green in urban areas.  Yet, she realizes that these efforts are not enough: 
They will not restore the wilderness; they will not save the planet if 
commercial interests continue to degrade it and if consumers do not rein in 
their insatiable appetites.  But local effort by ordinary people to restore 
nature in their cities is a necessary and encouraging step.  It is necessary 
because if most of us and our  children are to experience nature and 
thereby grow to care about it, nature must be close by.  It is encouraging 
because the future of the natural world will be inevitably intertwined with 
human beings: we must learn to live together.  The extinction of nature 
and the extinction of the experience of nature are profoundly connected.  
Our encounters with nature can be reminders that we do care about these 
others who are now so frequently out of sight, out of mind.209   
  
 McFague tries to re-educate the arrogant eye such that it becomes a loving eye; 
surprisingly, but quite practically, rooted in touch.  However, McFague, in the preface to 
her 2001 book, Life Abundant, writes: 
I have written each of my books in an effort to make up for deficiencies in 
the last one.  Life Abundant is no exception.  After completing Super, 
Natural Christians … I realized love was not enough.  I realized that we 
middle-class North American Christians are destroying nature, not 
because we do not love it, but because of the way we live.210 
 
Reflective on her work and committed to heuristic theology, which learns from taking 
chances, she admits of her dissatisfaction and continues to explore.  This time she moves 
into economic systems, the household management of earth. 
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 Neither the shock of different metaphors for God, nor experience of nature with 
the added reflective assistance of science and aesthetics, supplies her with the results that 
she had hoped.  So, she takes the best of what she thinks her previous works have to offer 
and she moves into economics, seemingly leaving aesthetics behind.  She decides, then, 
that the mission needs more than love; it needs the nuts and bolts of taking care of the 
household of earth, both its micro and macro systems.  However, in the end, there was no 
need for McFague to disparage her own efforts to combine science and aesthetics because 
the task needs more than love.   
 McFague could have retrieved from the tradition of nature writing more of a sense 
of its trajectory, which might have given her aesthetic approach more dynamism.  She 
might have pushed the question about how nature writing enlivens a cadre of aesthetic 
characteristics and creative activities.  She does not engage the practice in today’s 
technical world, but holds it comfortably within a contemplative reserve.  McFague’s 
subject-subjects model prioritizes relationship and touch, with touch integrating with 
sight, but she never specifically draws correlations between this and aesthetics.  
Historically theological aesthetics, as well as contemporary aesthetics, might have helped 
to deepen her project, which is to nurture the loving eye, all in service of a larger project, 
which is to care for all, especially the poor, both human and nonhuman.     
 McFague concentrates on nurturing the loving eye as a way to build relationships 
with nature.  But she is far less attentive to the creative person whom she hopes these 
relationships will change.  Still, she claims that humans are “constituted by and exist only 
in relationships,”211 and that we are interpretive and creative beings.212   
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 She chooses to focus her process of nurturing the loving eye on combining 
aesthetics and science, inclusive of first hand experiences of nature, in order to foster the 
loving eye in order that we might share these experiences with others in a meaningful 
manner.  McFague does not ask how nature writing is unfolding or developing during 
contemporary times.  This might have been helpful.  In both Super, Natural Christians 
and in Life Abundant one can find examples of a negative reception of contemporary 
genres, such as photography and its other forms.  She suggests that we “leave the camera 
home and take the notebook.”213 
 Granted, she does admit that there are other “mediating forms such as field 
guides, science textbooks, nature films, and museum displays” that are available and that 
they are “certainly useful for educating the loving eye.”  But it is nature writing that 
“gives us privileged access to nature via another—and usually well-informed human 
being’s experience with nature.”  Thus, nature writing “may be one of the best ways to 
educate our eye to nature as subject.”214   
 Even though the gifts of writing combined with aesthetics and science may be a 
choice that many of us would support, encourage, and long to see as an embraced way to 
develop one’s understanding, appreciation, and relationship with the natural world, 215 we 
must push beyond the boundaries of our own comforts.  McFague’s preference may be 
good in theory, but the reality of our day is that we live in what is being called a visual or 
mutli-media culture.  Could it be that nature writing is being done in different modalities 
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today and to insist upon the scribe may be to doom what is ultimately desired?  Even the 
Church recognized there was more than one way to write, as with Scripture and icons.  
Does she limit the experience and then say it is not enough, rejecting it for economics, as 
if these worlds are separate?   
 McFague wants to avoid a nineteenth century landscape vision of the world 
because this perspective towers over the natural world from a limited and privileged 
human vantage point, and then frames reality as we wish or as we naively and 
romantically wish it were.216  Similarly, she claims that the camera’s eye is basically 
arrogant because it highlights vision from one human perspective and because it plays 
into a diminishment of first hand experience.217  Later, she does redeem a photo of earth 
from space by NASA, acknowledging that it is acceptable, as long as it is seen through 
the sensibility of the subject-subjects model.218  In light of her aversion to the single 
perspective, she proposes that we think of the world as a maze219   
 In theory this might sound appealing, but the reality is that this idea never really 
gets off the ground and she herself continues to use the term landscape throughout her 
texts.  McFague criticizes the shallow dimensionality of the landscape metaphor, but she 
replaces it with one that mainly speaks of confusion and not dimensionality.   
 However, the word landscape is often used across disciplines today as a metaphor 
for the overall composition of environments, often dynamically composed.  Landscape 
can refer to complex or simple situations and conditions.  It can refer to an emotional 
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landscape of a community; an economic landscape of an international region or country; 
the landscape of a high plateau or a marshy terrain; the landscape of a small town or a 
complex large metropolis; the factious landscape of a global church; or the diverse 
landscape of Post-Modernity.  Her idea of landscape is far too one-dimensional and maze 
as a metaphor simply does not work, not even for McFague.   
 While the term “maze” is very descriptive and it does have certain advantages, it 
does not seem to generate the influence McFague intended, and is not used in her next 
book on economics.  Using the metaphor maze as a way to see the world feels like the 
following: The world is like a well into which you just keep falling.    
 Nonetheless, McFague is doing something important.  She is exploring space in 
light of a comment that she makes in The Body of God, where she argues that geography 
“may be the subject of the twenty-first century.”220  The subject of space forces us to ask 
questions about who has or does not have space; how much or how little; how is it 
divided and shaped; what is the condition and location of the space; what is its 
composition (resources); how is it impacted by humans, and how is it cared for by 
humans?  The questions surrounding space activate the topics of nature, aesthetics, 
theology, culture, politics, economics, ethics… in poignant ways.  But she does not 
overtly, at least, expand on her comment or connect it with her on-going body of work 
until A New Climate for Theology: God, the World, and Global Warming.221   
 In her 2008 text she continues to assert her metaphor, the world as the body of 
God, but now in regard to global warming and issues related to how we care for place 
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and attend to space.  She contends that Western culture has overly emphasized time and 
history.222  By paying attention to space, she ultimately connects human greediness for 
physical space with egocentric space; thus, the “power of the kenotic God lies in giving 
space for others, dying to self that others might live.  This strange reversal—losing one’s 
life to save it—is also the sensibility that is needed if our planet is to survive and 
prosper.”223 
 Earlier, in Super, Natural Christians, McFague considers the way in which the 
arrogant eye seeks to own or control nature, which comes down to controlling space.224  
More so, in 2008 she cautions against perceiving the natural world as absorbed by human 
construction and invention such that nature is perceived as replaced by development, 
invention and the urban world.  She contends that the “hybrid model of city as nature 
tends to hide the ‘rights’ of other life-forms as well as our necessary care for these others 
on whom we depend absolutely.”225   
 True enough, but while she wants to distinguish the particular subjects of the 
natural world, she does not acknowledge strongly enough how the environment is an 
increasing mix and blend of nature and culture.  In the contemporary environment 
distinctions between nature and culture get more and more difficult to recognize and 
name because of the results of human actions.  To say that nature should not be absorbed 
by culture does not stop it from happening.  The question is what can we do as part of a 
theological aesthetics of the environment that supports recognizing and respecting 
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distinctions wherever possible?  As part of this aim, how can we be attentive to language 
and metaphors that are in some way reflective of an environment that is increasingly an 
integration and blending of nature and culture.   
 Making space for others is reflective of something McFague wrote in Super, 
Natural Christians on poverty regarding the lives of St. Francis, Leonardo Boff, and 
Jesus.226  It is not the kind of poverty that makes people and nature and whole 
communities sick, but it is the kind that frees the world to be fully alive in an earthly,  
unromanticized existence of Mystery. 
 In today’s world, a theological and aesthetic understanding of fully alive for all of 
creation will inevitably have to inquire about a deep kind of freedom that makes space for 
all, especially those who are poor.  In A New Climate for Theology McFague admits that 
most of us will not be saints like Francis of Assisi,227 but hopefully we will see and act in 
the world differently enough to ensure a just and sustainable world. 
 In light of global ecological situations today, Sallie McFague deserves credit for 
insightful analyses, beginning with her 1987 book, Models of God: Theology for an 
Ecological, Nuclear Age.  McFague’s works are usually found to be challenging because 
she pushes readers to think differently and to experiment with their life choices.  She 
pushes herself to experiment and she is not afraid to change course.  This helps to make 
her interesting and credible, even if one’s agreement with her is not total.  
 What this study takes from McFague is a view of nature based on an ecological-
evolutionary-subject-subjects model that is rooted in God-self who is more than creation.  
In A New Climate for Theology she re-asserts that we see the back of God, as in Exodus 
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33:23, and that we find “intimations of transcendence in and through the world.”  At the 
same time she insists that while the “body metaphor is an important one,” it needs to be 
“complemented by others.”228  However, while McFague stresses that her metaphors are 
not to be taken literally, in 2008 she admits that she is “not afraid of pantheism; the line 
between God and the world is fuzzy.”229  In some sense, she comes to the edge of 
metaphor.  She writes: 
God is the “stuff” out of which everything comes and to which it will return.  Life 
emanates from God and is more “like God” than like anything else.  All creation 
was made in God’s image, as a reflection of God, and this is what we humans 
must acknowledge and live into.… The world (all matter) is a manifestation of 
God, for God is reality.230 
 
 Danger exists with an overly transcendent perception of God, as well as with an 
overly immanent perception of God. While God may be totally other, McFague asserts 
that creation does share some similarity, therefore indicating to us something about God.  
 However, just as there are dangers to be had in conflating creation with God, there 
can be difficulties when we unite aesthetics and ethics because we can lose the potency 
and gift of each.  McFague does seem to come close to merging them in The Body of God 
when she writes: 
If God is physical, then the aesthetic and the ethical unite: praising God in 
and through the beauty of bodies entails caring for the most basic needs of 
all bodies on the planet.  If God is physical, then the divine becomes part 
of the everyday, part of the pain and pleasure of bodily existence.231 
 
In A New Climate for Theology, McFague reassesses the connection between aesthetics 
and ethics and moves the topic to another level of discourse.  She argues: 
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If we cannot find the transcendent in the world, in its beauty and its suffering, 
then for us bodily, earthy creatures it is probably not to be found at all.  Finding 
transcendence in and … through the earth means paying attention to others: the 
ethical rests on the aesthetic, the prior moment of realizing that something outside 
of oneself is real.  Only then is one capable of the kenotic action, the retreat of 
one’s relentless ego, to allow the glory of God and the need of the neighbor to fill 
oneself.  The aesthetic is the recognition of otherness; the ethical is the practice of 
self-denial necessary so that others—God and neighbor—may be praised and 
served.  Thus, with the thought experiment of the world as God’s body, we can 
affirm with Simone Weil that “God is reality”: the body of the world, the ordinary 
reality of our lives, is where we meet God.232  
  
Where Plato and some others would claim that aesthetics is dependent upon whether or 
not something is moral, McFague in 2008 stands opposed to this idea and asserts that the 
“ethical rest on the aesthetic.”  For McFague, the ethical is dependent upon the 
“recognition of otherness” because recognition is preliminary to ethical action.233  By 
asserting that the ethical is dependent upon the aesthetic the task of recognizing reality 
and its relationships must precede the “practice of self denial necessary so that others—
God and neighbors—may be praised and served.”234  More so, if aesthetics is about 
recognition of otherness, then McFague’s theological distinction between God and 
creation is preserved.  
 McFague’s insight enhances and challenges our understanding of aesthetics.  It 
augments our understanding of aesthetics as being characterized by harmonization 
because recognition means that there is some degree of ordering, selecting, memory, 
imagination, associating, connecting, or a kind of making sense of otheness, hopefully 
with a positive integration of reason and emotions.  Theological aesthetics does so 
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because aesthetics searches for a way to order or bring entities together according to the 
measures of care, justice, and, now, sustainability.  McFague’s insight lends depth to a 
theological aesthetics of the environment as we struggle to recognize the particulars and 
to live justly and well as a complex environment of nature and culture.  
Conclusion 
 From a Christian perspective, humans are in integral relationship with a 
Trinitarian God and God’s creations, both human and non-human.  We are called to 
recognize others, to pay attention, to wonder and learn about others, to appreciate, to 
identify with, or, at the very least, respect others, especially those who are poor.  This 
means being responsible in particular relationships and being responsible for systems that 
we construct.  It means responding to a call to embrace a new kind of poverty for those of 
us who have so much.   
 McFague encourages us to remember the cross of Christ when any part of 
creation suffers and to recognize the fullness of God’s glory in the community of all of 
creation.  In Super, Natural Christians, a text wherein she concretely uses aesthetics, she 
pushes her reader to envision “this tree in God,” 235 and to envision the world of the tree, 
the fish, the bee, the bird, the ocean… and of persons who are poor.  
 Over the course of her work, McFague grows in her understanding and use of 
aesthetics, especially in her understanding of its importance and place concerning ethics.  
Although aesthetics was not her main task, it might be helpful to provide dialogue with a 
broader understanding of theological aesthetics historically and with contemporary 
aesthetics.  Also, McFague does not engage a twentieth/twenty-first century world of 
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technology that uses multi-forms of communications, marked by an especially high 
preference for the visual.  This is delicate territory for theology because McFague’s 
concerns are real regarding the diminishment of first hand experiences of the natural 
world.  Furthermore, while her cultural understanding of nature expands over time, as in 
A New Climate for Theology, this dimension of nature still requires attention as humanity 
is moving more aggressively in its ability and willingness to alter, shape, and even 
compose novel forms of life through the use of science and technology.   
 The environment is an integration of nature and culture, with culture’s footprint 
growing by the day.  In light of McFague’s assertion of ethics resting upon the aesthetic, 
the search for early common ground between nature and culture, perhaps even before the 
aesthetic moment of recognition, may be beneficial.    
 However, before moving to theological topics per se, it will be important to 
consider non-theological aesthetic approaches to nature for what they might bring to a 
contemporary conversation.  Three authors whose works we will examine are Emily 
Brady, Allen Carlson, and Arnold Berleant.
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Chapter Three 
 
Does Contemporary Aesthetics of Nature Enhance a 
Theology of Nature? 
 
 
 In this chapter we will examine the works of three contemporary scholars writing 
in the area of aesthetics and nature: Emily Brady, Allen Carlson, and Arnold Berleant.  
Each of these writers approaches the subject from a different perspective, but all with 
sensitivity for ecological issues.  Our goal in this chapter is to glean from these writers, 
who are outside of theological circles, ideas that could be helpful or challenging to a 
theological aesthetics of nature/environment.  
 In recent decades, the field of aesthetics has expanded to include questions 
beyond those limited to the arts, such as dance, music, literature, and the visual arts.  This 
expansion is in spite of those who would insist that aesthetics is only about art and 
against those who call for the demise of aesthetics altogether, because they believe it is 
too anthropocentric.1  Among the various possible aesthetic approaches to nature are the 
following: 
1.  non-aesthetic— 
 nature cannot be appreciated aesthetically because it simply is not art, nature is 
 not made by humans; 
2.  nature as art— 
 nature is approached through object model/like sculpture or via landscape 
 model/like painting; 
3.  cognitive/conceptual models— 
 nature is approached primarily through the natural sciences or via historical 
 information related to certain places; 
4.  non-cognitive/non-conceptual models— 
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 something other than a cognitive component becomes its central feature, such as 
 imagination, freedom, or mystery; 
5.  broad environmental models— 
 focus is on social/cultural and natural world integration.2 
 
 The writers examined in this chapter do not fall into either of the first two camps, 
but they do represent diverse opinions in a complicated arena that includes the cognitive 
and non-cognitive, and places in-between.  For this study, the writings of Emily Brady, 
Allen Carlson, and Arnold Berleant have been chosen because each believes that nature 
can be aesthetically appreciated.  All three encourage a serious understanding of 
aesthetics and nature, which means none of them approach nature simply as art.   
 However, Berleant does not separate art and nature to the extent that Carlson and 
Brady do.  His work stresses a strong social and cultural perspective.  Brady employs a 
non-cognitive model that emphasizes a renewed understanding of disinterestedness, along 
with imagination used well.  And Carlson, using a cognitive model, believes the natural 
sciences should be central to any appreciation of nature.  In addition, these writers 
recognize that their efforts build upon the works of others. 
 In an introduction to an edited work published in 2008, Carlson and Sheila Lintott 
tell of a particular shift in the appreciation of nature that took place with the observations 
of George Perkins Marsh, who is considered the first American environmentalist (1801-
1882), followed by John Burroughs (1837-1921, a conservationist) and John Muir (1838-
1914, founder of the Sierra Club).  Carlson and Lintott write, for example, that Muir 
found “all of nature and especially wild nature aesthetically beautiful.” He found 
“ugliness only where nature was subject to human intrusion.  His positive aesthetic 
appreciation seemed to encompass the whole natural world, from creatures considered 
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hideous in his day, such as alligators, to natural disasters thought to ruin the environment, 
such as earthquakes.”3  In contrast to viewing nature as frightening and needing to be 
tamed or conquered, or as material whose purpose was specifically for human use and 
pleasure, all of nature was accepted and seen as beautiful.  Following Burroughs and 
Muir, Aldo Leopold (1887-1948, an ecologist/environmentalist) presents a more complex 
“vision of the relationship” among “aesthetic appreciation of nature, environmentalism 
and an ecological understanding of the environment.”4   
 Also, noteworthy for this study is the fact that none of the three writers that we 
will examine moves into religious or theological territories, unless to draw distinctions.  
The most that any one of them does is to leave a small opening through which religion or 
theology might contribute supplemental meaning.  However, the guiding question will be 
what do Brady, Carlson, and Berleant offer to a contemporary theological aesthetics of 
nature/environment? 
A.  Emily Brady 
 Emily Brady works in the area of philosophy and aesthetics with a particular 
interest in natural environments and cultural geography.5  Brady opposes cognitive 
theorists who hold that an appropriate appreciation of nature requires a certain level of 
knowledge, usually related to science.  Instead, she joins with those who assert non-
cognitive theories, which means that she thinks a person does not have to know science 
or be an expert in any particular discipline in order to have an appropriate aesthetic 
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appreciation of nature.6  She describes her non-cognitive approach as an integrated 
aesthetic model. 
 Brady is most concerned that a cognitive view, such as one espoused by Allen 
Carlson, which requires scientific knowledge to some degree, would usurp the 
distinctiveness of what aesthetics has to offer and would restrict the contribution of other 
reasonable ways of informing an aesthetic appreciation of nature.7  She disagrees with 
Carlson’s primary dependency on science, whereby he divides nature into natural science 
categories, such as, class, order, and family, reminiscent of categories found in art, such 
as painting and painting’s different genres, and sub-genres.  Carlson then uses natural 
science as a guide for the appreciation of nature by way of these categories.  Brady 
contends that this discounts, at best, other experiences, appreciations, interpretations, and 
ways of knowing.8   
 However, aesthetics is frequently viewed as superfluous.  It is often looked upon 
as being rooted primarily in human desires, pleasures, and preferences of taste, and is 
mostly associated with art, having been cut away, generally, from ordinary experiences 
and theological thought.  Relativism and subjectivism abound; thus, all that the aesthetic 
perspective can bring to the table of decision making concerning the appreciation and 
valuing of the natural environment is a voice for the preservation of great scenic views, 
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Press, 2003), 3, 86-102, 102-116. 
     7Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 93-94,100-111.  Brady’s disagreement with cognitive 
models is particularly focused on Allen Carlson’s work, as she states on page 93. 
     8Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 98.   
 138
historically valued environments, such as the Civil War era at Gettysburg, and 
appreciation for sites conducive for pleasure and outdoor recreational activities.9   
 Today, when natural environments are threatened, for example, by brash 
development projects, interested parties in defense of conservation, or more earth friendly 
forms of development, look to more cognitive, objective presentations to affirm natural 
environments.  This usually means relying upon scientific models.   
 Science is seen as required in an appreciation of nature because it is believed that 
science can present as objectively as economics can tally currency.  In public debate the 
objective voice of science must confront a strong emphasis given to economics; that is, 
the monetary value of natural environmental sites, the need for jobs and economic 
development, and/or a community’s recreational interest that often involves economic 
development.   But, Brady feels too much is lost when we depend so heavily on science 
for its appreciation and judgment of nature.  Thus, she works diligently and methodically 
to build a case for an aesthetics of nature that includes and supports a more robust 
experience, appreciation, and judgment of an increasingly complex natural 
environment(s) that can be communicated cogently. 
 In support of her aim, Brady must show that it is possible to describe and assess 
natural environments without necessitating specific knowledge such as science.  She must 
offer a method that is reasonable and communicable to others.  And, she must address the 
question of whether or not nature is a social construct. 
 Brady views the nature/culture debate as a continuum, with one end occupying a 
holistic/ecological position where humans are understood as very much a part of nature.  
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On the other end, “nature is not real, but rather a cultural construct,” where human ideas 
determine the meaning of nature.  Here, the emphasis is on culture; such that, “humans 
are exclusively cultural beings rather than a part of nature.”10  Of course, there are places 
between these extremes, and this is where Brady generally makes her stand.  Regarding 
environmental landscapes she writes: 
On some accounts, all environments or landscapes are cultural; some 
constructivists contend that even pristine environments, if they exist, are 
experienced through cultural lenses and conventions.  My view takes a 
much narrower conception, given that I have made a distinction between 
nature and culture.  Cultural landscapes are those which have been 
intentionally modified by humans but where nature still plays some role.11  
They range from landscapes with traces of human habitation and 
agriculture, to the heavily modified landscapes of intensive agriculture and 
sparse settlements of indigenous cultures.  Although urban environments 
would appear to be cultural landscapes, it makes more sense to keep them 
in a category of their own, since their urban character leaves much less 
room for nature compared to, say, the rural countryside.12  
 
 While Brady is aware that the term “landscape” is not totally satisfying, she does 
not dismiss it.13  She realizes that it carries with it meanings derived from earlier times as 
part of the Enlightenment and early Modernity, such as associations with the scenery 
model (landscape) of aesthetic appreciation, which was itself derived from the 
picturesque theory.  The picturesque theory lies somewhat between the “serene, pastoral 
qualities of beauty and the awesome grandeur of the sublime.”14   
                                                 
     10Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 52-53, 100.  
     11Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 70.  Brady refers the reader to Steven Arntzen, whom 
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Perspectives,” in Lehari, Laanemets and Sarapik, eds., Place and Location II (Tallinn: Estland, 2001). 
     12Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 70. 
     13Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 21. 
     14Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 39.  Referring to Kant and the sublime, see in this text 
chapter one, pages 70-71. 
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 Aesthetic ideas related to the beautiful, the sublime, and the picturesque each had 
their extremes, but in some ways they show evidence given to understand what the 
differences are between an aesthetics of art, such as painting, and an aesthetics of the 
natural world.  They, in fact, signaled a change: 
All three of these new ways of aesthetically valuing nature signaled a 
softening of the predominant attitude which saw nature as ugly and 
uncontrollable, and as something to be tamed and perfected by [and] 
through human ideals.  With the picturesque (as with the sublime) came a 
valuing of change, disorder and the otherness of nature.  However, set 
against this, the picturesque was strongly human-centered in according 
value to landscapes in virtue of how well they met the standard by 
picturesque paintings.15 
 
These changes led to questions, such as: Is it necessary to differentiate between nature 
and culture?   
 As part of her work, Brady claims that within the contemporary landscape there 
are “degrees of naturalness and degrees of culture,” with her approach resting somewhere 
in the balance, claiming that she “leans towards the ecological view without embracing 
it.”16  She holds that there are different frameworks for understanding the natural world 
and culture, such as myth, aesthetics, religion, science, etc.  She is resilient in her resolve 
not to let any one framework be the interpreting lens for the natural world.  She is 
especially cautious regarding the hermeneutical lens of science.  
 Nevertheless, Brady must contend with Carlson’s claim that an aesthetics of 
nature necessitates a scientific/natural science model.  But she fears such a model lacks a 
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vital vulnerability and breadth of diversity.17  Therefore, she looks for a way that will 
balance the objective and subjective in an appreciation of nature.  
 For assistance with a proper balance Brady turns to disinterestedness, but not with 
an understanding such that the subject would be passive or where disinterestedness would 
leave an unbridgeable distance between humans and the natural world.18  She begins by 
recalling that in the eighteenth century Anthony Earl Shaftesbury (1671-1731) argues for 
disinterestedness in moral philosophy.  She writes: 
The original meaning of disinterestedness lies in eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, where Shaftesbury identifies the disinterested standpoint with 
morality.  Moral action is motivated by affection for something for its own 
sake, and it is therefore contrasted with desiring an object as a means to an 
end, for one’s own pleasure or for any other use.… Disinterestedness thus 
begins in this ethical context and is then brought smoothly into aesthetic 
theory to characterize the standpoint that we find in Kant.19 
 
Shaftesbury clears a way to understand Kant’s version of disinterestedness as not about 
passivity or distance, but about the “active use of the capacities of perception, thought 
and imagination,”20 but without self-interestedness or utility.21  Yet, Kant writes about 
aesthetic contemplation in such a way that it could be understood as passive.  Brady, 
arguing against this kind of interpretation, writes: 
Only judgements [sic] of taste are characterized in this way because the 
activity of the perception is complete in itself.  So, the passivity of the 
aesthetic response means only inactivity in respect of interest, and it does 
not preclude active contemplation.  But just what does this active 
contemplation consist in?  I would like to discuss the role of imagination 
                                                 
     17Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 89-91, 93-102. 
     18Referring to Kant and disinterestedness, see in this text chapter one, pages 67-73.  
     19Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 132.   
     20Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 133.   
     21See in this text, chapter one, pages 68-71 regarding Kant’s ideas on four moments in aesthetic 
judgment and the sublime.  The four moments include: disinterestedness; universal claim; purposiveness; 
and necessity.   
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as one aspect of this engagement to show that aesthetic attention is rarely 
passive and that there is no conflict between disinterestedness and 
participation with the aesthetic object.22   
 
Brady distinguishes between an interest in the object that is beneficial to the subject and a 
contemplative engagement by the subject in the aesthetic object.  
 Brady reads Kant such that contemplation refers to the harmony between the play 
of imagination and understanding.  Contemplation is not “constrained or directed by 
determinate concepts of the object.”23  Rather, Brady contends that Kant sees the role of 
the mind in aesthetic experience as active, “one which involves playing with the 
perceptual features of both artworks and natural objects.”  This mode of attention is not a 
“still, passive state of mind.”24  Again, referring to disinterested aesthetic pleasure, Kant 
writes:  
This pleasure is also in no way practical, neither like that from the 
pathological ground of agreeableness nor like that from the intellectual 
ground of the represented good.  But yet it has a causality in itself, namely 
that of maintaining the state of the representation of the mind and the 
occupation of the cognitive powers without a further aim.  We linger over 
the consideration of the beautiful because this consideration strengthens 
and reproduces itself, which is analogous to (yet not identical with) the 
way in which we linger when a charm in the representation of the object 
repeatedly attracts attention, where the mind is passive.25  
 
Brady is clear that Kant’s contemplative aesthetics is not passive.  More so, she is 
determined to show that he does not intend that aesthetics require or encourage 
unqualified detachment or distance between the subject and the natural world.  She 
writes: “‘Distancing’ is mistakenly coupled with the idea of creating distance (physical or 
                                                 
     22Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 133.   
     23Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 133.   
     24Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 133.   
    25Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer; trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Chp. 12, pg.107.  The parentheses are those of 
the translator.  Brady uses this quote in  Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 133. 
 143
otherwise) between subject and object rather than distancing oneself from desires and 
needs which might get in the way of appreciating the object itself.”26 
 Brady does not wish to err on the side of objectivism, which speaks of correct and 
incorrect, true and false, or on the side of formalism, which makes “knowledge irrelevant 
to aesthetic appreciation” because the “aesthetic is identified exclusively with the 
perception of form.”27  Nor does she advocate for relativism and subjectivism whereby 
aesthetics approaches nature loosely, by way of gross sentimentality or exorbitant fantasy 
that does, in fact, distance the appreciator from nature.28 
 Thus, with the help of a renewed disinterestedness that in aesthetic engagement 
means the subject is focused on the other, but not for personal gain, Brady moves to 
present the use of affectivity and imagination in aesthetic experience, appreciation, and 
judgment in such a way that aesthetic appreciation and judgment are reasonable, credible, 
and communicable.  Her goal is to make it possible for affectivity and imagination to 
have contributive influence when it comes to determining how we value nature.  She does 
this in two ways.  First, she describes what she means by imagination, and then she 
insists that for an aesthetics of nature to be taken seriously there needs to be a 
reasonableness about it.  In addition, it needs to be able to be communicated and shared.    
 Oddly, Brady does not believe that imagination, like science, is a necessity for 
aesthetic appreciation; however, it can certainly contribute to it: 
By bringing a range of experience and ideas to bear on perception, 
imagination contributes to the meaning and context of aesthetic objects, 
and to situating ourselves in relation to them.  It opens up new relations 
and connections and [adds] to the context of appreciation.  Contrary to 
                                                 
     26Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 134.   
     27Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 98, 130. 
     28Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 112-113. 
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Kant’s position, I do not believe that imagination is a necessary condition 
of aesthetic experience.… But when imagination is active, it opens up the 
aesthetic horizon and deepens the aesthetic response.  As an important 
component of the integrated aesthetic, it has the potential to encourage a 
more intimate engagement with our natural surroundings.29 
 
Brady does not tackle with any finality the meaning of imagination, but she does 
determine that there are two basic categories for understanding imagination.  These are 
“sensory imagination and creative imagination.”30   
 Sensory imagination is what fills in the blanks between our concepts and sense 
perceptions.  It brings memories into the present, thus acting as a bridge or connector.  It 
aids us in recollecting who people are, as well as assisting us in determining what an 
object is.  This aspect of imagination does not involve what we think of generally as 
“creativity or invention.”31 
 Creative imagination entails possibilities, inventiveness, problem solving of all 
sorts, make-believe and daydreams.  Brady says that this is sometimes referred to as the 
“productive imagination” because its activity is “not mimetic, but poetic,” allowing us to 
engage experience in new ways and to go beyond the conventional.32  Imagination cuts 
across all categories of experience, including those of the natural world and of culture.  
Brady says imagination has the capacity to bring meaning, which “emerges from the 
interaction of live creature with environment.”33 
                                                 
     29Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 147. 
     30Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 148. 
     31Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 148. 
     32Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 148-149. 
     33Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 149.  In her work, Brady refers to John Dewey because 
of his interest in experience and imagination.  See John Dewey’s text: Art as Experience (New York: 
Perigee, 2005), first published in 1934.  Dewey was an American pragmatist who helped connect (or 
reconnect) aesthetics to multiple kinds of experiences, especially ordinary experiences, so that aesthetics is 
not limited to the art world alone.  Also, in this chapter see footnote #130. 
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 But, Brady, like others, does not endorse superficial or trivial uses of imagination 
in an aesthetics of nature. There is a difference between imagination and the imaginary, 
or fantasy.34  For Brady, “imagination is not opposed to truth.”35  Reminiscent of 
McFague’s use of metaphor, there is a referent in Brady’s use of imagination in terms of 
an aesthetics of nature and it is squarely the natural world.   
 Brady strives for relevant imaginings, a kind of balance between what is, was, and 
what could be, perhaps a search for deeper meaning without losing a connection with 
what simply is.  It involves using imagination to wonder about the other; that is, using 
perceptions, understandings, memories, associations and beliefs that one has and then 
making a leap beyond this in order to engage with nature more deeply.  It does not 
involve flights of fantasy about nature that have no connection to reality,36 such as pigs in 
evening gowns with painted nails dancing the rumba.  There may be other occasions for 
such fancy, but Brady would not consider these excursions relevant or appropriate for an 
appreciation of nature. 
 Furthermore, Kant, according to Brady, allows for imagination to freely explore 
the object and its relationships but he does not allow for a freedom that distorts from the 
original sense of the object.37  Although his understanding of aesthetic judgment does not 
have a cognitive aim, Brady writes: 
In its free play, imagination makes connections and associations in relation to the 
object’s qualities for their own sake.  However, imagination does not have an 
entirely free rein; Kant is not putting forward imagination as ‘fancy,’ the power 
behind fantasy.  Although free from the laws of the understanding, imagination 
                                                 
     34Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 149. 
     35Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 148. 
     36Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 149, 165, 168. 
     37Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 153-154. 
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operates within a relationship with the understanding and the very basic concepts 
of cognition.38   
 
 Related to this, she asserts that imagination in nature has not been investigated 
thoroughly enough and although imagination is not a requirement for appreciation of the 
natural world, it is very important in an aesthetics of nature.  While Brady writes of 
sensory imagination that connects the sensual world with thoughts and concepts, and 
creative imagination that involves invention, she further describes imagination in several 
modes, including: associative; metaphorical; exploratory; projective; ampliative; and 
revelatory.39   
 According to Brady, ampliative imagination “involves the inventive powers of 
imagination,” although it may not necessarily “make use of images.”  It “amplifies what 
is given in perception.”40  Revelatory imagination involves following along an experience 
of amplification, but leads to some disclosure that gives way to significance or new 
meaning, but “not in a religious sense.”  Brady avoids religious/spiritual language.  She 
writes: 
Revelatory imagination is part of an aesthetic experience, and in this 
respect the revelation that occurs is not an extra-aesthetic truth that is 
disclosed.  Rather, an idea, belief or value is crystallized through 
heightened aesthetic experience, where perceptual and imaginative 
engagement with nature facilitates the kind of close attention that leads to 
revelation.  A quick glance at a lamb reveals little except an 
acknowledgement of its sweetness.  But the fuller participation of 
perception and imagination brings about a stronger grasp of the nature of 
innocence.  Contemplating the fresh whiteness of a lamb and its small, 
fragile stature evokes images of purity and naivety.  It is through dwelling 
                                                 
     38Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 151.  See also Christian Helmut Wenzel, An 
Introduction to Kant’s Aesthetics: Core Concepts and Problems (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 
2005), 9.   
     39Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 153-158.   
     40Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 156.   
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aesthetically and imaginatively on natural phenomena that we may 
achieve new ways of seeing.41 
 
 Again, Brady is in dialogue with Kant when she asserts that “imaginative 
devises—symbolic images, metaphor—open out new meanings beyond the limitations of 
literal language.”42  In addition, Brady stresses that we are not just to imagine, we are to 
“imagine well,” which means it is important that we allow the qualities of the natural 
world to “evoke and direct our imaginings.”  Secondly, we are to operate out of 
disinterestedness.  And thirdly, “imaging well is characterized by comparing imagination 
to a virtue”; that is, using imagination “skillfully and appropriately according to the 
context of aesthetic appreciation.”  She emphasizes flexibility in the use of these guides 
as a way to assist us in distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant use of 
imagination.43  Yet, even with such assistance our perceptions of nature and discernment 
of aesthetic qualities can diverge.   
 The task is to understand the reasons for our disagreements, which can include 
bias, prejudice, inappropriate attention, differences related to our experience, as well as 
“multiple legitimate experiences of aesthetic objects.”44  But even with this kind of effort, 
our differences of appreciation may persist.  In addition, our discernment of aesthetic 
                                                 
     41Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 157. 
     42Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 157. 
     43Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 158. 
     44Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 207.  Brady refers the reader to Frank Sibley’s, 
“Objectivity and Aesthetics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 42 (1968); 
reprinted in Approaches to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics.  Also: John Benson’s, 
“Sibley after Sibley,” in Aesthetic Concepts: Essays After Sibley, eds. Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 226. 
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qualities can change over time because of greater attention, familiarity, or reflection, but 
they may also remain as initially experienced and legitimately so.45   
 However, the goal is not uniformity of discernment, but some degree of consensus 
around how to move forward in terms of how we live with and in nature, which often 
requires that we make difficult decisions concerning the restoration, preservation, 
development, or even total forfeiture of natural environments or species.  Worse is when 
no responsible discernment takes place due to ignorance, deception, greed, or perhaps 
even fear, because we do not know what to do, or because we are overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the situation.  
 Brady insists that for an aesthetics of nature to be helpful it must be credible and 
to be credible it must be communicable.  This entails an awareness of the “particularity of 
the aesthetic object, the appreciator and the aesthetic situation.”46  Being able to move 
from the “particular to the communicable” is essential.  She writes: 
This is not particularity as private experience.  The practical approach to 
objectivity is an active, perceptually engaged method that encourages 
aesthetic communication between individuals.  Through argument and 
conversation about our aesthetic judgements [sic] we learn from others 
and may develop a critical aesthetic vocabulary that is designed and 
developed with the special demands of the environment in mind.47 
 
 Her aim is to share intelligibly about why nature is meaningful and valuable.  But 
for Brady this does not always require special information such as science.  Yet it may, 
and when it does she suggests that its involvement be among other kinds of contributions 
in hope of communicating a fuller interpretation of what the natural environment is about.  
This approach, she contends, demonstrates greater respect for nature. 
                                                 
     45Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 208. 
     46Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 206, 212-213. 
     47Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 206. 
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 Brady claims that with disinterestedness aesthetic appreciation is “akin to 
friendship that evolves into a close relationship with some degree of intimacy while at the 
same time maintaining distance to allow others to be themselves.”48  She says further: 
[I]t should not be surprising that a disinterested, integrated aesthetic 
potentially supports an environmental ethics characterized by respect and 
care.… Respect is a moral concept that depends upon allowing the other to 
be who they are, without using them as a means to one’s ends.  Aesthetic 
and moral values are distinct, but each type of valuing may complement 
the other for developing an appropriate attitude towards the natural 
environment.49 
 
 Brady is not a moralist, as was Plato who believed that if something is morally 
defective it is also aesthetically defective.  Rather, she is an autonomist, one who believes 
that “artistic value is non-instrumental; its value lies in a distinct, autonomous domain 
untouched by moral consideration.”50  However, an extreme autonomist holds that 
defects in morality never cause a decrease in the aesthetic value.  Plato and Leo Tolstoy 
would be considered extreme moralists.  Instead, Brady describes herself as a moderate 
autonomous, and thinks Kant would be too.51   
 A typical aesthetic/moral study is one Brady recalls used by Cheryl Foster.52  It 
raises the question, is a sunset whose vibrant colors are actually caused by pollution 
aesthetically beautiful?  Should moral constraints apply to aesthetic judgment?  Foster 
responds in the affirmative.  How can we affirm something that is harmful as beautiful?  
                                                 
     48Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 142.  
     49Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 142. 
     50Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 248. 
     51Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 248 
     52Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 249-250.  See Cheryl Foster, “Aesthetic 
Disillusionment: Environment, Ethics, Art,” in Environmental Values, 1, (1992): 212. 
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Brady questions this judgment because the visual experience of those qualities remains 
“brilliant.”53  Brady argues: 
Aesthetic value is primarily concerned with perceptual qualities and the 
emotional and imaginative responses connected to them, as well as the 
meanings that come through appreciating these qualities.  In this respect 
aesthetic evaluation is generally restricted to perceptual, emotional, and 
imaginative experiential states rather than significantly cognitive ones.  
Moral value is primarily concerned with making choices about how one 
ought to act, and how one ought to treat humans and the rest of nature.  
This is not to say that moral considerations are not part of our aesthetic 
experiences, or that aesthetic considerations are not part of moral 
deliberation.  But aesthetic and moral value are nevertheless distinct and 
require judgement [sic] on their own terms.54 
 
 Brady would not dismiss moral judgment from aesthetics, admitting that human 
agents by their actions can show a lack of aesthetic sensitivity.55  Therefore, she 
advocates for “moderate autonomism,” which “addresses the feeling that moral 
considerations ought to have some bearing on aesthetic appreciation but preserves the 
view that aesthetic judgements [sic] are distinct from moral ones.”56 
 Furthermore, Brady does not assume that all of nature is beautiful; that is, she 
does not automatically embrace a positive aesthetics.57  A positive aesthetics would mean 
that wilderness is always aesthetically superior to cultivated nature because the latter is 
affected by human agents whose works are critiqued.  For Brady, positive aesthetics 
                                                 
     53Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 248. 
     54Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 251. 
     55Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 252. 
     56Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 251. 
     57Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 198-199. 
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raises difficulties about how to compare natural environments that are wild and, more so, 
if they are not pristine.58   
 Brady stresses a method built on first hand perceptions, not just visual ones, and 
what she calls “practical objectivity” as a way to judge natural environments.  And while 
she does not approach nature as art, she does recognize similar skills and sensitivities that 
are relevant to both art and to nature.59  In fact, she supports a method of discernment 
based on particular experience, argument, and conversation: 
The practical approach to objectivity is an active, perceptually engaged 
method that encourages aesthetic communication between individuals.  
Through argument and conversation about our aesthetic judgements [sic], 
we learn from others and may develop a critical aesthetic vocabulary that 
is designed and developed with the special demands of the environment in 
mind.60 
  
 Brady asserts that an aesthetics of nature ought to be rounded and full and not 
limited to measurable data.  She advocates for multiple ways of experiencing, 
appreciating, and describing nature with primacy given to direct experience; argument 
and conversation in discernment toward judgment; and a renewed understanding of 
disinterestedness.  These are features that McFague would support, but McFague would 
require a scientific perspective in her appreciation of nature. This is made clear by the 
                                                 
     58Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 198-199.  Brady is in dialogue with Janna Thompson, 
“Aesthetics and the Value of Nature,” Environmental Ethics, 17, 1995, 291-305.   
     59Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 198-199.  Brady follows Janna Thompson. 
     60Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 206.  Brady expands on material related to first hand 
perception, argument and conversation provided by Frank Sibley, “Aesthetic Concepts,” Philosophical 
Review, 68, (1959).  Revised version reprinted in: Frank Sibley, Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers 
on Philosophical Aesthetics, eds. John Benson, Betty Redfern and Jeremy Roxbee Cox (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 20-23. 
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attention that she gives to science in her works, such as Super, Natural Christians and 
Life Abundant.61   
 Brady also deepens the conversation by fleshing out the use of imagination in 
concert with our relationship with nature.  She assists our understanding when she 
explains how time with nature can be practiced.  She helps to open up the experience, 
showing how it can be a subtle, but real dialectic that never becomes synthesized into 
one, but where two parties remain distinct, yet somehow engaged.  Also, with Brady, 
aesthetic value and moral value do not fold into one, but serve complementarily. 
B.  Allen Carlson  
 Allen Carlson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta and has 
written extensively on aesthetics and the natural environment.  According to Carlson, we 
cannot appreciate nature unless we know what it is and this requires the natural sciences.   
 Carlson situates the present discussion in light of history, realizing the importance 
of past figures, such as Kant.  But, contrary to Brady, he understands Kant’s meaning of 
disinterestedness to require greater distance between the subject and the natural world: 
 [T]he roots of environmental aesthetics lie in the ideas about aesthetic 
appreciation developed in the eighteenth century and given classic 
expression by Kant. Central to this approach was the concept of 
disinterestedness, in virtue of which aesthetic experience was construed as 
distanced from everyday interests, such as the practical and the personal.  
The coupling of the concept of disinterestedness with the eighteenth-
century fascination with the natural world resulted in a rich tradition of 
landscape appreciation.  With the aid of disinterestedness not only could 
domesticated, rural countrysides be seen as beautiful, but even the wildest 
of natural environments could be appreciated as sublime.  Moreover, 
between the beautiful and the sublime, disinterestedness made space for 
                                                 
     61McFague gives attention to ecology in relationship to the scientific account of the universe’s evolution, 
beginning with the Big Bang, see Life Abundant, Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 100-101.  
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the emergence of an even more powerful mode of landscape appreciation, 
the picturesque.62  
 
 The picturesque, while associated with landscape paintings, expanded to include 
“aesthetic experience of any kind of environment simply by focusing attention on picture-
like qualities involving sensory surface and formal composition.”63  But, the focus on 
landscape as an object of aesthetic attention did not endure intact, except perhaps for 
those “landscapes especially suited for disinterested, formalistic appreciation: grand 
scenes that could be easily composed to enhance picture-like sensory and formal 
qualities.”64  
 Change was occurring on multiple levels.  This included the rising significance of 
art in general, Hegel’s prominence of art over nature and the “expanded importance of 
the artifactual as opposed to the natural in western civilization,” such that the “natural 
world was increasingly marginalized.”65   
 As the twentieth century emerged, concepts associated with limited ideas of 
disinterestedness and with formalism led to an aesthetic sidelining of anything that was 
not art.66  However, in response to disinterestedness and formalism, mid-twentieth 
century analytic aesthetics rejected these constraints, at least in art, giving way to 
liberating forms such as Expressionism and the institutional organism of the art world 
itself.  This was a “new paradigm of emotionally and cognitively rich engagement with a 
                                                 
     62Allen Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” in The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 2nd ed., eds. 
Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York: Routledge, 2005), 541-542.  Regarding Kant, see in 
this text, chapter one, pages 67-71. 
     63Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 542. 
     64Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 542. 
     65Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 542. 
     66Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 542. 
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cultural artifact, intentionally created by a designing intellect, informed by both art-
historical traditions and art-critical practices, and deeply embedded in a complex, many-
faceted art world.”67   
 However, what some observers began to recognize was that the “aesthetic 
appreciation of the world beyond the art world was left behind, seemingly involving at 
best only distanced contemplation of sensory and formal qualities.”68  Nature “lacked key 
features of the new paradigm,” leaving nature unable to be appreciated within it.69  Thus, 
aesthetic appreciation in general could be limited to art.  But Aldo Leopold, a renowned 
naturalist, and others, objected to using the art world’s paradigm to appreciate nature.70  
Appropriate resources and tools for appreciating nature were needed. 
 In 1966 Ronald Hepburn wrote an article that “almost single-handedly launched 
the renewal” of interest in an aesthetics of nature.71  According to Carlson, Hepburn 
argued that those very “deficiencies” in nature are actually “sources for a different kind 
of a potentially very rich aesthetic experience.”  Carlson writes: 
[Hepburn] emphasized the fact that since the natural world is not 
constrained by things such as designing intellects, art-historical traditions 
and art-critical practices, it facilitates an open, engaging and creative mode 
of appreciation.  However, Hepburn also demonstrated that there is in the 
appreciation of nature, as in the appreciation of art, a movement from 
trivial to serious aesthetic experience.  He argued that if we are to realize 
this serious kind of aesthetic experience of nature, then the open, 
engaging, creative appreciation must be guided by an understanding of the 
real nature of the natural world.72 
                                                 
     67Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 543. 
     68Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 543. 
     69Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 543. 
     70Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 544. 
     71Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 544.  Carlson refers to: Ronald Hepburn, “Contemporary 
Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty” republished in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments, eds. 
Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004), 43-62. 
     72Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 544-545. 
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 But in the 1960’s the cultural pendulum was swinging in the direction of 
recognizing the importance of “immediate sensuous and emotional responses.”  Hepburn, 
followed by Carlson and others, feared such a trend would lead to a trivializing of nature 
that, in the end, could not contribute to the larger conversation concerning the 
degradation of nature.  Eventually, Carlson resorts to a cognitive, more scientific 
approach, as a way to deliver an aesthetic appreciation that is “guided by knowledge and 
understanding.”73  His approach is referred to as the natural environmental model.74  And 
following in the spirit of Leopold, “who linked the beauty of nature to its ecological 
integrity and stability,”75 Carlson contends that a cognitive model based in the natural 
sciences can be “embraced by philosophers concerned to bring our aesthetic appreciation 
of nature in line with our ethical duties to maintain nature’s ecological well-being.”76   
 Carlson believes that our experience of nature must be something akin to what the 
pragmatist John Dewey advocated.  It must be a “consummatory experience: one in 
which knowledge and intelligence transform raw experience by making it determinate, 
                                                 
     73Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 547-548. 
     74Allen Carlson, “Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” in The Aesthetics of Natural 
Environments, eds. Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2004), 
72.   
     75Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 548. Carlson credits Aldo Leopold, “Conservation Esthetic,” in 
A Sand County Almanac with Essays on Conservation from Round River (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), and to J.B. Callicott, “The Land Aesthetic,” in J. B. Callicott (ed.), Companion to a Sand 
County Almanac: Interpretive and Critical Essays (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).    
     76Carlson, “Environmental Aesthetics,” 548.  Carlson credits H. Rolston, “Does Aesthetic Appreciation 
of Nature Need to be Science Based?,” British Journal of Aesthetics, 35: (1995), 374-86, also M. Eaton, 
“The Beauty that Requires Health,” in J.I. Nassauer (ed.), Placing Nature: Culture and Landscape Ecology 
(Washington: Island Press, 1997), also Y. Saito, “Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms,” Environmental 
Ethics, 20: (1998), 135-149, and P. Matthews, “Scientific Knowledge and the Aesthetic Appreciation of 
Nature,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 60: (2002), 37- 48.   
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harmonious, and meaningful.”77  However, in contrast to Dewey, Carlson’s model 
centralizes scientific knowledge, although sometimes this can mean relying upon 
common sense knowledge.78  He writes:  
This knowledge gives us the appropriate foci of aesthetic significance and 
the appropriate boundaries of the setting so that our experience becomes 
one of aesthetic appreciation.  If to aesthetically appreciate art we must 
have knowledge of artistic traditions and styles within those traditions, 
then to aesthetically appreciate nature we must have knowledge of the 
different environments of nature and of the systems and elements within 
those environments.79   
 
Different environments require different approaches to apprehension and appreciation, 
that is, “our knowledge of the environment in question indicates how to appreciate.”80  
Furthering his argument, Carlson delineates between design appreciation and order 
appreciation. 
 Art is designed, it entails an object that embodies that design, and it involves an 
agent, a designer/artist that makes it appropriate for evaluative judgment.81  Art, 
traditionally, has focused on an object that is generally limited and contained in some 
way.  Even art genres that feature process acts or objects that are discovered or found and  
are determined to have aesthetic value involve artists’ decisions concerning the process, 
selection, and materials to some degree.  However, these latter genres, according to 
                                                 
     77Carlson, “Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” 71.  John Dewey, in Art as Experience, 
attempts to counter analytic aesthetics by reconnecting aesthetics to ordinary and practical experience.  
Also, in this chapter see footnotes  #32 and 129.  
     78Regarding disinterestedness, see Allen Carlson’s text , Aesthetics and the Environment (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 23-27.  
     79Carlson, “Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” 72. 
     80Carlson, “Appreciation and the Natural Environment,” 72. 
     81Allen Carlson, “Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature,” in Landscape, Natural Beauty and the 
Arts, eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 216. 
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Carlson, are best approached via order appreciation versus design appreciation.  Carlson 
writes: 
An individual quo appreciator selects objects of appreciation from the 
things around him and focuses on the order imposed on these objects by 
various forces, random and otherwise, which produce them.  Moreover, 
the objects are selected in part by reference to a general nonaesthetic and 
nonartistic story which helps make them appreciable by making this order 
visible and intelligible.  Awareness and understanding of the key 
entities—the order, the forces which produce it, and the account which 
illuminates it—and of the interplay among them dictate relevant acts of 
aspection and guide the appreciative response.82   
 
 Similarly, nature does not have an intentional design and it does not have a 
designer.83  According to Carlson, nature should not be approached using a design model; 
instead, nature should be approached using order appreciation.  Carlson claims nature is 
not art, stressing appreciation should follow the “lead of the object.”84   
 Carlson asserts that there are three “entities significant to order appreciation in 
nature: 1) “the relevant order is that typically called the natural order”; 2) relevant forces 
are the forces of nature, such as related to geology, biology, and meteorology, that shape 
the planet and all that is in it; 3) and the “story given to it by natural science” through its 
many areas of study such as “astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, genetics, 
meteorology, geology as well as the particular explanatory theories within these 
sciences.”  Carlson states: “Awareness and understanding of evolutionary theory, for 
example, is relevant to appreciating the natural order as revealed in flora and fauna; 
without such knowledge the biosphere may strike us as chaotic.”85  Ultimately, Carlson 
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wants to understand the natural forces that shape the natural environment.  Thus, he is 
uneasy approaching nature via a design model, especially a design model that is based in 
theism.   
 Any aesthetics of nature that relies on theistic accounts, where God is understood 
as the artist, are criticized as overly simplistic of both nature and God.86  However, 
important to Carlson’s appreciation of nature is his belief that all of nature is basically 
beautiful in some way; that is, “untouched, pristine nature has only or primarily positive 
aesthetic qualities.”87  Yet he does not justify a positive aesthetics of nature based upon 
religious or theological grounds, which he works to avoid.88   
 There are multiple difficulties to be found within Western theistic perspectives 
that play down an appreciation of nature.  These include dualism, which holds that spirit 
is of greater value than matter, descending in importance according to the degree of 
mental giftedness.  Further, if humans and the natural world are in need of redemption, 
how can nature be good or beautiful?  And, if there is such a thing as ontic evil in the 
world, then by extension, if there is ugliness in the world, how can you have a positive 
aesthetics of nature?89  Carlson contends that it took secular aesthetics and secular 
science to free aesthetics of nature from restrictive theism.90  He advocates for an 
aesthetics of nature based in science: 
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Scientific information and redescription make us see beauty where we 
could not see it before, pattern and harmony instead of meaningless 
jumble.  If these suggestions are correct, they begin to explain the 
relationship between scientific knowledge and the aesthetic appreciation 
of nature.  They begin to account for the way in which the two have 
developed hand in hand and why, in light of scientific knowledge, the 
natural world seems aesthetically good.91 
 
 Among those who believed that untouched nature is beautiful, sullied only by 
humans, are George Marsh, John Ruskin, and John Muir.92  More contemporary believers 
“not given to absolute or universal claims” say that nature is more than likely good and 
beautiful.93  Carlson looks at art critically because human actions and makings are open 
to critique, but he looks at nature positively.94  Negative criticism of nature really pertains 
to that part of the natural world that has been affected by humans. 
 Carlson contends that even if you do not think that nature qualifies as an aesthetic 
entity, you cannot deny that we respond to nature aesthetically.95  However, because 
nature is not human art it should not receive evaluative judgment based upon art’s 
criteria; rather, it should “involve explaining it and judging it in terms of what it is, 
placing it within its natural category, its species, genus, etc., locating it in its natural 
history and in its environmental milieu.”96  Carlson claims: “Appropriate aesthetic 
appreciation is that appreciation of an object that reveals what aesthetic qualities and 
value it has.”97  But Carlson also makes a connection between “correctness in science and 
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aesthetic goodness” saying that this connection is both complex and contingent.  First, he 
believes that a “more correct categorization in science is one that over time makes the 
natural world seem more intelligible, more comprehensible to those whose science it is.”  
It does so by recognizing certain qualities “order, regularity, harmony, balance, tension, 
resolution, and so forth.”  He writes: 
If our science did not discover, uncover, and/or create such qualities in the 
natural world and explain the world in terms of them, it would not 
accomplish its task of making it seem more intelligible to us; rather, it 
would leave the world incomprehensible, as any of the various world 
views that we regard as superstition seem to us to leave it.  Moreover, 
these qualities that make the world seem comprehensible to us are also 
those that we find aesthetically good.  Thus, when we experience them in 
the natural world or experience the natural world in terms of them, we find 
it aesthetically good.  This is not surprising, for qualities such as order, 
regularity, harmony, balance, tension, and resolution are the kinds of 
qualities that we find aesthetically good in art.98   
 
 However, Carlson asserts a strong qualification regarding his views on aesthetics 
and nature.  He does not claim a positive aesthetics of nature beyond one limited to a 
specific paradigm based in science/natural history, and he does not think this is a 
drawback.  Instead, he believes it is less “misleading” than broader, grand proposals.99  
Furthermore, he contends that advances made in the “natural sciences can be viewed as 
heralding a corresponding advance in positive aesthetics” and “ecological” aesthetics in 
general.100 
  Along this line, Carlson, similar to Brady, makes distinctions between extreme 
and helpful forms of disinterestedness.  He claims that the difficulty with the 
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disinterestedness tradition is that “too much attention is paid to the concept of the 
aesthetic and too little to that of appreciation.”101 Furthering his case, he writes: 
Following in the wake of analytic aesthetics’ assault on essentialism, 
formalism, and disinterestedness, more recent philosophical movements 
such as feminist aesthetics and postmodernism so completely rejected 
these doctrines that they leave no basis for anything but the most radical 
answers to the question of aesthetic relevance.  Thus we now have what I 
call, rather casually and indifferently, a postmodern approach to aesthetic 
relevance, which seemingly holds that anything and everything that any 
appreciator happens to bring to an object is relevant to its aesthetic 
appreciation, for in some sense or other the object is created anew in light 
of that which the appreciator contributes to it.102 
 
Carlson claims to emphasize an appreciation of nature that practices a kind of sympathy 
for nature, making the point that you cannot have a narrow understanding of 
disinterestedness and, at the same time, call for sympathy for nature.103   
 Carlson’s model is reliant upon cognitive knowledge, which includes 
understanding the workings of nature and nature’s interrelatedness.  His model is reliant 
on science, which itself depends on a kind of objectivity, but Carlson does not embrace 
traditional disinterestedness.  Traditional views of disinterestedness discourage any focus 
on utility or personal benefit and interest by the subject in the object.  Instead, Carlson 
moves away from traditional disinterestedness, as well as formalism, and places more 
attention on nature itself with the use of an object-focused approach rooted in 
science/natural history.104  However, he does believe that the natural environmental 
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model can be enriched by supplementing it with other approaches, including non-
cognitive approaches.105  
 But Carlson is criticized, as evidenced by Brady, for asserting that science/natural 
science should be the central feature of any serious appreciation of nature.  Thus, 
criticism surrounds what is generally thought to be left out of Carlson’s model.  Among 
these, for example, is profound emotional experiences of nature where one does not have 
significant knowledge of the environment, but is still moved appropriately and deeply.106  
 Additional criticism includes how Carlson approaches those aspects of nature that 
are specifically shaped by humans, such as agricultural land, by asking, what is its 
function?  As a result, you would appreciate and judge the environment based upon an 
aesthetic category set according to its particular utility.107  But Carlson may not always 
go far enough in asking if the use or function of the land itself is proper and sensitive to a 
general ecological aesthetic.   
 However, Carlson is astute at recognizing that we tend to appreciate those 
environments that we are familiar with from our own experience.  For example, we might 
find newly shaped environments, such as broad, wide fields with single crops and large, 
rectangular metal barns boring and unattractive, because we are not accustomed to them.  
Instead, we may be drawn to what we knew in years past; that is, fields where several 
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different crops are grown, that have trees, briars, and ditches stitched across its acreage, 
and where there can be found shapelier constructions.108  
 In addition, Carlson suggests that aesthetic value can be “thin,” which is primarily 
related to the quality or value of its surface sense and its formal properties, or “thick,” 
which may include thin characteristics but also deeper “qualities and values that the 
object expresses or conveys to the viewer.”109  Thus, the object may express or convey 
both thin and thick value.  For example, a plastic houseplant may be given “thin” positive 
value, while its live version is given “thick” value.  Items that are found along the way, or 
what some might call junk, could be arranged such that they express value related to both 
thin and thick value.110  However, caution is required, the “life values an object expresses 
are often the ones reflecting the values, emotions, and attitudes of the individuals who are 
responsible for its nature and function.”111 
 According to Carlson, science is required for appropriate aesthetic appreciation of 
the natural environment.  What makes Carlson so challenging and controversial is how 
adamant he is about this belief.  In the final analysis, he wants the natural environment to 
be appreciated for what it is, even if humans are the ones who name it and describe it.  
C.  Arnold Berleant 
 Like Brady and Carlson, Arnold Berleant’s aesthetic approach stresses 
understanding the world as an ecosystem(s), as an environment.112  However, Berleant 
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works intensely to understand the active engagement of art/culture and nature, asserting 
that there are multiple factors that influence the ongoing dynamic of an environment.  
These mutual pressures and influences interact and interweave.113  He perceives that 
within the environment there is a complex social matrix, what he describes as a social 
aesthetics that is integral to a broader environmental aesthetics.114 
 Berleant’s focus on context moves away from the use of the terms nature and 
landscape, although he realizes that the term environment is no less vulnerable to the 
argument of human construction than are nature and landscape.115  Also influenced by 
Dewey’s emphasis on aesthetic experience,116 Berleant’s approach is referred to as an 
aesthetics of engagement.   
 Berleant believes that aesthetics as a discipline has become more than its 
eighteenth century understanding that is rooted in sense knowledge or perfection of the 
senses.  Aesthetics includes other factors, such as cognitive ones like “meaning, memory, 
metaphor, symbol, and history,”117 yet, he strongly emphasizes sense experience: 
[I]t is important to reaffirm the central place that sense perception holds in 
aesthetic experience, for the senses are essential and indeed central to the 
study of art and natural beauty.  Of course, the early emphasis of 
aesthetics on beauty has changed with the evolution of the arts, and today 
the field embraces a wide range of qualities and features of perceptual 
experiences that may be termed, in some fashion, ‘aesthetic’.  These 
include the ugly, the grotesque, the comic or playful, as well as the 
conventionally pleasing.  In fact the concept of beauty may itself be 
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extended to cover such as these, in so far as they enable us to have 
experience that is both positive and aesthetic.118  
 
He is adamant that sense experience not be limited to sight and hearing.119    
 Somatic involvement by a participant is “part of perceptual awareness,”120 and, 
“aesthetic engagement may include a cognitive component in the form of mythical, 
religious, or other belief systems that informs, interprets, or guides perception.”121  
Factors such as these combine, forming what Berleant calls an “aesthetic field, which 
may be seen as the matrix in which those experiences we call aesthetic take place.”122   
 As Berleant pursues a broader understanding of aesthetics in today’s world, he 
recognizes that there are multiple forces impacting the environment, and that it is the 
overall environment that is today oppressed.  He writes: “Not only has the countryside 
been desecrated: industry has invaded the city with industrial sites, acrid smoke, chemical 
odours [sic], and their accompaniment of slums, sweatshops, and despair.”123  As 
Berleant pursues an environmental aesthetics, he names three major approaches to 
aesthetics: the contemplative model, the active model, and the participatory model, which 
he later refers to as the engagement model.   
 The contemplative model, according to Berleant, has a history rooted in the 
“intellectualist, visual model” whose influence remained even when art was set free from 
“[r]eligious, metaphysical, historical, and epistemological criteria,” which provided the 
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“governing principles by which art was to be made, understood, and judged.”124  
Continuing, he writes: 
When the study of art finally achieved its emancipation and identity late in 
the Enlightenment, this intellectualist, visual model was not abandoned.  It 
became instead the governing metaphor for the explanation of aesthetic 
experience, which emerged as a contemplative attitude for appreciating an 
art object for its own sake.  Only in the last century was this account 
challenged by explanations such as those based on empathy or pragmatic 
functionalism.125 
 
 The contemplative model received special distinction during the Enlightenment, 
but versions of it go back to classical times.126  It recognizes the art object as distinct and 
separate from its surroundings, and it “requires a special attitude, an attitude of 
disinterestedness, that regards the object in the light of its own intrinsic qualities with no 
concern for ulterior purposes.”127  In its more contemporary version, it speaks of the 
object’s properties and of distinctive ways of looking at the object, sometimes using 
psychological theories that serve to remove or elevate the object from the experiential 
environment.128  Distance and space are key components. 
 As in the history of landscape painting, there is a “conception of space modeled 
on the space of the physicist, more specifically the eighteenth-century physicist.”  Within 
this view, Berleant says that space becomes an “abstraction, a medium that is universal, 
objective, and impersonal, independent of the objects that are situated in and move 
through it.  Such an objective space leads to the objectification of things in it, which are 
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then regarded from the stance of an impersonal observer.”129  Berleant’s particular 
analysis of the contemplative model draws attention to the space that surrounds the 
solitary object.  Later, this point will help contextualize his concern for the entire spatial 
influence. 
 Next, Berleant examines the active model, which, contrary to the contemplative 
model, usually stresses that the perceiver is absorbed in the object via sympathetic or 
empathetic identification with the object, rather than distance or separation.  However, 
during the twentieth century “some proposals appeared that went well beyond the 
psychological locus of the common nineteenth-century alternatives.”  Struggling to 
“overcome the passivity and separation of disinterested contemplation” they claimed that 
the aesthetic perceiver was a “multi-sensory, active agent.”130   
 The result of the active model is not mathematical facts or scientific truths, but 
presences or energized space.131  This presence is diversely described, such that a 
“discernment of places with their value and meanings occurs in relation to the central 
position of the body,” and includes inner and outer presence, as well as relationship with 
the broader social world.132  Berleant, searching for patterns, writes: 
What is common to the various forms of the active model is the 
recognition that the objective world of classical science is not the 
experiential world of the human perceiver.  Thus there is a sharp 
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difference between space as it is presumably held to be objectively and the 
perception of that space.133 
 
 But, the participatory model (a.k.a. engagement model) holds that the two 
previous models fall short.  They do so because environment is “not wholly dependent on 
the perceiving subject.”134  Instead, the environment “also imposes itself in significant 
ways on the human person, engaging one in a relationship of mutual influence.”  Thus, 
the environment should not be objectified, and “it cannot be taken as a mere reflection of 
the perceiver, either.”135   
 Berleant emphasizes the influence that the environment itself, natural and 
constructed, has on the human body and the human perceiver’s “definition of its lived 
space.”136  He believes that the “environment is understood as a field of forces continuous 
with the organism, a field in which there is a reciprocal action of organism on 
environment and environment on organism, and in which there is no sharp demarcation 
between them.”137  Berleant claims this view is not new, because “artists and architects 
have long utilized it.”  What he says is different is an articulation of how environmental 
activity happens, along with an explanation that assimilates this understanding within the 
frame of aesthetic theory, such that it holds for both art and physical environment.138 
 Berleant’s model is sensitive to secondary features that do not inhere in the object, 
nor do they originate in consciousness; rather, they are “invitational qualities” or 
“characteristics to which perceptual awareness is receptive and to which it responds.  
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They emerge only in the intimate reciprocity that is central to aesthetic engagement.”139  
This means that environment is not an “alien” something-or-other that surrounds human 
beings.  Instead, Berleant asserts: 
The environment is rather the medium in which we live, of which our 
being partakes and comes to identity.  Within this environmental medium 
occur the activating forces of mind, eye, and hand, together with the 
perceptual features that engage these forces and elicit their reactions.  
Every vestige of dualism must be cast off here.  There is no inside and 
outside, human being and external world, even, in the final reckoning, self 
and other.  The conscious body moving within and as part of a spatio-
temporal environmental medium becomes the domain of human 
experience, the human world, the ground of human reality within which 
discriminations and distinctions are made.  We live, then, in a dynamic 
nexus of interpenetrating forces to which we contribute and respond.140 
 
In the midst of his dynamic understanding, Berleant is convinced that if aesthetics loses 
its connection to the experiential it becomes “empty spider webs of logic.”141   
 Even though Kant’s work in aesthetics did focus primarily on the natural world, 
it, paradoxically, helped set in motion Modernity’s marginalization of the natural world.  
Aesthetics, in fact, became centered on objects, developing along the scientific vision of 
its day, dealing with “discrete objects to which the human subject stands in various 
external relationships.”142  This provided “art with an identity of its own and an 
independent cultural status.”143  More so, while traditional aesthetics distanced nature 
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from humanity, it also “separated the arts from their integral place in the matrix of human 
cultural life.”144   
 But, Berleant claims that with the environmental crisis there has been a 
“rediscovery of the values that reside in and depend on our environment,” and with this 
rediscovery has come recognition of the need for an enlarged, inclusive aesthetics that 
does not lose focus on particularity.145  Berleant writes: 
[A]n enlarged aesthetic awareness allows us to extend aesthetic 
appreciation to the natural world and beyond the appreciation of nature to 
all environmental situations, including urban and industrial ones.  
Moreover, environmental aesthetic values lead us past the search for 
beauty to the recognition of negative aesthetic values and the importance 
of the aesthetic criticism of particular environments.  While nature may 
always be beautiful, as some have held, the nature that humans have re-
made may not.146  
 
 Contrary to a narrow interpretations of disinterestedness, Berleant encourages an 
aesthetics of engagement.  Engagement, he believes, “connotes a range of appreciative 
involvement” whose degrees will vary according to the situation, appreciator, and the 
context.147  Berleant is immensely aware that it is the human person who is aesthetically 
involved in the environment, whereby environment is the natural world, the human 
constructed world, the social and the virtual world, and where neither the natural world 
nor the human stand apart from the other.  Rather, they are “best understood as realms 
that in experience are actually co-extensive.”148   
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 Berleant is significant for this study because he describes today’s environment in 
more amorphous, fluid terms.  He deals starkly with questions about the real world and 
the virtual world.  Is the virtual real?—Berleant claims that it is, whether it be computer 
generated or of the human mind.149  He sees similarities between cyberspace and its 
computer generated worlds with that of fiction, letter writing, history, and human 
imagination.  For example, humans write stories, creating other worlds per se, but today 
we write using many different formats, all part and parcel of a contemporary landscape. 
Cyberspace is part of the larger environment and it has its own aesthetic domain as 
well.150  Berleant writes: 
The electronic world is neither more real nor less real than the world of 
dreams or the world of daily activities.  In fact, we might regard the realm 
of cyberspace, cybertime, and cybermotion as the dream world of the 
inhabitants of the high tech computer world.… The human presence, then, 
is as integral to a cyberaesthetic as it is to the aesthetic of every other 
environment.  Nor can we ever stand entirely outside it.  Moreover, the 
cyberenvironment offers resistance to our desires and imposes its demands 
on us, just as other environments do.151 
 
In fact, speaking to the difference of environment and place, with place being more 
particular and circumscribed, he writes: 
There is something to be gained in explanatory force with a definition of 
place that is not earthbound.  It may be that some of our most vivid and 
compelling experiences of place occur in space that is imaginary or that 
inhabits dreams.  This may be taken as a comment on the spaces in which 
many of us live in industrialized environments, spaces at the least not 
memorable and that often provide what is perhaps our most common 
experience of location, placelessness.152 
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 Although Berleant is very open to human innovation and construction, he is 
sensitive to how humans construct.  He gives a scathing critique of “happy make-
believe,” family-friendly Disney World, describing it as a “subtly penetrating” 
environment of “glittering surfaces,” behind which “hide disturbing meanings.”153  It is 
an environment that lauds technology as that which solves problems and makes for a 
perfect world that is benignly fueled by consumerism.  It is, according to Berleant, a 
“megamonument to the commodification of culture.”154   
 False and hallow, theme park ideology sells and replicates, taking extravagant and 
simple forms around the globe, a kind of “corporate colonialism,” even creating “history 
as it influences our beliefs about the past,” as well as beliefs about the present.155  Disney 
World represents “itself as the full flowering of the Modern ethos, with its confidence in 
a future guided by scientific imagination toward a technological utopia.”156  The 
difficulty resides in distortions and the “blurring of distinctions,” such as the “deliberate 
confusion” of different modes of reality like “economic reality” with fiction and 
fantasy,157 and, one should add, the natural world with fiction and fantasy as well. 
 Berleant encourages analysis of motives and interests, arguing that because of 
postmodernism we cannot resort to facade level certitudes that blur differences and 
distort facts.  He asserts the provisional character of life, but does not “abandon us to 
intellectual fragmentation and cognitive chaos.”  Instead, he calls for a “conceptual 
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landscape vastly different from the modernist ideal of an unequivocal order revealed by 
‘the light of reason.’”  He encourages visioning the world as one, but with multiple 
meanings and a plurality of relationships.  Furthermore, he says that we must admit value 
with the assistance of an “enlarged cognitive realm.”158   
 Berleant, whose aesthetics of engagement encompasses both art and nature,159 
believes that no human activity is value neutral.160  In fact, although Berleant’s aesthetic 
analysis of the theme park may have started with description, it concludes with “moral 
judgment.”  He writes: 
This does not create an unwelcome complication in the knowledge 
process; it recognizes that another facet on the complex jewel of human 
understanding has been glowing all along.  We find ourselves returning, in 
this humanized landscape of understanding, to the insight of our classical 
forebears that truth and value are inseparable, but we must couple this 
with the recognition by contemporary science and philosophy that these 
are invariably contextual and contingent.161 
 
 Berleant primarily studies the broader environment, the interweaving of culture 
and nature, and within this environment he investigates particular events, locations, and 
places.  He is significant for this study because although we may speak as though the 
world of nature and culture are separate, one could argue that this dichotomy simply does 
not exist.  Instead, this is the world in which we live: pristine nature on earth is gone; all 
has been touched, to some degree, by culture.  However, as we find ourselves at the 
“close of the postmodern age,” Berleant believes that “multiple interpretations do not all 
have equal weight, that postmodernism requires deconstruction, and that its 
                                                 
     158Berleant, “Deconstructing Disney World,”148. 
     159Arnold Berleant, “The Aesthetics of Art and Nature,” in The Aesthetic of Natural Environments, eds., 
Allen Carlson and Arnold Berleant (Orchard Park, New York: Broadview Press, 2004), 86.  
     160Berleant, “Deconstructing Disney World,”148.  Clarification: positivism has to do with requiring 
measurable, empirical evidence, whereas a positive aesthetic refers to goodness and beauty. 
     161Berleant, “Deconstructing Disney World,”148. 
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deconstruction leads to a conclusion somewhat less destructive than indefiniteness and 
less autocratic than ‘Truth.’”162  He writes: 
[An] aesthetic analysis of Disney’s worlds, by showing how realities are 
created and subverted, confronts us with the pervasiveness of the 
normative and the inseparability of the moral and the aesthetic.  The 
challenge of our time is to reform knowledge and value in a way that is 
pluralistic and open-ended, and yet provides the basis for both decision 
and action.”163   
 
 Berleant’s harsh criticism of Disney’s portrayal of reality and fantasy is not 
without surprising opposition.  In an article noting the death of Ollie Johnston, a 
celebrated Disney animator who worked on such films as Bambi, the reporter tells of 
environmental criticism that would fit with Berleant, but also of those who think such 
works have generated empathy for the natural world more, even, than Disney’s nature 
films.164  Needless to say, to assume that such media projects have no influence in 
shaping our concepts, appreciations, and engagements with the natural world is to make a 
foolish assumption.  
 Berleant’s work in environmental aesthetics attempts to grapple with a 
multifarious reality that grows in complexity.  The situation itself continues to compound, 
due in large part to environmental degradation, increased population, growth in 
technology, and tensions in social, political, and religious sectors.  In addition, our 
understandings and appreciations of what it means to be human and what it means to be 
non-human life, all contribute, for good or for ill, to the evolving process of ongoing 
creation.   
                                                 
     162Berleant, “Deconstructing Disney World,”148-149. 
     163Berleant, “Deconstructing Disney World,”149. 
     164Patricia Cohen, “Animated Bambi Debate Arouses Pastoral Passions,” nytimes.com, 23 April 2008, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/books/23bambi.html... > (accessed on 23 April 2008). 
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Conclusion 
 After examining works by Emily Brady, Allen Carlson, and Arnold Berleant, we 
conclude that they do contribute meaningfully to an historical understanding of how an 
aesthetics of nature/environment has evolved, and that they address many of the current 
debates.  Also, similar to Sallie McFague, one or more of these writers emphasizes a 
strong need for firsthand experience as a way to know and appreciate nature.  We find a 
valuing of non-human nature for its own dignity, as well as some degree of objectivity or 
disinterestedness and empathic feelings for the natural world.  There is the recognition of 
the importance of aesthetics and science, and a sense of the connection between 
aesthetics and morality.  We find with these writers an understanding that an aesthetics of 
nature/environment involves multiple issues related to economics and development in 
light of the contemporary world.  There is a sense of environment as nature and culture 
and a growing appreciation of the significance of space and geography, in addition to 
history.165 
 By their giving attention to these issues, McFague’s work is validated or at least 
connected to contemporary scholarship in the area of aesthetics and the environment.  
However, in their differences these scholars also stand apart from McFague, some in their 
opposition concerning particular topics, but also when these scholars suggest ideas and 
issues not raised by McFague.   
 Individually, Brady would support McFague’s desire to include a deep sensitivity 
for the natural world by not limiting appreciation to science alone, yet Brady’s insistence 
that science is not required would not be acceptable to McFague.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
     165Contemporary geography includes at least three main areas of study: physical; social/cultural; and 
geographic information science.  Within these are included studies pertaining to development and 
environment. 
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Carlson supports McFague by emphasizing the need for an educated eye (natural 
sciences), but McFague might not find Carlson forceful enough in terms of how to 
develop sensitivity toward nature, and she would likely not agree with his seemingly 
neutral approach to the process by which cultivated nature functions.  Berleant, however, 
opposes McFague with his assertion that virtual reality is quite real.  He would be in 
alignment with her in terms of morality and aesthetics never being radically separated, as 
would Brady and Carlson.   
 Also, we find Brady reluctant to assume that nature is good, preferring instead to 
work at getting to know nature, trusting in what will be discovered.  In a similar vein, it is 
interesting to remember how McFague encourages us to work metaphors, such as the 
world as the body of God, letting their tensions reveal something new to us.   
 Contrary to Berleant, McFague, who is open to science, seems leery of 
technology.  She favors a simpler, more direct method of meeting the natural world, 
which she hopes, at least, will aid us in developing an appreciation and respect for non-
human nature.  Also, McFague encourages some degree of de-anthropocentricism, to 
which Brady and Carlson would lean, but Berleant is more resolved to the human 
footprint and to the undeniable fact of human culture’s pervasiveness, although his vision 
of an environmental field would seem to neutralize arrogant hierarchies.166     
 Each of these writers supports some kind of balance or integration of objectivity 
and subjectivity by the human subject regarding nature or what is often referred to as 
disinterestedness.  For her part, Brady wishes to renew Kant’s first moment, claiming 
disinterestedness helps to insure against self-interestedness by the subject and against 
                                                 
     166Berleant, Aesthetics and Environment, 9, 11, and 110. 
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focusing on the object’s utility.167  Brady does not believe that this has to mean a 
distancing of health emotions by the subject in regard to nature.  Carlson, however, 
usually avoids the term disinterestedness, because he is concerned with how nature 
functions, but still he seeks a clearing of the subject’s selfish interests.  He uses science as 
his method of aesthetic engagement, but wants it to have a sympathetic quality.  Varying 
from Brady and Carlson is Berleant, who prefers to avoid the subject/object dichotomy 
and focuses, instead, on the mutual influence that occurs between and amongst all of 
creation as a complex and dynamic environment that includes the natural world and 
culture.   
 Concerning the topic of sublimity, Brady claims it is a feeling and although 
nature’s magnitude and dynamism can seem to overwhelm us, human reason finds a way 
to deal with it.  However, she does not focus on the dominion of nature by human reason, 
but on the respect due to nature and the “ability, in our freedom, to transcend our 
phenomenal selves,” because we have “resources beyond how it limits us.”168   
 Carlson takes a different track, asserting, that the magnitude and awesomeness of 
nature does not mean that nature is beyond our understanding.169  Science, in fact, allows 
us to know and understand the natural world.  Therefore, because of science, the feeling 
of the sublime regarding nature would seem to be eliminated or at least reduced.170   
 Yet, perhaps the topic of the sublimity of nature is shifting, because of changes to 
the contemporary environment.  That is, when humans alter and denigrate the natural 
                                                 
     167See in this text, chapter one, pages 68-71, regarding Kant’s ideas on disinterestedness and the 
sublime. 
     168Brady, Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, 38-39. 
     169Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment, 80-81. 
     170Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment, 85-95. 
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world leaving incomprehensible and truly threatening ecological circumstances, for 
example, global warming and ocean dead-zones, can imagination or science resolve these 
dilemmas?  Is science alone to carry the burden and responsibility to apprehend the 
situation and its causes, and then the vision to carry us through what is needed for a 
sustainable and just environment? 
 None of these writers are relativist, nor are they doomsayers, but they do attempt 
to be realists.  Each writer challenges humanity to recognize difference, appreciate 
otherness, discern value, engage the natural world responsibly, and to create well.  All 
endorse respect and care for the natural environment, but none, other than McFague, 
engage Christianity as a path to do so.   
 However, what Brady, Carlson, and Berleant do offer is secular appreciation for 
the environment without theological assumptions.  Their efforts give us a chance to be 
influenced outside of the Christian paradigm.  This, in turn, allows us to see what it is that 
Christianity might have to offer that is at the very least different, if not more dimensional 
than what Brady, Carlson, and Berleant propose.  At this juncture, it is important to note 
that although Brady, Carlson, and Berleant avoid giving attention to religious beliefs and 
theism, one must assume that each has been influenced, at least to some degree, by 
Western Christian history and culture. 
 We find an affirmative response to the question regarding whether or not these 
scholars can contribute to a theology of nature/environment.  Christian theology benefits 
from their contributions in several ways.  We find that they further encourage theology 
beyond the dualism of nature and culture; give growing support for the notion of one 
aesthetics of the environment that includes nature and culture, while appreciating 
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distinctions, interconnectedness, and integrity of systems.  They challenge theology to 
actively include multiple frameworks as we try to appreciate, understand, and interpret 
non-human reality, as well as human reality.  They also invite us to engage with nature 
respectfully, in the context of a very complex environment where all dimensions of the 
natural world on earth have been affected by humanity in some fashion. 
 While Brady, Carlson, and Berleant’s contributions challenge or further 
encourage theological aesthetics to stretch in several ways, McFague’s view challenges 
them as well.  We have noted that Brady, Carlson, and Berleant are not very comfortable 
with religious topics.  In comparison, McFague is adept with God language, but like her 
three colleagues, she too is uneasy with dualistic visions of creation.   
 McFague, in fact, does speak of the mystery of the incarnation of God in a way 
that sees Jesus as unique, but not as an anomaly.171  She contemplates ongoing, unfolding 
revelation as experienced in the wonder and depth of creation.  Yet, Jesus’ life reveals to 
us, as well as calls us to cruciform living, which welcomes and supports abundant life for 
all, here and now, in the midst of living, dying, mystery, and hope.   
 McFague joins the above scholars by focusing and engaging an earthly reality, but 
ventures beyond their comfort zone when she uses religious language to assert that the 
glory of a transcendent and immanent God is “every creature fully alive.172  In addition, 
in an effort to broaden our understanding of salvation beyond anthropocentricism and 
transcendent other-worldliness she again joins with Berleant, Brady, and Carlson when 
she avoids defining human experience in absolute terms or making human experience the 
defining criterion by which norms should be discerned and determined.   
                                                 
     171McFague, The Body of God,  136-137. 
     172McFague, Life Abundant, 143. 
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  In comparison to McFague, we find that of the above mentioned scholars either 
one or more encourages a bolder grasp of the world’s dynamic environment as nature and 
culture and, together, they more broadly emphasize and encourage multiple frameworks 
for engaging the environment.  However, it seems that all four scholars recognize the 
increasing impact of science in aesthetic dialogue regarding the environment.  McFague, 
for her part, encourages attributing greater subjecthood to nature, gives added weight to 
all those who suffer, and while still advocating for a strong theology from below, she 
seeds our imaginations with temporal and spatial stories and images that nourish and 
challenge us to live in a world marked by profound wonder.  She encourages us to 
envision an ecological economic model that demands a healthy integration of the natural 
world and culture.  Lastly, according to McFague, the “ethical rest on the aesthetic,” that 
is, in the recognition of otherness, which she names as a moment prior to ethical action.173    
  In chapter four we will suggest a framework for a theological aesthetics of the 
environment that includes nature and culture in light of the contributions of Brady, 
Carlson, Berleant, and McFague. 
 
                                                 
     173McFague, A New Climate for Theology, 113. 
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Chapter Four 
 
A Proposal for a Theological Aesthetics of the Environment 
 
 With appreciation for her effort to change and deepen human perceptions and 
relationships that we have with the mystery we call God, with fellow human beings, and 
with non-human creation, the ecological theology of Sallie McFague was chosen as a 
major focus of this dissertation.  Earlier than many, she realized that theology needed to 
address how humans are degrading the earth.  Over the years her understanding and 
commitment to the earth’s natural environment has only deepened.  As an element of her 
work she employed the use of aesthetics as a way to shift our perceptions and, hopefully, 
our actions.  However, over the years, McFague’s understanding of aesthetics has 
changed as well.   
 Early in her work she investigates the use of metaphor.  In light of her metaphor, 
the world as the body of God, in 1993 she asserts: “If God is physical, then the aesthetic 
and the ethical unite: praising God in and through the beauty of bodies entails caring for 
the most basic needs of all bodies on the planet.”1   
 By 1997, as part of Super, Natural Christians, she overtly addresses the topic of 
aesthetics as a way to experience, know, appreciate, and respect the natural world.  She 
wants to develop the loving eye toward nature, which is to be understood with greater 
subjecthood.  Aesthetics and science are partnered for the task.  However, in 2008 there 
can be seen a shift in McFague’s understanding of aesthetics such that the “ethical rest on 
the aesthetic.”   
                                                 
     1McFague, The Body of God, 132-133. 
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 She claims that finding transcendence in and through creation means giving 
attention to others.  Ultimately, “the ethical rests on the aesthetic, the prior moment of 
realizing that something outside of oneself is real.”  Only at that point are we “capable of 
the kenotic action, the retreat of one’s relentless ego, to allow the glory of God and the 
need of the neighbor to fill oneself.”  The “recognition of otherness” is the aesthetical 
moment, and where the “ethical is the practice of self-denial necessary so that others—
God and neighbor—may be praised and served.”2  
 In essence, McFague plumbed the depths of her metaphor, the world as the body 
of God, and concluded that there is what she calls the aesthetic, that “prior moment” 
when we recognize the tree in God.  Her insight contributes toward a twenty-first century 
vision of the environment that encourages us beyond fragmentation, and where respect 
for particularity and harmony are essential.   
 In summary, we contextualized our analysis by selectively surveying the history 
of aesthetics in the Western tradition, followed by an examination of Sallie McFague’s 
works regarding aesthetics and nature.  Next, we explored the works of three 
contemporary scholars in the field of aesthetics and nature/environment.  In terms of this 
dissertation’s examination and McFague’s recent claim that the ethical rest on the 
aesthetic this study proposes an initial framework for a Theological Aesthetics of the 
Environment.  And, as a conclusion to this chapter, we will suggest questions for further 
study. 
                                                 
     2McFague, A New Climate for Theology, 113.  Also, the term aesthetics appears on pages: 74, 88,112, 
127, and 134.  For other allusions to the topic, see: ecological unity, 75; vision, 89; measure, 130-131; 
picture, 150, 162; and ordered, 151.  
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A.  Context for a Framework 
 Ancient perceptions of creation envisioned one cosmos, but later we realized that 
these accounts did not give due regard to particularity and to differences.  An historical 
survey has shown that aesthetics/beauty and goodness were often conflated, meaning for 
something to be beautiful it had to be morally good.  Eventually the moral and the 
aesthetic were separated, until the aesthetic referred mostly to art.  In due course, both the 
divine and the natural world became less a focus for art/aesthetics.   
 Through history, as knowledge of the natural world developed and social systems 
evolved, aesthetics was released from the confines of church oversight, becoming known 
as the science of the senses or the philosophy of art.  Yet, almost in defiance of these new 
restrictions, over the last century understandings of aesthetics and beauty have stretched, 
as have understandings of art, culture, and the natural world, especially in light of 
ecological awareness and concern.  As a result, we find that approaching creation today 
with two aesthetics, one for nature and one for culture, is much less helpful or attractive.  
For example:  
1) The human enterprise and the natural world are intricately intertwined, even 
blurring at times, even more so because of the scale of the human enterprise.  
2) Aesthetics is a harmonizing activity that operates according to an unlimited 
number of themes arising from the natural world and human interest and 
invention, but with beauty still, often a central theme across divides. 
3) Beauty is not limited to art or to formalism, but includes the everyday, the natural 
world, human constructions, religious themes, non-material, material, and virtual 
realities, as well as the sublime and at times, paradoxically, even those aspects of 
the world that some consider ugly.    
 
 In conjunction with these ideas we recall Brady’s assertion that we should 
experience and appreciate the natural world via multiple frameworks.  Her work stands to 
encourage and challenge contemporary theology to be in dialogue with many disciplines 
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as theology works to discover, as well as re-discover, and interpret the meaning(s) of the 
natural world and questions how humans are to be in relationship with the natural world.  
Her work also challenges theology to come to know the goodness of nature, and not 
simply to assume its goodness, especially at a time when we have less and less firsthand 
experience of the natural world.   
 Carlson’s work insists that theology understand more about the science of the 
natural world if we are to appreciate nature for what it is.  And Berleant challenges 
theology to a deeper perception and articulation of ways in which culture and nature 
mutually influence each other in the context of one web of life.     
 However, for a theological aesthetics of the environment that would encourage 
secular and theological positions to be in dialogue, and challenge us toward a more 
wholesome integration of culture and nature, a rudimentary framework seems necessary.  
In light of McFague’s strong use of metaphor and analogy and her assertion that the 
ethical rest on the aesthetic, this study supports the use of a modified analogical 
framework for a theological aesthetics of the environment.   
B.  A Modified Analogical Framework  
 McFague holds steady to the belief that creation allows us some glimmer of the 
goodness of God, and she works to prod us beyond constricting mindsets about creation 
and God.  In support of her efforts, she is attentive to the strong use of analogy in the 
Catholic tradition.  She balances her use of dialectics, generally identified as a more 
Protestant approach, with analogy and its three pronged process of affirmation, negation, 
and a kind of re-affirmation, which encourages us beyond the limitations of both 
affirmation and negation.  In her use of metaphors she guards against them becoming 
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literal or petrified.  McFague’s method allows her to explore relationships and their 
meanings, in hope of trying to assert new and renewed relationships, ones that are in 
service of life abundant.  She experiments, trying to envision God and the world 
differently, hoping that human actions supportive of a bio-diverse rich environment will 
follow. 
  However, in a complex, dynamic world, when we employ analogy as a way to 
speak of God, the goodness of creation, and an ever evolving ongoing creation, how do 
we account for human contributions when goodness is not a given beyond the goodness 
of being?  That is, human contributions to ongoing creation in the context of the earthly 
environment are not always positive.   
 Creation, as an evolving cosmos, includes planet earth, whose general habitat we 
now refer to as the environment.  However, when analogous method starts with a positive 
assumption does the contemporary mind too readily become complacent?  Do we let slip 
the work that is required for engaging, knowing, and appreciating the earthly landscape 
of culture and nature and of the hybrid manifestation of culture and nature, now all 
referred to as the environment?   
 At a time when it is no longer helpful to view culture and nature so 
dichotomously, does the affirmation, the goodness of creation, become a deduction of 
sorts, not emerging from relationship with the environment?  Might we ask, how could an 
aesthetics of the environment support relationship and appreciation of culture and nature, 
as well as participation in the visioning and labors necessary for their integration as a 
sustainable future environment?  And, in light of a strong and perduring history with 
analogy, would it be possible for the traditional process of Christian analogy to be used in 
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a modified fashion?  That is, would it be possible to start from a place of common ground 
concerning culture and nature where room is made for theological and secular 
investigation and appreciation?   
 In response to this question, we suggest beginning with an acknowledgement of 
the unknown, instead of with an affirmation, even prior to McFague’s aesthetics as 
recognition of otherness.  That is, our framework for a theological aesthetics of the 
environment would begin by acknowledging how little we know about creation, in its 
parts and as a whole at any deep level.  This does not imply that creation is unknowable 
or that we are overwhelmingly ignorant about the natural world.  Second, we move 
toward further encounter with the environment by using multiple methods of exploration 
and engagement.  Third, we would return to an acknowledgement of the unknown, but 
now, in light of our engagement with the environment, hopefully, to a deeper 
understanding, respect, and appreciation of its complexities.  Thus, our question 
becomes: Would such a framework: 
1) make us pause for just a moment before assuming who the other is or is not; 
2) encourage rich questioning concerning the integration of culture and nature, as 
well as more openness to human limitations;  
3) make it reasonable for us to be more cautious about our choices, constructions, 
and inventions having acknowledged the fact that we can never understand, 
appreciate, or plan for all of the consequences of our actions or makings;  
4) promote dialogue with invested parties because we leave more opportunity for 
possibilities not yet imagined;  
5) encourage a kind of humility in the face of ongoing creation and our challenge to 
participate well in its evolution;  
6) encourage us to explore our affirmations and analogies of God, as well as nature, 
in light of a less dichotomous perception and understanding of culture and nature? 
 
 A modified analogical framework would begin from a position that appreciates a 
sense of not knowing, that respects our limitations even concerning appreciation.  This 
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initial step holds that we can never plumb the depths of creation cognitively or through 
our senses.  We cannot reach the ends of human creativity or foresee all of the 
ramifications of our choices, inventions, systems, and actions.  Such an approach begins 
by taking seriously the vastness of creation, the intricacies of nature and of culture, and 
the limits and gifts of being human.   
 This model would start with an openness to wonder and to question, rather than 
with assumption and judgment.  Instead of beginning with what nature is, or what culture 
is, we start with a sense of the complexity and richness of how every aspect of nature and 
culture mutually influence each other temporally and spatially.   
 In stage one there is a humble acknowledging of how much we do not know or 
can ever really experience.  We respectfully question and acknowledge how much is still 
unknown about oceans, bees, trees, and birds, about complex communities of multiple 
species, even the human person and the formation of society.  We respectfully wonder 
about how much we do not know about things of our own making: different cultures, 
different histories, the consequences of our politics and economics, human constructions 
and inventions, and about the simple experiences in our everyday joys and suffering.  
How much goes by us without our ever noticing, much less understanding, and 
appreciating?  In addition, by beginning with an appreciation for the unknown we leave 
opportunity for both secular and religious questions and appreciations.   
 We often attribute the gift of wonder and fresh questioning to children, as well as 
to creative and reflective adults.  Although worded differently and from a point of view 
of doubt, the gift to question has been especially attributed to theologian and ethicist, 
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Margaret Farley.  Francine Cardman in a forward to a book of essays in honor of Farley 
recalls Farley’s phrase of the “grace of self-doubt.”  Cardman writes: 
 The gift and habit of this graced self-doubt is a relational attitude that trusts the 
 inherent power and attractiveness of truth at the same time as it acknowledges the 
 incompleteness of our comprehension.  It is a way of being that respects the 
 integrity of the other, so that it seeks to persuade rather than impose, to invite 
 rather than demand.… [T]he grace of self-doubt creates more space rather than 
 less for truthful living.3 
 
 In stage two of a modified analogy we discover and learn that we are members of 
a complex milieu composed of many kinds of others who participate in their own kinds 
of worlds as part of the earthly environment.  In the second stage of this proposed 
framework we participate in understanding and appreciating the environment.  More so, 
we participate in the shaping and evolving of the environment, but with a vision that 
invites, challenges, and compels us to contribute to a biologically and culturally diverse, 
healthy environment that has a future; that is, theologically, to a kind of eschatological 
hope in action.  More so, with hope (not wishing), and with what theologically we call 
grace, we engage culture and nature and live into affirming and participating in the 
goodness and beauty of creation.   
 In this modified analogical framework, because stage two is where the bulk of 
engagement occurs, it is here that we find a kind of dialogue between what has often 
been considered two opposing forces, culture and nature.  However, we are beginning to 
perceive this tension not so much as a clash, but as a plea and a demand for a wholesome, 
ongoing integration, or harmonization of culture and nature.  More succinctly, we are 
beginning to perceive the ongoing tension between culture and nature as an opportunity 
                                                 
     3Francine Cardman, “Forward,” in A Just & True Love: Feminism at the Frontiers of Theological 
Ethics: Essays in Honor of Margaret A. Farley, eds. Maura A. Ryan and Brian F. Linnane (Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), xii. 
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and as a demand for creative, aesthetic activity that must aim in hope and service of an 
environment that gives rise to a sustainable future.  Within such aesthetic activity we 
recognize the significance of otherness. 
 A theological aesthetics of the environment is a working harmonization of culture 
and nature struggling toward a sustainable future, while respecting particularities and 
communalities.  It is not the rise of human value such that it clashes and struggles to 
conquer the natural world, and not just any integration of culture and nature.  It is an ever 
evolving, ongoing integration and harmonization of culture and nature in ethical, creative 
tension with the challenging theme of sustainability and the deeper ramifications of what 
sustainability implies in the ongoing shaping of the environment.     
 However, in this model, moral and aesthetical distinctions are to be respected; that 
is, as each discipline goes deeper, the pull to converge is to be resisted.  This resistance 
allows for further deepening, instead of collapsing into a too early or too shallow 
resolution.  A too shallow resolution in an aesthetics of the environment would have us 
believe that corn for ethanol is a solution for an energy crisis, without investigating its 
ramifications and weighing many perspectives. 
 Also, while this study acknowledges that cultural and natural realities are 
increasingly more and more intertwined, this study argues that we need to work to name 
distinctions within the environment as best we can, especially as these distinctions 
become more subtle and difficult to name and describe.  Forfeiting these distinctions 
leaves us with a flattening of existence; nature is absorbed by culture, which could look 
like Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the one extreme, or a corporate controlled urbanized 
pseudo-natural landscape on the other.  
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 Instead of viewing nature and culture as opposing forces, at the core of this 
dialogue a Christian theological aesthetics finds Mystery/God with us, inviting us and 
drawing us into the much lived tensions of ongoing creation.  In addition, we are called to 
be for one another in the very midst of these tensions, even to sacrifice for one another, 
human and non-human, in hope of a sustainable and abundant life for all, now and into 
the future.   
 Although the unique dignity of the human species is granted, the unique gifts of 
being human, including creativity, carry increased responsibility.  While we are working 
to recognize greater dignity in non-human creation, the measure of human dignity will 
not be realized until we appreciate the increased measure of human responsibility.  Thus, 
human freedom must engage ethical as well as aesthetic concerns.   
 At stage two, as part of this dialogue, diverse voices are encountered and engaged.  
Along with McFague’s desire for increased subjecthood for non-human creation is Brady, 
who asserts that multiple frameworks are needed for discernment of aesthetic and ethical 
value.  Brady and others struggle with Carlson’s belief that scientific knowledge is 
central to an appreciation of the natural world.  Also at stage two, we find the balancing 
of economic interest and the common good wrestling with the question of how policies 
and practices that shape the environment should be constructed if there is to be a future 
worth living. 
 A theological aesthetics of the environment focuses on how the environment both 
unfolds and is shaped.  However, for Christians, participation in this ongoing process is 
itself informed through an ongoing encounter with the Christian story.  This encounter 
includes engagement with the story of a dynamic cosmos, and continues through life’s 
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evolving creation, world, and environment, rooted in a dynamic love we refer to 
theologically as the Trinity. 
  The lived Christian encounter calls us to a life of discernment, asking questions 
such as: Who or what are we not seeing, not noticing, not including, not appreciating, or 
not tending; what might be operating that we do not yet understand or may never grasp?  
How do we live lives of appreciation, gratitude, and respect of and for creation?  
Simultaneously, how can we be curious and responsibly assertive as creative beings?  
What are we not understanding or not willing to see concerning power structures and 
justice?  In an environment where sin exists, how do we make decisions of aesthetic and 
ethical value regarding the integration of culture and nature?  How do we avoid missing 
the mark, what is the measure, towards who/what/where is our aim? 
 Within a theological aesthetics of the environment the experience of beauty 
cannot be ignored.  As a cross cultural and enduring reality, beauty attracts, nourishes, 
and inspires; it carries and enlivens the human mind and heart, individually and 
collectively.  This model suggests that in order for the environment to give rise to a 
sustainable future we are compelled into a new awareness and experience of beauty.  This 
experience is delivering a new type of aesthetical measure that operates in tandem with 
ethical concerns, both secular and religious.  Does a particular activity contribute to the 
harmonization of culture and nature such that it supports a sustainable future, the 
flourishing of life, for all?   
 Theologically, working for an environment that has a sustainable future means 
that we are drawn into a deeper commitment to reality; further into the profound mystery 
called creation, with hope of a future experienced in immanence, where our responsible 
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participation is now vital.  Anthropologically, humanity is now called to a new threshold, 
a new kind of vision or dialogue between culture and nature?  Ordinarily, new 
responsibilities change us; they can seem to carry with them an invitation or a beckoning, 
if not a demand, for transformation and conversion.  McFague claims that “reality is good 
because God is with us,” but then she clarifies this statement when she writes: “Reality 
can be said to be good only through joining God in trying to make it so.”4  Thus, she 
speaks to the goodness of creation in conjunction with the role of human participation in 
ongoing creation on earth.   
 For Christians, Jesus Christ is, as theologian David Tracy writes, the prime 
analogue, the harmonizing focus that draws us and gives us meaning.5  When we 
recognize the tension between culture and nature, yet envision it as an opportunity and a 
demand to participate well in ongoing creation then this tension becomes a special place 
of meeting where we encounter the creative Spirit of the living God with us.  Within this 
tension and encounter we are called, humbly, to join in the responsibility and privilege of 
living and creating well.  We do not go outside of this tension or use this tension to get to 
God.  Mystery is already there in the creative, evolving space of culture and nature. 
 Because we are seeking a theological aesthetics of the environment, the question 
of ethics must always be at the table.  Against the background of the Christian story, and 
into its story as well, is woven the lived tension of culture and nature, while the beliefs 
and values inherent in religious stories, and multiple stories, also become embodied in the 
environment.   
                                                 
     4McFague, Life Abundant, 178-179. 
     5David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New 
York: Crossroad Publishing, 1981), 408. 
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 How we use our creative capacities, care for humans and non-humans, as well as 
how we shape and tell stories, speaks to the ethos of a theological aesthetics of the 
environment.  Together we are called to create lovingly and to love creatively in a world 
earnestly struggling with how to live, and how to move forward into a sustainable future 
for all.  Herein, the sacramental story of Christianity as dynamic love is exercised and 
broken open.  Ethical responsibility requires an assertive contemplation of otherness.   
 Stage three of a modified analogy represents a growing, compounding wonder 
concerning how much we do not experience, know, or appreciate, now in light of 
questions, experience, and dialogue.  Take for example the fact that scientists have 
discovered approximately 1.8 million species, but they estimate that there are about ten 
times this many yet to be discovered.6  In light of this information, how do we participate 
in shaping the environment so all others can flourish? 
C.  Conclusion 
 In service of a rich theological aesthetics of the environment, before we name 
anything, or describe it as beautiful or good, this framework supports starting with a 
sense of the unknown, of wonder and respect for mystery, and letting experience and 
appreciation unfold from there.  One might argue that a primary analogous symbol shared 
by God, nature, and culture, is mystery.  Further, such an initial approach prepares us for 
an engagement between culture and nature that may leave us more open to surprise, to 
recognition of the other, to ethical practice, and to caution concerning the consequences 
of our actions and omissions.  A third step returns us to a humble sense of an even greater 
                                                 
     6Carl Zimmer, “The Encyclopedia of Life, No Bookshelf Required,” nytimes.com, 26 February 2008, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/26/science/26ency.html?sq=eol&st=nyt&scp=1&pagew... > (20 May 
2008). 
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unknown.  In the spirit of analogous knowing, there is always more that we do not 
perceive, recognize, appreciate, or know, than there is that we do.    
 Although very similar to the traditional model of analogy, by starting with an 
appreciation for the unknown this framework supports McFague’s fear of literalizing and 
idolizing our limited understandings of God, but, also, of each other, nature, and our own 
inventions.  More so, in stage two, by insisting on multiple frameworks to explore and 
engage the tensions between culture and nature we are forced to widen and deepen the 
conversation of aesthetics and ethics, and to broaden membership at the table of dialogue.  
Yet, returning to a position of respect and wonder in stage three keeps us tethered to the 
tradition’s model, which encourages us beyond our initial questions and wonderments, 
and then beyond our limited experiences and judgments. 
 In days gone by, when men and women looked up at mountain tops and saw 
distant glorious but haunting heights, or they looked at oceans and saw wide foreboding 
depths, or at the lunar light and surmised that it was a place of strange, shadowy powers, 
it may have been important for humans to start with affirming the goodness of creation as 
they analogously tried to understand and know God.  But at a time when humans all too 
easily attempt to box mystery into limited ideologies, readily run ransack over the natural 
world, and when the value of human makings is too often deemed highly questionable, 
perhaps it would be important for a theological aesthetics of the environment to start with 
a kind of humility in terms of our perceptions and appreciations of the contemporary 
environment.  Then, through engagement in the environment and with the creative 
tension of hope and vision of a future for all of life, we are challenged to discover, learn, 
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and create well as humble and privileged participants in the goodness and beauty of 
ongoing creation.  
 The creation story in Genesis 1 starts with darkness and the abyss: “In the 
beginning, when God created the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless 
wasteland, and darkness covered the abyss, while a mighty wind swept over the waters” 
(Gen. 1:1 NAB).  Then, however, God brings forth each day and what it holds, and God 
sees it and says that it is good.  And, at the end of the sixth day God sees everything and 
says this is very good.7   
 In this proposed framework for a theological aesthetics of the environment we 
start with the unknown.  Then, while recognizing that each other has its own aesthetic 
quality, the environment is like the sixth day when everything comes together.  But, now 
the environment is realized in an evolving fashion and includes the creative tension of 
culture and nature in which humans are pressed to discern responsible participation in 
ongoing creation, in hope of a sustainable future.   
 A modified analogical framework speaks to the pervasiveness of mystery and of 
our need to explore more deeply the intimate, dynamic tension between culture and the 
natural world as it is the contemporary environment and the environment in which 
today’s people draw their operative analogies of life and of God.  A modified analogical 
process offers some degree of common ground where culture and nature are encountered 
as one environment within a sense of respect for the unknown, and where the ethical aim 
of a future environment is a pervasive challenge to how we imagine, recognize, vision, 
engage, interpret, appreciate, relate, live, and create.    
                                                 
     7McFague, A New Climate for Theology, 134.  She considers Genesis 1:31 to be an “aesthetic 
statement.” 
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 While Carlson argued science is central to an aesthetics of nature, this model 
asserts that respect for the unknown is central to an aesthetics of the environment.  By 
doing so, this aesthetic framework encourages humans to not objectify nature, to not put 
undue faith in human makings, to create well, to appreciate the wonders of both culture 
and nature, and to discern the growing hybrid of nature and culture.  It respects the 
magnitude, complexity, and the continuing task of working to harmonize the creative 
tension of culture and nature in aim of a sustainable and just future.   
 The ancient mythic story in Genesis 1 says that God called the seventh day holy, 
indicating that each facet of creation, somehow, is to be in relationship with the holy, to 
be in harmony with a holy reality.  Challenging for today, the environment as culture and 
nature is about humans living and creating in a way that supports a vision of the planet as 
an earthly environment of rich bio-cultural diversity, at the very least.  
 However, an environment that supports a sustainable future may not be without 
its shortcomings.  In fact, we may be aiming too low.  But considering McFague’s 
abundant life is leagues away, perhaps the first step is to work toward sustainability and 
justice.  Toward this aim, this study suggests that it is important to continue to develop 
the aesthetical idea of a thick sense of beauty, which challenges us to address increasingly 
deeper ethical concerns as we struggle to participate well in ongoing creation.  It would 
encourage a deep sense of sustainability as one emerging new measure of beauty.  
Questions for Further Study 
 The explorations and limits of this study encourage further research in several 
areas.  The following questions are suggestive of some of those areas and topics. 
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1.  Is there room to rethink contemplative attitude, such that it is not about distancing, 
emotional or physical, as part of a theological aesthetics of the environment? 
 
2.  While direct experience with the natural world is encouraged, how do we balance the 
need not to engage nature so that the life of the natural world is respected, thus 
supporting a kind of conscientious distancing born of reverence?  
 
3. Are human makings still valued more greatly than nature’s capacity to create and 
contribute to the environment?  For example: What is the cost of producing clean air, of 
pollinating crops?  What is the dignity and worth of an ecological system?  Is it 
appropriate to speak of the rights of nature and ecological systems, as in the Ecuadorian 
constitution of 2008?   
  
4.  What does it mean theologically to be a creative and responsible participant in 
ongoing creation when the margin for creating environmental mistakes is now basically 
zero?  How is this both similar and different from secular perspectives and other religious 
perspectives? 
  
5.  Would a theological aesthetics of the environment that starts with respect for the 
unknown be supportive of non-violence, and if so, how? 
 
6.  If human beings are beginning to realize a new level of responsibility regarding the 
environment, what implications are there for theological anthropology?  How are humans 
changed in the midst of new responsibilities and commitments?  How, then, do we 
construct our homes and workspaces?  How much space does any one human require? 
 
7.  How does language, secular and theological, continue to marginalize or exclude non-
human creation?  (Example: A perduring view that the earth/nature was given to 
humanity and is now our property.) 
  
8.  How is beauty to be named, experienced, and valued in a world struggling for 
sustainability? 
 
9.  In terms of Christian eschatology, how do we move more deeply into naming and 
living the experience of promise and hope, while experiencing the world as not 
guaranteed?  What is the theological aesthetic appreciation and call of solidarity, 
suffering, ambiguity, and simplicity? 
 
10.  If the ethical rest on the aesthetic, as McFague suggests, then how does this change 
ethical discourse?
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